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1. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, §§ 2-22, 102 Stat. 2467, 2467-86 (1988)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2000)).
2. See The Last Shall Be First, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 29, 30 (“A group that used to be pitied
as impoverished—and still is, overall—is now more likely to be seen as rich and powerful.”).
3. Some prosperous “tribes”—like the racially mixed Mashentucket Pequots, who operate the
Foxwoods casino in Connecticut—have tenuous connections with historic Indian nations.  See JEFF
BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL INDIAN TRIBE AND
FOXWOODS, THE WORLD’S LARGEST CASINO 60-69 (2000); KIM ISAAC EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS:
HOW A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBE CREATED THE WORLD’S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO 148 (2001);
see also Iver Peterson, Would-Be Tribes Entice Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at A1 (“It has
become a ritual . . . [that] a group of people of American Indian heritage, eyeing potential gambling profits,
band together and seek federal recognition as a tribe.”).
4. Tribes far from urban centers, in harsh climates, will not attract many on-site gamblers.  See IAN
FRAZIER, ON THE REZ 84-85 (2000); see also Jim Carlton, Indian Tribe’s Future Seems Set in Cement,
WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at B1 (describing Moapa Tribe’s agreement with major cement company to
construct plant on reservation land in Nevada “in the shadow of gambling-glutted Las Vegas”).  And it is
not clear that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act applies to Internet gambling.  Even if a server is located
within tribal lands, would Internet activity be “gaming on Indian lands,” which is what the statute seeks to
further?  See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2000).
5. But see Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug.
2003, at 49 (arguing that “U.S. tribes have become economic, legal and political forces to be reckoned
with,” with most Fortune 500 corporations doing business in Indian country).
TAXATION AND DOING BUSINESS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
Erik M. Jensen*
I.  THE THREE TAXING SOVEREIGNS, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, 
AND THE PERPLEXED INVESTOR
Economic development on the lands of the American Indian nations has been
spotty at best.  Almost everyone knows the great success stories with Indian gaming,
which has been furthered by federal legislation,1 but those economic benefits have not
been felt uniformly.2  Some tribes have prospered because of this peculiarly favored
form of enterprise;3 others have not and, in many cases, probably cannot.4
Substantial economic development in Indian country will not occur without
significant infusions of outside capital, but investment by non-Indian and non-
governmental sources is risky, or is perceived to be so, which leads to the same
practical result.5  This situation has many causes, none of which is easily remedied, but
one important reason is uncertainty about the powers of federal, state, and tribal
governments to impose their taxes on transactions within, and those doing business in,
Indian country.  If a prudent investor cannot predict the tax liability he will incur on
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6. Taxation is not the only problem for investors, of course.  The law “favors Indian property rights
over ‘innocent’ third parties.”  In re Blue Lake Forest Prods., Inc., 143 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1992), aff’d sub nom. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 30 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that a tribe prevailed under federal law, whether or not a bank’s security interest in a timber
company’s inventory was entitled, under the U.C.C., to priority over the tribe’s claim to proceeds from the
sale of logs to the bank by the United States, acting as trustee for the tribe).  Courts have limited what off-
reservation lenders can do in Indian country to protect their loans.  See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo
Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting vehicle repossession without consent of owner or
tribe); Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980) (forbidding garnishing reservation wages to satisfy
off-reservation debt).  Furthermore, because tribal land is generally not individually owned, tribal
entrepreneurs cannot use it as security.  See Terry Anderson & Dominic Parker, The Wealth of Indian
Nations, NAT’L REV., Jul. 12, 2004, at 57; see also John J. Miller, Off the Rez, NAT’L REV., Dec. 31, 2002,
at 28, 29 (noting that the number of trailers on reservations is attributable to tribal members’ being unable
to get home mortgages).  Anderson and Parker also argue that tribal courts “may not consistently enforce
contracts,” which is another deterrent to investment.  Anderson & Parker, supra, at 29.  See also Margaret
Graham Tebo, Betting on Their Future, A.B.A. J., May 2006, at 32, 34 (noting chain stores’ concerns about
“enforceability of contract provisions between the tribes and the retailers”); see generally PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992); Susan Woodrow & Fred Miller, Lending
in Indian Country: The Story Behind the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Law, BUS. L. TODAY,
Nov./Dec. 2005, at 39.
7. In one limited circumstance, courts have shown sympathy to taxpayers: when legislation is so
clearly directed at a particular class of persons that a contractual right is created, and a person relies on
legislative promises of particular, beneficial tax treatment, the government might be liable for breaching
obligations of good faith and fair dealing if it later tries to take away the tax benefits.  For example, in
Centex v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and First Nationwide Bank v. United States, 431
F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ determinations that the federal
government had breached such obligations in enacting the Guarini amendment, part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13224, 107 Stat. 312, 485-86.  The amendment
negatively changed the tax status of assistance payments provided by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Co. (payments intended to encourage takeovers of failed thrifts).  See also First Heights Bank,
FSB v. United States, 422 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming damages award against the federal
government attributable to the Guarini amendment); cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839
(1996) (considering when sovereigns may not change rules on which persons have relied); infra notes 551-
62 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court has not yet found a retroactive change in national tax laws egregious enough
to violate due process requirements.  Suppose a taxpayer assumed that the law on the books when he
entered a transaction would govern the tax treatment of the transaction, at least for the first year.  If
Congress changed the law retroactively to his detriment—so that the law turned out to be different from
what any reasonable person would have thought at the time—the taxpayer may deserve our sympathy, but
he is probably out of luck legally.  The Court has found no problems with statutes that have retroactive
effects of less than a year.  See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); see also ERIK M. JENSEN,
his investment with reasonable certainty, he is likely to look for investment
opportunities elsewhere.6
No investor should expect absolute certainty in taxation, of course: tax laws
change, and American courts have not been sympathetic to the argument that a
taxpayer has a due-process right to a continuation of existing laws.7  If a taxpayer
invests on the assumption that his income will be taxed at a 35-percent rate for federal
purposes and Congress raises the rate to 50 percent, the taxpayer is out of luck.  He can
argue until he is blue in the face that he relied on the 35-percent figure in making his
investment decisions, and he may find friendly listeners at the country club.  But no
court is going to come to his aid: one cannot reasonably rely on an assumption that
national or state legislation will remain unchanged.8
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THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 183-85 (2005)
[hereinafter JENSEN, TAXING POWER].
9. In this Article, I am not going to discuss original peoples in other countries, but, if you are so
inclined, you can add more layers of complexity to the analysis. See JOHN J. BORROWS & LEONARD I.
ROTMAN, ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES 745-828 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing taxation).
10. Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
251, 251 (1997) (“Taxation in Indian Country . . . blends together the legal complexity that arises when
three sovereigns are involved in a technically confusing area of tax law.”); see also Cotton Petroleum Corp.
v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 188 (1989) (resolving a severance tax dispute involving “three different
governmental entities, each of which has taxing jurisdiction over all of the non-Indian wells”).
A reader of an earlier draft asked whether this situation is any different from New York City, where
taxing powers of multiple governments affect business. I concede similarities. Doing business in the city
is bewildering, and uncertainty deters investment, as is true in Indian country. Furthermore, some
reservations straddle state lines, as does the metropolis—confusing investors in both cases. When it comes
to advising investors, however, nitty-gritty particulars trump abstract similarities. What one might advise
about investing in New York City would not be helpful to a potential investor in upstate New York Indian
country.  Professor Cowan has pointed out to me that information about tribal tax systems is much more
difficult to gather than information about states and their subdivisions, for which major tax publishers
market reference works.  Most important, the peculiarities of American Indian law add issues not found in
the metropolitan context. See infra Parts II & III.
11. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189 (noting “burdensome consequence” from taxation that was
“entirely attributable to the fact that the leases are located in an area where two governmental entities share
jurisdiction”). And rules derived from the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, that
require apportioning state taxes when businesses have contacts with more than one state do not apply in
the Indian context. Tribes are not states for these purposes. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191-93.
12. And they might not be unfair.  Tribal members often disagree among themselves about
development.  Who would have expected otherwise?  See, e.g., The Politics of Indian Coal, ECONOMIST,
July 28, 2007, at 30 (describing disagreement among Navajo Nation members about coal-fired power
plant).  If a tribal government changes, development policy could suddenly change.  See infra Part VI.B;
see also Miller, supra note 6, at 30 (quoting Chamber of Commerce official on Pine Ridge Reservation:
“We have a political revolution every two years.”).  Perhaps this is a concern with other American
governments as well, but the rules of the game are better understood in those contexts.  In this respect,
uncertainties about doing business in Indian country are like those facing would-be investors in developing
countries.  Cf. supra note 10.
The uncertainty about taxation in Indian country goes beyond the usual risks
associated with changes in federal or state law, however.  For one thing, investing in
Indian country adds at least one more layer of potential tax liability to the analysis, the
tribal government.9  It requires no advanced degree in probability theory to recognize
that the more governments there are, the greater the likelihood that a subset of those
governments will act to an investor’s detriment.10  And that is so even if none of the
governments is acting discriminatorily.11
In addition, most potential investors are unfamiliar with tribal governments.  A
typical investor has some sense about tax law changes that the national and state
governments might make in the near future: rates might increase, for example, but they
are not suddenly going up by 50 percentage points.  With the relatively mysterious
tribal governments, however, the non-Indian investor may be clueless about the future.
Who would not worry about investing in a jurisdiction where, as far as the investor
knows, the tax law might be fundamentally changed tomorrow?  Such concerns might
be unfair, but they are real.12
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13. A number of practitioners in firms specializing in American Indian law and in more generalist firms
have become experts on the intersection of business law and American Indian law.  See Galanda, supra note
5, at 49 (“Because Indian law has become so prevalent in corporate lawyering, every business lawyer should
have some working knowledge of it.”).  But this group is a distinct minority of the bar.
14. This Article does not deal, except in passing, with Alaska natives, who are subject to their own
special statutory regime.  See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1972) (codified, as amended, at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629i (2000)).  The lands of the Alaska natives, which
were conveyed to state-chartered and state-regulated private business corporations, are not “Indian country.”
See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); see also infra notes 51-54, 74-76
and accompanying text; cf. Warbelow’s Air Ventures, Inc. v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 579 (2002), aff’d, No. 02-
73328 2003 WL 22417080 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2003) (using definition of “Indian country” in analyzing
whether airport land held by federal government and surrounded by lands of an Alaska native community
was “within an Indian reservation” for purposes of the Indian Employment Tax Credit in I.R.C. § 45A and
holding that “within” means “on” in this context). Nor are Alaskan corporations exempt from federal
income taxation.  See, e.g., Bob Tkacz, Alaska Native Corporation Settles IRS Claim with $85 Million
Payment, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 228-5 (Nov. 28, 2006).
15. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK
379-415 (Clay Smith ed., 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter DESKBOOK]; Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian
Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1994); Jennifer Nutt Carleton, State
Income Taxation of Nonmember Indians in Indian Country, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253 (2002-2003);
Mark J. Cowan, Tax Issues in Indian Country: A Guide for Practitioners, 106 J. TAX’N 296 (2007); Mark
J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the
Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93 (2005)
[hereinafter Cowan, Double Taxation]; Mark J. Cowan, Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination
of Federal Income Tax Policy Towards Indian Tribes, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 345 (2004) [hereinafter Cowan,
Leaving Money]; Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349 (2004); Taylor, supra note 10, at 251; see also Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw
Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute, 97 TAX NOTES 1195 (2002) [hereinafter Jensen, Chickasaw]; Erik
M. Jensen, American Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code: Warbus v. Commissioner, 74 N.D.
L. REV. 691 (1998), reprinted in 83 TAX NOTES 105 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, Warbus].  The present
article had its genesis, in skeletal form, in Erik M. Jensen, Doing Business in Indian Country: Introduction
to American Indian Law Concepts Affecting Taxation, 20 J. TAX’N INVS. 223 (2003).
16. The newly updated chapter on taxation in Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law is very
valuable in that regard. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2005) [hereinafter COHEN].  In addition, The American Indian Law Deskbook also has a useful compilation
of material on taxation.  DESKBOOK, supra note 15, at 379-414.
If all of that is not confusing enough, add to the mix uncertainty about American
Indian law, the body of law concerned with jurisdiction in Indian country.  Anyone
trying to figure out what federal, state, and tribal governments can tax in Indian country
must examine a bewildering body of authority.  Business law practitioners typically do
not read nineteenth-century cases, but advisors on American Indian law matters cannot
escape that responsibility: they should be familiar with decisions of the John Marshall
Supreme Court, for example, as well as dozens of subsequent cases that might affect
jurisdictional issues.  Advisors might have to look as well at acts of Congress and
associated regulations from across the centuries, treaties the United States signed with
tribes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grand jurisprudential issues such as
the nature of inherent tribal sovereignty, principles of federalism, and who knows what
else.  Even well-informed advisors may despair at such complexity,13 and the prudent
investor is likely to throw up his hands and invest in municipal bonds.
This Article serves as a guide through the maze.14  Some significant work has been
done in recent years on taxation in Indian country,15 but it is time for a major
compilation and critique of existing principles and rules.16  This Article is intended to,
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17. The goal of encouraging economic development in Indian country is not totally uncontroversial.
Some oppose economic development of any sort in Indian country, fearing that traditional tribal values
might be compromised.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that on the Lakota Sioux reservation,
many view starting a business as a “white-man thing”).  And those who favor development in general may
of course still oppose particular forms of development. See also infra Part VIII (discussing whether
economic development can have negative effects for tribes).
18. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 14 (1987).
19. But see infra Part VIII (discussing whether economic development in Indian country is an unalloyed
good).
20. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (noting
“particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake” in doing preemption
analysis); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (noting that each case
“requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests” (quoting Ramah
Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982))).
21. Indeed, Justice William Rehnquist complained about the Court’s having to hear so many cases
requiring particularistic analyses.  He wanted to set out controlling principles and let lower courts handle
the details.  See, e.g., Ramah, 458 U.S. at 847 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The general question
presented by this case has occupied the Court many times in the recent past, and seems destined to demand
its attention over and over again until the Court sees fit to articulate, and follow, a consistent and
predictable rule of law.”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 176 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is
essential in order to end the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law.”).
among other things, make the structure of taxation in Indian country as transparent as
possible to potential investors, and to suggest ways the “system” can be improved—all
with the goal of encouraging economic development.  That goal is an important one,
and, at an abstract level at least, it is generally uncontroversial.17  Whatever the merits
of “measured separatism” as the defining characteristic of American Indian law and
policy,18 no one should be indifferent to economic difficulties in Indian country.19
I have written some pieces critical of aspects of American Indian law and policy,
but, for purposes of this Article, I take the system of measured separatism as a given.
I assume that the American Indian nations are not going to disappear voluntarily, that
Congress is not going to disestablish the nations, and that the concept of “Indian
country” will continue to have significance.  If those assumptions are correct, economic
development will, for the foreseeable future, have to occur within the constraints
imposed by American Indian law.
Those looking for absolutely clear answers in American Indian law are
nevertheless likely to be frustrated by this Article; the structure of taxation in Indian
country can be made only so transparent.  Although general principles can be stated,
the analysis of a specific issue (for example, can state X tax the income of non-Indian
contractor A who does business with Indian tribe C?) is likely to be particularistic,
depending on such factors as treaty language (if a treaty is involved); relevant
statutory, executive order, or regulatory language; the specific facts at issue; and the
scope given to interpretational principles intended to resolve disputes such as the
Indian “canons of construction,” discussed below.20  Moreover, most commentators
agree that, because of particularistic analyses and the ebb-and-flow of judicial
sympathy for tribal concerns, Supreme Court decisions do not come close to
establishing a coherent body of law.21  One can sometimes find unifying themes in the
cases, but the process of rationalization can go only so far.  Despite uncertainty at the
(often wide) margins, it is possible to state some generally applicable principles about
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22. E.g., I.R.C. § 168(j) (West 2007), as extended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-432, § 112, 120 Stat. 2922, 2940 (providing accelerated depreciation rules for “qualified Indian
reservation property” placed in service before 2008); see infra notes 322-24 and accompanying text; I.R.C.
§ 45A (West 2007), as extended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act § 111 (providing tax credit to persons
who employ tribal members or spouses for work primarily on a reservation); see also supra note 14.
23. No revenue will be lost anyway if investment occurs only because of a targeted tax break.  The
difficult task for a tribal government is predicting what investments will be attracted only because of
incentives and what investments would have been made in any event.
24. See infra Parts IV.A.1, V.F.  In addition, some specific categories of income are favorably treated
for tribal members.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7873 (West 2007); infra note 318.
25. There is also potential for abuse, as the director of the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of Tribal
Governments has noted.  See Christie Jacobs, Message from the Director, ITG NEWS, Pub. 4267E, at 1
(Apr. 2004) (noting that promoters “are attempting to use tribal sovereignty and some of the special tax
benefits that tribes enjoy . . . to enrich a select group of individuals”); see also Cowan, Leaving Money,
supra note 15, at 367-68 (discussing Indian tax shelters).
the tax liabilities a non-Indian investor might incur by doing business or investing in
Indian country:
1.  The non-Indian investor will generally be subject to otherwise applicable federal
taxes, but there have been special federal benefits for investing in Indian country;22
2.  He will probably (although not automatically) be subject to otherwise applicable
state taxes; and
3.  He will probably be subject to any tribal taxes, unless the tribe specifically
exempts the investor from those taxes, or unless the activities being taxed take place
on non-tribal land within the boundaries of Indian country.
Those generally applicable principles suggest one operational standard for a
potential investor in Indian country: because the investor is likely to be subject to
federal and state taxation anyway (except in special circumstances), he should be
negotiating with tribal officials to lessen any otherwise applicable tribal taxation.  The
investor should be trying to convince tribal officials that the benefits of economic
development outweigh the short-term revenue loss attributable to any tax break the
investor receives.23
In addition to targeted tax relief, tribal officials may have another selling point to
offer investors: because of tax law, there can be significant economic benefits to
investing in Indian country.  The tribes themselves, and their federally chartered
corporations, are exempt from federal and state income taxation,24 and transactions can
be structured to, in effect, transfer the benefits of those exemptions to investors.  In a
fashion that is time-honored in other contexts, an entity that cannot make use of tax
breaks can shift the benefits to someone who can—for a price, of course—which is
why this sort of transaction can make economic sense for a tribe.25
In the following pages, I first discuss “Indian country,” a concept that is critical
to many of the issues discussed in this Article.  In Part III, I discuss some general
doctrines of American Indian law that may affect the powers of various governments—
national, state, and tribal—in and occasionally outside Indian country: the federal
plenary power doctrine; the national government’s role as trustee for the tribes; the
effects of inherent tribal sovereignty; the significance of treaties between the United
States and the tribes; and the Indian canons of construction.  In Part IV, I turn to
federal taxing power—the extent to which the national government can tax tribes, tribal
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26. A state is still likely to be able to tax nonmembers investing there.  See infra Part V.G.
27. For example, a state may be able to tax transactions that take place on nontribal land located within
the boundaries of Indian country, see infra Part V.H, and may even be able to tax tribal land, at least in
some special circumstances.  See infra Parts II.C, V.I.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).  This definition of “Indian country” is not coextensive with the definition
of “Indian lands” under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 4, 102 Stat. 2467, 2468
(1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (2000)).  That latter definition has only two components—
reservations and other land held in trust—with no reference to dependent Indian communities.  See id.  For
most practical purposes, however, this difference will not matter.
29. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
30. Id. at 527; see also DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (noting that
§ 1151 “generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction”).  But see Atkinson Trading Co. v.
corporations, tribal members, and non-Indian investors in Indian country.  In Part V,
I consider the doctrines potentially limiting state taxation of persons and transactions
in Indian country, none of which, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to
the contrary, is likely to preclude a state from taxing nonmembers of a tribe.  In Part
VI, I discuss tribal taxing powers, attributable to tribes’ status as sovereigns, which
should generally include the power to tax those doing business in Indian country.  Part
VII raises issues likely to be important in future discussions about taxation in Indian
country.  Finally, Part VIII considers briefly whether economic development in Indian
country is really a good thing.
II.  INDIAN COUNTRY
The rules governing many matters, not just taxation, can be very different de-
pending on whether the relevant events or transactions take place in “Indian country.”
State power to tax is likely to be weaker in Indian country than elsewhere within the
boundaries of a state,26 and tribal power to tax will clearly be stronger inside Indian
country than outside.  The boundaries of Indian country will not dictate the results of
all disputes about taxing jurisdiction—no one set of principles can do that27 —but
determining whether land is Indian country is an important analytical starting point.
At a minimum, the term “Indian country” refers to the reservations of federally
recognized tribes, and, following popular discourse, I will occasionally use the terms
“Indian country” and “reservation” interchangeably in this Article.  But the two
concepts are not identical, and Indian country includes more than reservations.
Congress has defined “Indian country” as encompassing:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including
rights-of-way running through the reservation; (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.28
This definition is found in section 1151 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, and therefore, as
the Supreme Court has noted, “by its terms [it] relates only to federal criminal
jurisdiction.”29  But the Court has often emphasized, most recently in 1998, that the
definition “generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction” as well,30 thus
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Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 n.5 (2001) (“Section 1151 simply does not address an Indian tribe’s inherent
or retained sovereignty over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.”); infra notes 532-42 and accompanying
text.
31. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978) (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442,
449 (1914)); see also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938); infra text accompanying note
52.
32. “[C]ivil courts rely on [§ 1151] in part.  There is no generic definition for Indian Country applicable
to all tribes.”  Internal Revenue Service Office of Indian Tribal Governments, FAQs Regarding Termino-
logy, http://www.irs.gov/govt/tribes/article/0,,id=108431,00.html [hereinafter FAQs Terminology] (last
visited Sept. 7, 2007).
33. Nor is it to say that tribes may automatically tax nonmembers doing business in Indian country.
See infra Part VI.B.
34. See infra Part V.G.
35. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
36. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
37. Both Yakima Nation and Sherrill are discussed below.  See infra Parts II.C, V.I.
38. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)
(holding that land held in trust for the benefit of the Potawatomis was Indian country).
39. The original idea was that reservations would eventually disappear. See CHARLES E. MIX, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-1 (Nov. 6, 1858), reprinted in
Documents of United States Indian Policy 92, 93 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000) (describing “policy
of concentrating the Indians on small reservations of land, and of sustaining them there for a limited period,
until they can be induced to make the necessary exertions to support themselves”).  As originally
contemplated, however, reservations—while they did exist—would encompass only tribal land.
potentially affecting jurisdiction to tax.  According to the Court, the common principle
in the three statutory categories is that land has been “validly set apart for the use of
the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.”31
To say that a definition “generally” applies is not to say that it applies in all
circumstances,32 and it is certainly not to say that state taxing power is automatically
forbidden in Indian country.33  State power over non-Indians remains strong,34 and the
state may even be able to tax tribes and tribal members in some special circumstances.
That latter point was painfully illustrated in several recent cases, including County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,35 decided in
1992, and City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,36 decided in 2005.37
Despite these and other cases, however, the definition of Indian country remains
important in considering limitations on state taxing power, and for many courts—
particularly those unfamiliar with the intricacies of American Indian law—it may
continue to be controlling.  When a definition presents itself that might make it
possible to avoid lengthy, distasteful analysis, a desperate judicial decision-maker is
likely to run with it.
A.  Reservation Land
Although “Indian country” includes more than reservations,38 the quintessential
example continues to be the reservation.  If reservations had remained in their
originally contemplated forms—sizeable blocks of land set aside solely for tribal
purposes39—the jurisdictional issues arising on reservation lands would have been
relatively simple.  But the pristine concept of a reservation was short-lived, as many
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40. Most important was the General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), but there
were other allotment acts as well.  In addition, some treaties provided for something like allotment.  See,
e.g., Treaty with the Chippewa, arts. 3 & 11, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109, discussed in Keweenaw Bay
Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514, 516-21 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 680 (2006).  The
basic allotment rules were codified for many years at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2000), but, after enactment
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
479 (2000)), and the end of allotment, many provisions had become of purely historical interest.  Sections
331-333 were finally repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1991, 2007.  On allotment generally, see STUART BANNER, HOW THE
INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 257-90 (2005).
41. The statutes nevertheless typically permitted issuance of a patent in fee simple at an earlier time
if an allottee was found to be “competent.”  That politically incorrect language can still be found in the U.S.
Code.  See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000).
42. One result was that the land was often leased to others.  See John Collier, Memorandum, The
Purposes and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill, Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the
Senate and House Committees on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934), reprinted in DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 171, 172-73 (5th ed. 2005).
43. Cf. id. at 17-18, reprinted in GETCHES ET AL., supra note 42, at 173.
44. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427-28 (1975) (holding that the Lake
Traverse Reservation had been terminated by act of Congress).
45. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998) (holding that the
Yankton Sioux reservation had been diminished with the result that landfill on non-Indian fee land was
subject to federal environmental regulations); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1994) (holding that
reservations wound up with significant blocks of non-Indian land within their
boundaries.
The “checkerboard” pattern—nontribal land interspersed with tribal land—is a
quite common phenomenon, generally the result of allotment acts in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.40  The purported purpose of allotment was to break up
the communally owned tribal land mass and to transfer the land to individual Indians,
thus making tribal members owners of private property and therefore potential yeoman
farmers.  The breakup in fact occurred, but often without the officially desired result.
Many lands characterized as “surplus” were directly transferred to non-Indians, and
lands that were initially allotted to tribal members also often wound up in the hands of
others.
All allotted land was held by the federal government in trust for a specified
period—generally twenty-five years with the possibility of extensions—during which
time alienation was not permitted.41  At the end of the trust period, assuming it had not
been extended, title passed to the allottees, individual tribal members.  When that
happened, pressures to sell were overwhelming.  To begin with, the individual blocks
of allotted land, generally eighty acres, were often too small to stand alone, particularly
in arid parts of the country.  Even when a parcel was economically viable, that viability
was likely to be short-lived: upon the death of an owner, partition among heirs
occurred, and eighty-acre parcels were chopped into smaller and smaller slices.42  Most
important, regardless of the economic potential of any particular parcel, the lure of
cash-in-hand was difficult for an impoverished American Indian to resist.43
In the worst cases, where little or no land remained in Indian hands after allotment
had run its course, reservations were altogether disestablished.44  In other cases,
reservations continued in “diminished” form: the boundaries of the reservations, and
therefore of Indian country, contracted to reflect loss of tribal land.45  But even when
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Uintah Indian Reservation had been diminished with the result that crime was committed outside “Indian
country” and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the state).
46. That was not always the case.  Some reservations lost no land.  See FAQs Terminology, supra note
32  (“Some 140 reservations have entirely tribally owned land.”).  Other reservations, like that of the
Mescalero Apaches, lost very little.  See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 326 (1983)
(noting that the Tribe controlled all but approximately 194 of 460,000 reservation acres).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
48. As a matter of statute, allotted lands cannot be alienated, unless Congress once again changes the
rules.  See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 462
(2000)) (“The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation
thereof are extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.”).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
50. Id.
51. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
52. Id. at 527-28 (citing United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938); United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)).
53. The clearest example of a “dependent Indian community” comes from United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913), in which the issue was whether the New Mexico Pueblos were covered by a statute
making it illegal to introduce intoxicating liquors into “Indian country.”  Id. at 38.  One argument made by
Sandoval, the introducer of intoxicants, was that Pueblo lands could not be “Indian country” because they
were held in fee simple (albeit communally).  Id. at 48.  The Supreme Court concluded that fee-simple
status made no difference; the purposes of the statute would not have been served by excepting Pueblo
lands.  Id.  Part (b) of section 1151 was intended to pick up this unusual, but not unheard of, situation.  See
also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) (concluding that land of the Reno Indian Colony,
although not a reservation, was Indian country).
disestablishment or diminishment did not occur, some reservation land generally
passed into non-Indian hands, creating the checkerboard reservations.46  In that
situation, all of the land within reservation boundaries, including nontribal land,
continues to fit the definition of “Indian country” under section 1151.47
B.  Other Categories of “Indian Country”
Despite the pressures created by allotment, not all allotted land was transferred out
of American Indian control.48  The statutory definition of “Indian country” includes
allotted lands “the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.”49  Thus, whether
or not such land is within reservation boundaries, if it continues to be held in trust by
the United States for Indian allottees, it remains Indian country.
Although limited in practical import, the most conceptually difficult part of the
definition of Indian country is the reference to “all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States.”50  In 1998, in Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government,51 the Supreme Court said that this language
refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments,
and that satisfy two requirements—first, they must have been set aside by the Federal
Government for the use of Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal
superintendence. . . . [I]n enacting § 1151, Congress codified these two requirements,
which previously we had held necessary for a finding of “Indian country” generally.52
In those two respects, the land is no different from the other two categories of Indian
country.53
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54. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978) (quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 499).  Land held
by corporations formed by Alaska Natives after enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is
not Indian country because it fails both parts of the test: it is neither under the superintendence of the federal
government nor “set apart for the use of the Indians as such.” Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 532.  The
land can be conveyed to non-Indians, and the corporations “are not restricted to using [the] lands for Indian
purposes.”  Id. at 533.
55. A state’s power to tax within Indian country is much stronger on land held in fee by non-Indians
than it is on tribal land.  See supra Part V.H.  Similarly, tribal power to tax on such fee land is less than
would otherwise be the case within reservation boundaries.  See infra Part VI.A.
56. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
57. See id. at 270.  However, the Court struck down a tax on sales of such land.  See id. at 268-69.
58. Indeed, the result for land was the opposite of that for a state tax on personal property held by an
Indian within Indian country.  See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 479
(1976); see also infra notes 395-97 and accompanying text.
59. The analysis proceeded as follows.  Section 5 of the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 had
set out the framework, providing that at the end of the trust period a patent in fee would be issued to an
eligible tribal member “discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever.” 25
U.S.C. § 348 (2000).  The Burke Act in 1906 amended section 6 of the Dawes Act to provide generally that
an allottee would, at the end of the trust period, “be subject to the laws . . . of the State or Territory in which
they [sic] may reside,” and provided further that the Interior Secretary could issue a patent in fee at an
earlier time to a competent Indian “and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said
land shall be removed.”  Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000))
(emphasis added).  The Yakima Nation Court found an express grant of taxing power in this language, 502
U.S. at 261-65, although doing so was arguably inconsistent with what the Court had said about the Burke
Act in Moe, 425 U.S. at 479.  As a result, “[w]hether tribally owned and Indian-owned fee land inside a
reservation is subject to state taxation may well depend upon whether the land was allotted pursuant to the
Finally, land held in trust for American Indians that is not part of a reservation and
that is not associated with allotment or with a “dependent Indian community” does not
fit the statutory definition of “Indian country,” but general usage extends the term to
that land as well.  As noted above, the critical consideration is whether the land was
“validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the
Government.”54 
C.  State Power to Tax Within “Indian Country” 
The characterization of a reservation (or any other Indian land) as Indian country
is an important analytical starting point and, at a minimum, it calls exertions of state
power into question.  But, as will be discussed in detail in Part V, it does not
necessarily defeat a state’s power to tax nonmembers doing business within Indian
country, nor does it automatically prevent a state from being able to tax nontribal land,
or transactions that take place on such land, within Indian country.55
For that matter, it might not even preclude the state from taxing tribal land, at least
in special circumstances.  For example, in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,56 the Supreme Court in 1992 held that a state
could impose an ad valorem tax on land within Indian country held in fee either by a
tribe or by tribal members.57  The result seemed to be a striking repudiation of the
importance of “Indian country.”  After all, what could be more important to a tribe than
its land?58  However, the outcome of the case depended on a determination that
Congress had authorized state taxation in those particular circumstances.  The analysis
was not done in a tribal-friendly way, but at least there was a tie to statutory language.59
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[Dawes] Act [in which case the above analysis applies] or another scheme.”  ROBERT L. PIRTLE ET AL.,
TAXATION AND INDIAN AFFAIRS: A COMPLETE SURVEY OF INDIAN TAX LAW 57 (1999). 
60. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
61. Id. at 113 (quoting Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 263).  The Court held that a state could tax former
trust land that had been reacquired by a tribe, but that had not been reaccorded trust status.  The Court
discounted the significance of the Burke Act proviso discussed in Yakima Nation.  Id. at 114; see infra Part
V.I.
Circuit courts have considered whether Congress could have manifested an intent to make tribal
land alienable (and therefore taxable) through a treaty, rather than by statute—an issue the Supreme Court
has not ruled on.  In Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 680 (2006), the Sixth Circuit concluded that particular treaty language, when read using the
canons of construction, was insufficiently clear about the possibility of involuntary alienation to permit state
taxation of land allotted pursuant to the treaty.  Id. at 522-27.  In fact, the court questioned whether a treaty
could ever constitute sufficiently good evidence of congressional intent.  See id. at 530 (“A treaty is not a
federal statute or an act of Congress.  In our view, Congress makes its intent to allow state taxation of
reservation lands unmistakably clear when it passes a statute to that effect.”).  And the Sixth Circuit
explicitly rejected what it saw as the Ninth Circuit’s position, reflected in a pre-Cass County case, Lummi
Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that land allotted under the Treaty
of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927, was alienable and thus could be subject to state taxation), by
holding that “alienability equals taxability, regardless of the source of that alienability.” Keweenaw Bay,
432 F.3d at 531.
62. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
63. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 152-65 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d,
544 U.S. 197 (2005).
64. But see Cass County, 524 U.S. at 114 (holding that once Congress has acted clearly to make former
tribal land subject to state taxation, reacquisition of the land by a tribe will not render the land exempt from
taxation unless Congress makes any new exemption “unmistakably clear”).
65. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Six years later, however, in Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians,60 the Court downplayed the need for express statutory authority for taxation.
After Cass County, it was apparently enough for state taxation that Congress had made
tribal land alienable, even if Congress had been silent about taxation: “[W]hen
Congress makes reservation lands freely alienable, it is ‘unmistakably clear’ that
Congress intends that land to be taxable by state and local governments, unless a
contrary intent is ‘clearly manifested.’”61
The most recent development in state taxation of tribal land is City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York,62 which reached the Supreme Court in 2005.  In
Sherrill, the Second Circuit had concluded that, absent congressional authorization,
state taxes could not be imposed on land within reservation boundaries that had been
sold to non-Indians in the nineteenth century but that was reacquired by the Oneida
Nation, in market transactions, in the 1990s.63  For the Second Circuit, the statutory
definition of “Indian country,” coupled with the lack of congressional action explicitly
permitting state taxation, was dispositive.  Congress could have permitted the state to
tax the land of the Oneida Nation, but it had not done so explicitly.64
As far as dissenting Justice John Paul Stevens was concerned, the Second Circuit
had gotten it right.65  But the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a more
particularized inquiry was required and that
[g]iven the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its
inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its
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66. Id. at 202-03 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id.  A related example not involving taxation is Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), where a badly divided Court held that state zoning laws could
apply to nontribal land within the part of a reservation that had lost its Indian character.
69. See infra notes 507-11 and accompanying text.  Of course, a court may have to come to a bizarre
result if that is what Congress intended.  But the Yakima Nation Court read the allotment statutes in a
decidedly pro-state way in ruling on land taxation.   See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1992).  Additionally, because those statutes were silent
about other matters, the Court found it impossible to read them as permitting state taxation of personal
property or of sales of tribal land.  Id. at 268-69.  The Cass County Court went even further, effectively not
requiring specific statutory support for its conclusion about the taxation of tribal land held in fee.  See 524
U.S. at 110-11.
70. Yakima Nation, as extended by Cass County, is harder to interpret in a positive way for tribes.  But
it is important to emphasize that the decisions are limited to tribal land that can be alienated.  The cases
provide no authority for a state’s applying an ad valorem tax to tribal land held in trust.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
72. For nontribal land in Indian country, state power to tax is likely to be undiminished.  See infra Part
V.H.
73. The authors of the new Cohen Handbook also note that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York was
not organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 “and thus could not claim the protection of
counties and towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief against
parties other than the United States, . . . the tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient
sovereignty . . . over the parcels at issue.66 
The land had long ago lost its Indian character, and the federal government had not
taken steps to re-accord trust status to the land.
The analysis used in Sherrill was like that applied in some diminishment cases and,
in fact, the Court referred to “the different, but related, context of the diminishment of an
Indian reservation.”67  Thus, after Sherrill, tribal land within the boundaries of an
undiminished reservation may, despite the definition of “Indian country,” be subject to
state taxation if the character of the land has become decidedly non-Indian, and
“justifiable expectations” of non-members of the tribe have developed.68  In Sherrill, no
diminishment had taken place—the land was still technically Indian country—but the
state could tax the land just as if it were outside the boundaries of a diminished
reservation or just as if it were owned by nonmembers within the reservation.
A determination that land is Indian country is thus not enough by itself to foreclose
state taxation, even if the land is tribal land.  The decision in Yakima Nation, as extended
in Cass County, is particularly troubling: if it is alienable, tribal land has less protection
from state taxation than does personal property of tribal members, a bizarre result.69
The significance of Sherrill, at least, should not be overstated.  This may seem like
spin control, but it is possible to interpret Sherrill in a tribal-friendly way.70  For one
thing, Sherrill presented an unusual set of facts: land reacquired by a tribe in market
transactions.  Moreover, in all of these cases, it was because the tribal land was Indian
country that there was an issue for the Supreme Court to resolve.  In Sherrill in
particular, the statutory definition of “Indian country”71 made what might otherwise
have been a slam dunk into a difficult case.  It was thus not that the status of the tribal
land as Indian country was irrelevant to the Court;72 it was that strong, countervailing
considerations—of a sort not often to be duplicated—were present.73 
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section 16 of that statute,” which generally forbids encumbering tribal assets without the consent of the
affected tribe.  COHEN, supra note 16, at 694 n.197.
74. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
75. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629i (2000)).
76. Tribal power may also be limited on nontribal land within Indian country.  See infra Part VI.B.2.
77. See infra Part VI.A; supra note 30 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co.).
78. See infra Part III.C (discussing tribal sovereignty).
D.  How Does “Indian Country” Affect Tribal Power to Tax?
State power may be lessened within Indian country, but tribal power— obviously
—is strongest there.  In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,74
decided in 1998, the question was the power of an ethnically Indian, Alaskan tribal
government to impose a tax on a private contractor that constructed a school on
Venetie land—land that was, as a result of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,75
actually held by a state-chartered corporation.  The answer to that question was totally
dependent on the character of the land.  For reasons already discussed, the land was
held not to be Indian country and, as a result, the tribal government could not tax the
non-Indian contractor.  Whatever their historical powers, unless Congress provides
otherwise, tribes may not tax non-Indians on transactions that occur outside Indian
country.76
I would characterize the post-Yakima Nation, post-Cass County, post-Sherrill
significance of the definition of “Indian country” as follows: if land is Indian country,
state power to tax may be reduced.  In contrast, if land is not Indian country at all, the
state taxing power is likely to be as strong as on other land within the state’s
boundaries.  And nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Yakima Nation, Cass
County, and Sherrill (or, for that matter, Native Village of Venetie) calls into question
tribal power to tax persons residing, and transactions taking place, on the tribal land
at issue in those cases.  Absent congressional action, a tribe would nonetheless have
no power to tax non-Indians outside Indian country and, as we shall see, tribal taxing
power might be reduced or eliminated on land held by nonmembers within Indian
country.77 
III.  AN INDIAN LAW PRIMER: DOCTRINES AFFECTING 
TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
In this part of the Article, I discuss some doctrines peculiar to American Indian
law that can affect taxing issues in Indian country: the federal plenary power doctrine;
the obligation of the federal government to act as trustee for the benefit of the Indian
tribes; the notion of inherent tribal sovereignty; the continuing vitality of treaties
between the United States and various tribes; and the Indian canons of construction.
These doctrines make the issues discussed in this Article distinctive; this is not just
another boring tax article.
A.  Federal Plenary Power Doctrine
Whatever the inherent, traditional powers of tribes within their own country,78 it
is now generally accepted that the federal government has plenary power over the
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79. Indeed, that is why even dissenting Justice Stevens in Sherrill assumed that Congress could have
explicitly permitted New York to tax land within the Oneida reservation.  See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.  Congress had not done so, however.
80. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (quoting, inter alia, Washington v. Confederated
Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979)).
81. Due process is more of a theoretical than a real limitation.  The Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, might constrain Congress’s power over Indian tribes, but the threshold for a court to invoke the
Clause is presumably very high. It is hard to imagine real-world circumstances (as distinguished from law
school hypotheticals) in which due process might be a serious limitation on plenary power.
82. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
84. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
85. If there is doubt, the prerogatives should survive.  See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
738 (1986) (“We have required that Congress’s intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and
plain.”); Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412 (holding that treaty rights survived termination of federal
supervision absent clear evidence to the contrary).
86. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 436 (2005) (finding “no evident basis for [the doctrine] in constitutional text”); see also id. at
443 n.58.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
90. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
tribes.79  As the Supreme Court said in 2004, “[T]he Constitution grants Congress
broad general power to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that [the Court has]
consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”80  As a result, if it wished to do so,
Congress could eliminate many of the jurisdictional issues affecting taxation that can
arise in Indian country.
1.  Breadth of Power 
Subject to limitations like due process,81 the grant of power to Congress is very
broad indeed.  It includes the powers “to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters,
including their form of government”;82 to abrogate treaties with the tribes;83 and even
to terminate the federally recognized status of tribes84—as long as the congressional
actions are unambiguous.  A court should not lightly infer that Congress intended to
curtail tribal prerogatives,85 but, if the legislative intentions are clear, the action is
likely to be definitive, no matter how adverse it is to tribal interests.
The idea of federal plenary power is not new.  It comes from the Constitution, or
so it is assumed, even though no constitutional language speaks to the issue directly.86
The authority derives from Congress’s power under the Constitution to regulate
“[C]ommerce . . . with the Indian tribes,”87 coupled with the Treaty Clause88 (under the
authority of which the United States treated with many tribes until 1871), and the
Supremacy Clause.89
Moreover, the idea, including the purported tie to the Constitution, can be found
in the foundation of American Indian law, the Marshall trilogy of Supreme Court cases
decided in the early nineteenth century.  In 1832, in Worcester v. Georgia,90 Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote that Georgia’s actions in exercising criminal jurisdiction
over a non-Indian for entering Cherokee land were “repugnant to the constitution, laws,
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91. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984).  Most surprising, it seems not to be accepted by Justice Clarence Thomas,
who can find no provision in the Constitution “that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal
sovereignty.”  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (concurring in judgment); see also id. at 215
(rejecting idea that Commerce Clause or Treaty Clause provides such authority).
93. The founders intended to create a government that would speak with a unified voice in Indian
affairs.  The Articles of Confederation had provided to Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power
of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States,
provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”  ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX.   However, James Madison understood the Commerce Clause as clarifying the
primacy of the national government over Indian lands and eliminating what he termed “limitations in the
Articles of Confederation.”   THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison explained:
What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State is not yet settled, and has
been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils.  And how the
trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative
jurisdiction can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the
internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.  This is not the only case in
which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish
impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty
in the States . . . .
Id. at 269.
94. Professor Frickey has noted that Justice Thomas seems to be questioning federal plenary power on
formalist grounds: nothing in the Constitution clearly supports the doctrine.  See Frickey, supra note 86,
at 471-72; see also Lara, 541 U.S. 193; infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.  But Thomas seems
to have attracted no other justices to his position, at least not in a way that would lead the Court to
reexamine the premises of American Indian law.
and treaties of the United States.  They interfere forcibly with the relations established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according
to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the govern-
ment of the union.”91  The Worcester language does not speak to every issue regarding
the power of various governments, but it is nonetheless far-reaching in its scope.
The notion that Congress has plenary power in dealing with American Indian
nations is not universally accepted, certainly not by the tribes.92  Tribal proponents
reject the doctrine for many reasons, but the core argument is this: the plenary power
doctrine does not recognize the tribes as having an existence independent of the United
States.  Although the constitutional structure requires that the national government
have supremacy over state governments in Indian affairs—on that point, the real issue
in Worcester, there can be little doubt93—nothing in the Constitution unequivocally
gives the national government absolute power over Indian tribes.  The power to
regulate commerce ordinarily does not connote the power to control the existence of
those engaged in commerce, and the treaty power makes no sense unless nations exist
with which the United States can treat.  The Constitution did not create the tribes; it
presupposed their existence.
The plenary power doctrine may be theoretically problematic, but challenging it
in the real world is hopeless: except in extraordinary circumstances, what Congress
says goes.94  One friend of American Indian tribes, Professor Robert Laurence, has
accordingly “learned to live” with the doctrine, and he suggests that we should all do
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95. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988).
96. Professor Laurence also appropriately notes that “plenary” need not mean “absolute”; it should
mean “without subject matter limitation,” but that proposition often gets lost in interpretational battles.  See
id. at 418-20; see also Del. Tribal Bus. Comm’n v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (noting that plenary
power of Congress over Indian affairs is not absolute); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S.
40, 54 (1946) (same).
97. It is not my purpose here to question whether particular policies are in fact in the best interests of
American Indian tribes.  My point is only that it is within the power of Congress to take positions that are
generally consistent with the tribes’ perceptions of what is best for American Indian nations.
98. Following a long and tangled history, Congress responded to a Supreme Court decision by acting
to extend tribal criminal power over Indians who are not members of the host tribe.  Congress had never
explicitly divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians or non-members.  But in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Court concluded that a tribe could not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over two non-Indian residents of a reservation; such exercise was “inconsistent with [the tribe’s]
status.”  Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).  The Oliphant
decision was unclear, however, about whether the important distinction was between members and non-
members or between Indians and non-Indians.  That issue was addressed in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990), where the Court concluded that a tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction only over tribal
members.  Id. at 688.  Responding to arguments that this result exacerbated an already critical “jurisdic-
tional void” (if a tribe could not enforce the law in Indian country, who would?), Congress legislatively
fixed Duro, effectively providing that a tribe can enforce its criminal laws against American Indians who
are not members of the tribe.  See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1856,
1892 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000)).
99. See infra Parts V.E-G.
the same.95  We must accept reality, and work with the doctrine as best we can to
improve the situation of American Indians.96
Besides, a judicial doctrine that gives primacy to Congress is not so bad if
Congress acts in the best interests of the American Indian nations.  The doctrine will
still irritate the tribes, of course; good results can only partially compensate for a
doctrine that assumes congressional control of Indian nations.  But good results are
better than bad results. Indeed, in an era when the Supreme Court is considered less
friendly to tribal interests than has been true for decades, tribal proponents have every
reason to look to Congress rather than the Court for doctrinal aid.97
For example, Congress can act to enhance the power of tribal governments vis-à-
vis nonmembers of the tribe, in taxation and other areas, and it has occasionally done
so.98  In addition, congressional actions can preempt state power within Indian country,
thereby making tribal power relatively more important—if Congress is clear that it
intends to do so or if Congress creates a regulatory scheme so pervasive that little or
no room remains for state action.99
As a result of the plenary power doctrine, doing business in Indian country can
take almost any form Congress thinks it should take.  Congress could exempt on-
reservation transactions, and the parties participating in those transactions, from federal
taxation; it could provide that states have no power to tax any person doing business
in Indian country or any transaction occurring there; it could take away the tribes’
otherwise sovereign power to impose taxes; it could impose whatever regulatory
restrictions on doing business that it thinks appropriate; and so on.
Congress thus could make Indian country more attractive as a place for investment
simply by clarifying the respective governments’ taxing powers.  To be sure, interpre-
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100. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (2000)); see PIRTLE ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 17.
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (2000)).
102. Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2000)).
103. Id. § 7.
104. As a result, the provisions of the 1924 and 1927 Acts sit in the U.S. Code next to the provisions
of the 1938 Act, all, as far as bewildered codifiers know, the “law.”  See supra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text.
105. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
106. Id. at 764-68.
107. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
108. For more on preemption, see infra Part V.
tive difficulties would inevitably remain—simplification can go only so far with a
complex body of law—but if Congress were willing to buck political pressures, it
could do a much better job than it has to this point.
2.  Mineral Leasing: A Case Study of Federal Plenary Power
Taxation of mineral leasing in Indian country provides an example of the uncer-
tainties that can arise when Congress does not clarify the various governments’ taxing
powers.  In 1924, Congress authorized leases for oil and gas production on most
reservations that had been established by treaties (with a few exceptions), and
specifically provided that states could levy taxes on the oil and gas production.100  The
merits of permitting state taxation were debatable, but Congress obviously understood
itself as having the power to permit states to tax within Indian country.  In 1927,
Congress extended those rules to reservations created by executive order.101
Eleven years later, however, Congress muddied the interpretive waters.  In the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,102 it enacted comprehensive rules governing leasing of
tribal lands for mining, and it repealed all laws inconsistent with the 1938 Act.103  In
the abstract, those steps sound perfectly reasonable, and maybe even desirable, but
Congress did not specify which already existing acts were inconsistent with the 1938
Act.104  Was state taxation permitted or was it not?
Because of congressional silence, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
confuse things further, which is exactly what it did.  The Court started the process in
a clear enough way.  In 1985 the Court held, in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,105 that,
because the 1938 Act did not explicitly permit state taxation or incorporate the taxing
authority that had been granted in 1924, the Court was not going to infer congressional
intention to permit state taxation.106  The Court was following the general principle that
tribal prerogatives should be curtailed only if Congress is explicit, and permitting state
taxation obviously affects tribes adversely.
Then, in 1989, the Court decided Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.107  Both
the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the state of New Mexico taxed Cotton Petroleum, a non-
Indian enterprise, on the extraction of oil and gas on the Jicarilla reservation.  Cotton
Petroleum challenged the state tax on several grounds, one of which was that state
taxation was preempted108 and another of which was that, under Blackfeet, congres-
sional silence about state taxation in the 1938 Act should have been interpreted to
protect tribal interests.  That, argued Cotton Petroleum, meant that state taxation,
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109. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177.
110. See infra Part III.E.
111. The Cotton Petroleum Court also required no demonstration of a strong connection between state
taxation and state services associated with the activity being taxed, although it might have mattered if the
state had provided no services at all.  See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185 (concluding that no
proportionality requirement exists, and noting that two cases in which state taxation was preempted
“involved complete abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity”).  The Court
“found it significant that New Mexico provided ‘substantial services’ to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton,
in the approximate amount of $3,000,000 per year, regardless of the fact that there was no indication that
these benefits were in any way related to the on-reservation activity the state sought to tax.”  PIRTLE ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 22; see infra Part V.G.2.b.  Nevertheless, after Cotton Petroleum, the Ninth Circuit
continued to require a connection between state services provided and taxed activity.  See Hoopla Valley
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1989).
112. One reason for the result was that changes in intergovernmental immunity doctrine had intervened.
See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173.  The legal world had moved from assuming that one government
cannot impose taxes with negative effects on another to the repudiation of such an idea.  See infra Part
IV.A.3 (discussing intergovernmental tax immunity).
113. The Court has also held that the federal government has fiduciary obligations with respect to
individual tribal members.  See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (concluding that
the federal government was obligated to act if it had reason to know tribal government was misappro-
priating funds intended for members).  If the interests of a tribe and its members diverge in a particular case,
however (which is certainly conceivable), the federal government’s obligations are not so clear.
114. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
115. Article III, section 2 of the Constitution includes in the judicial power cases “between a State . . .
and foreign States, citizens or Subjects.”  In the Commerce Clause, Congress is given power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, suggesting that “Indian tribes” are not included in the category of “foreign Nations.”
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
which makes investing in Indian country less attractive and therefore harms tribes, was
impermissible.109
But the Cotton Petroleum Court interpreted congressional silence about taxation
in the 1938 Act as incorporating the understanding of the 1924 Act, contrary to both
Blackfeet and the canons of construction,110 under which ambiguities are ordinarily
resolved in favor of tribes.111  That was a strikingly anti-tribal result.112
Reasonable people can differ about the merits of the analysis in Cotton Petroleum,
particularly about how congressional silence should have been interpreted.  But what
is not open to question is this: the uncertainty arose only because Congress had not
spoken clearly about the power of New Mexico to tax.  Had Congress spoken clearly,
the Court would have had no issue to decide.  Congress’s exercise of its powers would
have been controlling.
B.  Federal Government as Trustee for American Indian Nations
Another basic doctrine of American Indian law, which also goes back at least as
far as the Marshall Court, is that the United States government is obligated to look out
for the best interests of American Indian tribes.113  The language used in the early cases
is condescending—John Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,114 decided
in 1831, uses a ward-guardian metaphor—but that idea has been reiterated often over
the centuries.
In Cherokee Nation, the Court considered whether, under the Constitution, Indian
nations were properly characterized as “foreign States” for jurisdictional purposes.115
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116. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.  Marshall’s opinion was not for a Court majority, although
he was part of a majority that concluded American Indian tribes are not foreign nations.
117. Id.
118. The sovereign status of tribes is discussed in the next section of this Article.  See infra Part III.C.
119. Cf. Cherokee Nation. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (stressing that weaker states
do not lose sovereignty simply because they align themselves with more powerful ones).
In his opinion on that issue, Chief Justice Marshall said that they were not, and that
they 
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.  They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take
effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.  Meanwhile they
are in a state of pupilage.  Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian.116 
Likening tribes to wards in “a state of pupilage” was not intended as a compliment, but
with that status comes certain expectations about the behavior of the American national
government.  The Indian nations “look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president
as their great father.”117  And the national government is expected to act accordingly.
As a result, although the federal government may have plenary power over
American Indian tribes, it must operate in a way that furthers the interests of those
tribes.  At a minimum, this ought to mean that the national government will act, as best
it can, to limit state power to tax within Indian country when exercise of that power
could compromise the best interests of the affected tribes, and it ordinarily ought to
mean that the national government will protect tribal taxing power as well.
To be sure, the trust doctrine has a tension at its core (as does American Indian
law generally): by stressing the national government’s obligations to protect tribal
interests, the doctrine, together with the federal plenary power idea, could call into
question the tribes’ status as sovereigns.118  The trust obligation need not be interpreted
in that way: one sovereign nation may have obligations to act in the best interests of
a weaker sovereign nation without diminishing the weaker nation’s sovereignty.119  The
tension nonetheless exists.
The tension is not merely in the imagination of academic pundits.  Suppose a tribal
government proposes action that has potential for significant long-term damage to
tribal interests.  For example, suppose a tribe were to propose a tribal tax that could
deter arguably desirable economic development on the reservation. Like governments
generally, tribal governments can make mistakes.  Should the national government as
guardian of tribal interests act to prevent implementation of an arguably ill-advised
tax?  Doing so would be inconsistent with the idea of the tribe as sovereign, and the
federal government should act cautiously, realizing that its views might be mistaken.
Nevertheless, if the federal government properly views itself as a guardian, in some
circumstances intervening and thereby limiting tribal power might be essential to
protect the long-term interests of a tribe.
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120. Id. at 16-17 (majority opinion); see supra Part III.B.
121. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980).  The
reference to “dependent status” comes from the Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978).  See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
122. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
123. Id. at 137.
124. In United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), Justice Breyer wrote that “major policy changes
inevitably involve major changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty,” id. at 202, and he
characterized various decisions over the years as “reflect[ing] the Court’s view of the tribes’ retained
sovereign status as of the time the Court made them.”  Id. at 205.  The decision in Lara approved
Congress’s “power to relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exercise
of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.”  Id. at 196.
125. See generally JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra note 8.
126. As sovereigns they also have the power to develop new, less sophisticated systems if they wish.
C.  Tribal Sovereignty
The American Indian nations predated the United States, and they possess
attributes of sovereignty.  The sovereignty is not unqualified, of course: as noted in the
discussion of the trust doctrine, the ideas of federal plenary power and tribal
sovereignty coexist in a state of tension.  However, even though the Supreme Court
effectively concluded in Cherokee Nation that the tribes are not foreign nations,120 and
even though sovereignty does not connote absolute power, the tribes remain sovereign.
As sovereigns, tribes possess the power to tax.  As the Supreme Court said in
1980, “The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the
tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their
dependent status.”121  And in 1982 the Court reemphasized, in Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe,122 
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a
necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. . . . [I]t derives
from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within
its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring
contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that
jurisdiction.123
The powers of sovereign tribes, like the powers of sovereigns generally, are not
frozen in time.124  For example, a tribe’s taxing power is not limited to forms of
taxation, if any, used by the tribe in 1787 or 1789, nor is it restricted to types of
taxation that were known to exist at the time of the nation’s founding.  Thus, whether
or not tribes traditionally imposed anything like an income tax or a severance tax or a
value added tax, the power to impose such a tax is inherent in the concept of
sovereignty.  Just as the sovereign national government can develop systems of
taxation not contemplated by the founders (subject to some constitutional constraints,
of course),125 tribal governments can develop new, more sophisticated forms of
taxation as time goes by.126
And that power is not waived by failure to exercise it: there is no “use it or lose
it” rule that applies to taxing power.  In Merrion—which, among other things, upheld
tribal power to impose a severance tax on mineral lessees who were already engaged
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127. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148; see infra Part VI.B.
128. James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes, 59 MONT. L.
REV. 51, 53 (1998).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).  That the passage has been blessed
does not mean that its effect on a particular set of facts is clear or that all members of the Court accept the
proposition.  Dissenters have quoted Cohen to make the point that the majority in particular cases has not
understood this “most basic principle.”  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 698 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (photo. reprint 1971) (1942)
[hereinafter COHEN (1942)]. 
131. See Laurence, supra note 95, at 418-20.
132. Authority from different eras can be exceedingly difficult, and may be impossible, to fit into a
coherent whole, and there can even be diametric underpinnings of cases from the same period.  Compare,
e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (stressing tribal power of self-government), with United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (stating that only two sovereigns, the federal government and the
individual states, can exist in the United States).
in activities on a reservation and who had reason to think the tribe would impose no
new taxes—the Court wrote that “sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.”127  
The argument is sometimes made that tribal sovereignty may have existed once,
but it disappeared long ago.  As one commentator put it, “[B]y virtue of their
assimilation into the United States, Indian tribes have lost all of their retained powers
that are inconsistent with the rights of citizens of the United States.”128  Tribes might
act like sovereigns, it is argued, but tribal power is the result of grants from Congress,
not retained sovereignty.
From a logician’s perspective, it is peculiar for Indian law scholars and
practitioners to talk simultaneously about tribal “sovereignty” and federal plenary
power.  What does sovereignty mean if someone else can snap his fingers and make
it disappear?  Adding to the conceptual difficulty is the federal government’s fiduciary
obligation to protect the tribes.  How is the notion of the United States government as
“guardian” of the Indian “ward” consistent with the idea of retained sovereignty?
Those conceptual difficulties are real, but the sovereignty attributable to the tribes’
pre-constitutional status nevertheless remains legally important.  As Felix Cohen put
it in 1942, in a passage that has been blessed repeatedly by the Supreme Court,129
“Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle that those
powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated
powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”130
We talk about both sovereignty and federal plenary power, about both sovereignty
and the United States’ obligations as trustee for the tribes, because the way Felix
Cohen described things is the way things are.  Being a “sovereign” does not mean
being all-powerful, just as the “plenary” power of Congress has its limits.131  That
tension in the conception of American Indian tribes—sovereign in some ways but
subject to congressional control as well—is part of the fabric of American Indian law.
Because much American Indian law doctrine does not mesh, one can “prove”
almost any proposition by finding the right case or statute to cite and ignoring contrary
authority.132  And there have been passages in Supreme Court opinions that can
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133. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379 (“The soil and the people within [the geographical limits of the
United States] are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the States of the
Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.”); see also Daniel L. Rotenberg,
American Indian Tribal Death—A Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409 (1986)
(characterizing Kagama as death of tribal sovereignty).  But see Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381-82 (noting that,
while tribes do not possess “full attributes of sovereignty,” they are “a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations”).
134. The phrase originated in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973),
where the Court also referred to “platonic notions of tribal sovereignty,” id., in a way that was not intended
to flatter Plato.  See also infra Part V.G.2.a; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 884
(1986).
135. See infra Part V.G.2.a. If nothing else, the backdrop of sovereignty has meant that state power is
presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian country.  See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and
Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (treating backdrop as presumption that state lacks power over tribal
members within reservation boundaries); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176
(1989) (stating that backdrop of sovereignty means that “questions of pre-emption . . . are not resolved by
reference to the standards of pre-emption that have developed in other areas of the law”).  In many cases,
particularly those involving application of state law within Indian country, tribal sovereignty and federal
preemption point in the same direction—keeping the state out.  See Laurence, supra note 95, at 418.
136. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
137. Id. at 212.  The boundaries of Oliphant were unclear for several years because the Court was not
careful in its language.  Did the Court mean to preclude jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe—a
category that could include Indians who are members of other tribes—or only over non-Indians?  See supra
note 98.  Alas, my language in this Article sometimes has the same problem.  It is hard to avoid.
138. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
139. Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, even if committed by
tribal members, see, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), and it has limited the penalties that
tribal courts can impose.  See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
140. The Court suggested that Congress could permit criminal proceedings against nonmembers in tribal
court. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.  Perhaps I am reading too much into his opinion, but Justice Rehnquist
reasonably be interpreted as denying the existence of any form of tribal sovereignty.133
But even recent cases that have downplayed the importance of sovereignty—relegating
it to a “backdrop” against which questions of preemption are evaluated, for example134
—have not said that tribal sovereignty has ended.  Backdrops have effects, sometimes
very important effects.135
The case that presented the Court with the best opportunity to inter tribal
sovereignty once and for all was Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,136 concluding
in 1978 that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.137  Oliphant was
hardly the product of a Court sympathetic to strong tribal interests.  The Court could
have announced the demise of tribal sovereignty and stated that if tribal courts are to
exercise criminal jurisdiction at all, constitutional limitations must bind those courts.
The tribes, that is, might have been characterized as mere subdivisions of the national
government, therefore constrained by the Bill of Rights.  Nothing like that happened.
Although some language in Oliphant makes tribal supporters cringe—tribes have
lost not only those powers that Congress has explicitly taken away, but also those
powers “inconsistent with their status”138—the Court did not say that tribes have lost
all sovereign powers.  To the contrary, the Court’s conclusion—preserving tribal
criminal jurisdiction over members except insofar as Congress has taken that power
away,139 while precluding tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in
the absence of congressional action140—makes no sense if the Court thought that full
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seemed to be hinting that Congress could take that step without providing for constitutional protections in
tribal courts.  See id. at 210 (“Indian tribes . . . gave up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United
States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”).  In addition, Congress has acted to permit tribal court
jurisdiction over Indians who are not members of the host tribe, apparently not seriously concerned about
constitutional issues arising from that jurisdiction.  See supra note 98 (discussing Duro v. Reina and the
congressional reaction to that case).
141. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
142. Id. at 214 (concurring in judgment).
143. Id. at 214-15 (citations omitted); see also supra note 92 (noting Thomas’s skepticism that federal
plenary power is grounded in the Constitution).
144. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
145. Id. at 112-14 (noting that tribal sovereignty is strongest when a tribe is dealing with its own
members in Indian country).  This was done, however, in concluding that interest balancing was unneces-
sary in a case in which a state imposed a tax on motor fuel delivered to non-Indian distributors off the
reservation, who would then deliver the fuel to a tribal gas station, most of the business of which was from
visitors to a tribal casino.  The tax was held to be valid despite its deleterious effects on the tribe. See infra
notes 345-55 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 92.
147. But see Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year Contracts,
Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water Act, and
Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137, 149 (2004) (“All of
American Indian law is like a piano, tightly strung with strong conflicting forces, but still able to play in
tune.”).
148. I am not even sure how the Court would go about doing this.  No matter which direction the Court
wanted to move in, it would require overturning an enormous body of precedent.  And it would require
constitutional protections for criminal defendants were already a necessary component
of the tribal court system.
Justice Clarence Thomas recently announced, in United States v. Lara,141 decided
in 2004, that he thinks it is time to revisit “the premises and logic of our tribal
sovereignty cases.”142  By that he apparently means not only revisiting the notion of
tribal sovereignty but also revisiting the federal plenary power doctrine:
It seems to me that much of the confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two
largely incompatible and doubtful assumptions.  First, Congress (rather than some
other part of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes
without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity.  Second, the Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members. . . .
. . . [T]he tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian
law cases untenably hold both positions simultaneously.143 
It is not an overstatement to suggest that Justice Thomas wants to revisit the under-
pinnings of American Indian law, with much of that doctrine up for grabs.
The fact that Justice Thomas wants to do this does not necessarily mean that he
sees no role for tribal sovereignty.  Indeed, in a tax case decided in late 2005, Wagnon
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,144 he waxed eloquent about the importance of
tribal sovereignty as it affects tribal members within a reservation.145  Even if he is
skeptical of sovereignty—and he seems also to be skeptical of the plenary-power
doctrine146—Justice Thomas was writing only for himself in Lara.   He concurred in
the judgment, not the reasoning, of the Court.  I suspect that few, if any, other justices
would be enthusiastic about tearing up the existing body of American Indian law—as
incoherent as it might seem logically147—and starting over.148  
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taking a position that, because it would be inconsistent with existing authority, no party would have
advanced in any particular case.
149. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03
(2000)).
150. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
151. To be sure, ICRA has turned out to be largely surplusage anyway, since the Supreme Court has
ruled that Congress did not waive tribal sovereign immunity in enacting it.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).  As a result, persons harmed by tribal officials have no recourse in federal court,
except in habeas actions. See id. at 58-59.  But Santa Clara actually reinforces my point: the Court’s refusal
to read an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity into ICRA is strong evidence that the Court does not view
tribal sovereignty as a dead letter.
152. See Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2000)) (“Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty. . . .”).
153. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 43, at 152.  But see David P. Currie, Indian Treaties, 10 GREEN
BAG  2D  445 (2007) (questioning the constitutionality of Congress’s limiting Executive treaty-making
power); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 225 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning Treaty
Clause as a source of congressional power).
154. They were not foreign nations, however, or the Commerce Clause references to both foreign nations
and Indian tribes would have been redundant.  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831).
The Supreme Court does not think that sovereignty has disappeared, and neither,
apparently, does Congress. Modern Congresses have acted as though Indian tribes
occupy a special constitutional position in America.  Consider, for example, the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA),149 which imposed on tribal governments many of the
protections contained in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  Among its provisions, ICRA
contains a prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” a double jeopardy
clause, a right against self-incrimination, a due process and equal protection provision,
and a right to a jury trial in criminal cases that could lead to imprisonment.150  Congress
obviously did not think the Bill of Rights already limited the powers of Indian tribes.
It did not think, that is, that tribal governments merely exercise powers delegated by
the national government.  If Congress had thought that, ICRA would be surplusage.151
The current state of American Indian law and policy was not inevitable; it did not
develop solely as a matter of logic.  But tribal sovereignty is no less real for all of that,
and it affects the analysis of taxation in Indian country.
D.  Treaties Between the U.S. and the Tribes
Many tribes, particularly in the West, entered into agreements with the United
States that were characterized as treaties.  The governing assumption was that tribes
are distinct nations, at least up to a point.  Treating with Indian tribes ended in 1871,152
not because the tribes’ status as nations was in question—although some congressmen
felt that way—but because the House of Representatives thought treaty-making gave
the Senate too much power over Indian policy.153
For the average person, the very idea that these treaties have effect today is
startling; it can bewilder students of international law as well.  When the treaties were
signed, tribal members were not American citizens and there was a clear sense that the
United States was dealing with distinct nations.154  Now that American Indians are U.S.
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155. All American Indians “born within the territorial limits of the United States” are citizens of the
United States, regardless of their wishes, as a result of a 1924 statute.  Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253.  Prior to that time, with some exceptions, many Indians could become citizens only through
naturalization, even if they had severed all ties with their tribes.  The Fourteenth Amendment provided that
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” thereby making virtually every black person born
in the United States into a citizen.  But Indians were deemed not to be subject to United States jurisdiction
and were therefore not covered by the Amendment.  See WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
SERIOUSLY 35-36 (1987).
156. See Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, 16 Stat. at 566 (providing that, although treating was
ending, “nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty
heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe”).
157. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“We have required that Congress’ intention
to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain.”).
158. PIRTLE ET AL, supra note 59, at 15.
citizens,155 however, these treaties have metamorphosed into agreements between the
United States and groups of American citizens, special though those groups may be.
The agreements remain “treaties” in important respects, but they are sui generis.
As jurisprudentially peculiar as this situation is, the treaties continue to be
honored,156 and treaty language often plays a central role in evaluating the limits of
governmental power within Indian country.  Unless Congress has acted clearly to
abrogate a treaty with an American Indian tribe, that treaty remains in effect.157 
Treaties can speak to taxing power within Indian country.  Robert Pirtle and his
colleagues have noted that, “[a]lthough it might appear strange, treaty-guaranteed tax
immunity seems to be extremely rare.”158  Nevertheless, treaties sometimes contain
specific limitations on taxing power, or at least language that could be interpreted as
a limitation on the power of the federal or state government to tax within the
boundaries of tribal lands.  Unless the canons of construction have been completely
obliterated, a subject to be discussed in a moment, treaty language that is interpreted
in a tribal-friendly way may in fact decide a difficult jurisdictional issue—against the
imposition of federal or state taxation, perhaps, or in favor of tribal taxation.
Because the United States did not treat with tribes in the aggregate, treaty
language applies only to specific tribes or groups of tribes, and analysis of specific
treaty language is required to determine taxing power within the lands of any particular
tribal group.  This means that, in considering what tax liabilities might arise from a
particular investment, a potential investor should not ignore the language of any
applicable treaty.
E.  Indian Canons of Construction
The Indian canons, which were intended to help interpret treaties and other
foundational documents, have been important parts of the law for nearly two centuries.
In addition to explicating the canons, this part of the Article discusses whether the
canons are disappearing.  If that is so—and it may be the case—the effects on taxation
in Indian country could be profound.
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159. See supra Part III.B.
160. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
161. Id. at 582.
162. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
163. Id. at 380 (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886)).
164. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
165. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As
Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601
(1972).
166. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 42, at 337.
1.  The Canons Generally
The Indian canons of construction were developed to aid in the difficult task of
interpreting language in treaties between the United States and Indian tribes: the
treaties are like contracts of adhesion and should be construed against the more
powerful party, the United States.  The canons can thus be seen as one method of
satisfying the national government’s obligation to act as guardian to the tribal wards.159
Chief Justice John Marshall made this point, in a limited way, in Worcester v.
Georgia:160
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice.  If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning
than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be
considered as used only in the latter sense.161 
In 1905, in United States v. Winans,162 the Supreme Court wrote more expansively,
quoting a late-nineteenth-century opinion:  “[W]e will construe a treaty with the
Indians as ‘that unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason demand in
all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection . . . .’”163  Similarly, in 1930, the Court wrote that “doubtful expressions are
to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the
nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.”164
Although developed to interpret treaties, the language of which can, by modern
standards, be extremely cryptic,165 the canons have been extended to apply to statutes,
executive orders, regulations, and maybe more as well.  The canons are expressed in
different terms in different contexts, but, whatever the language used, the canons
encompass the following points: “(1) very liberal construction to determine whether
Indian rights exist; and (2) very strict construction to determine whether Indian rights
are to be abridged or abrogated.”166  This generally means that, if there is doubt about
the interpretation of a provision, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the affected
tribes or, as against federal or state governments, individual tribal members.  For that
matter, the principles of the canons might be extended to provide that if there is doubt
about whether there is doubt—if, that is, there is doubt about whether the canons
should be brought into play—the canons should be invoked to resolve the doubt in
favor of invocation.
Critics have characterized the canons as a “tribes win” principle, and that
characterization is not entirely unfair: when the canons apply, a tribe’s likelihood of
success in a dispute increases markedly.  But the canons apply only when there is
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167. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 263, 268-69 (1992) (applying canons generously to forbid excise tax on sale of fee land within
reservation boundaries while generally downplaying effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on
such lands was permissible).
168. Occasionally the canons were ignored because a court did not know about them and was not
informed of their existence by the parties.  In Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998), for example,
a special Tax Court trial judge made no reference to the canons in interpreting Code section 7873, which
generally exempts from taxation income of a “fishing rights-related activity.”  Id.; see also I.R.C. § 7873
(West 2007).   Warbus, a tribal member, had plausibly argued that discharge of indebtedness income from
the foreclosure of a boat used in what the government conceded was treaty-protected fishing was covered
by the statute.  The loan proceeds had been used to acquire items such as a salmon net.  The canons should
have been used to strengthen that argument, but Warbus and his lawyer did not help the judge, who almost
certainly had had no experience with the canons.  See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) (“Petitioner Warbus agrees that, absent some expressed
exemption found in statute or treaty, Indians are subject to the federal income tax laws the same as any other
citizens.”).  I have discussed Warbus at excruciating length in Jensen, Warbus, supra note 15.
legitimate doubt about the meaning of critical passages.  If no such doubt exists, the
canons are, and always have been, irrelevant.  When there is serious doubt, however,
the canons have historically served as a tiebreaker, a mechanism to resolve disputes
that would otherwise have no clearly right answer: ties go to the tribes.
In the taxation context, the application of the canons should mean that the
imposition of federal or state taxes on persons or transactions within Indian country—
taxes that might harm a tribe’s economic position even if the taxes are nominally
imposed on nontribal parties—ought to be disfavored (and limitations on tribal taxing
power similarly ought to be disfavored).  Because of its plenary power over Indian
affairs, Congress can impose, or permit states to impose, taxes that have unhappy
consequences for tribes—and it can limit tribal taxing power—but, if Congress is going
to do any of those things, its intentions should be clear.  If the intentions are not
clear—if, that is, there is legitimate doubt about what Congress intended—the canons
point toward resolving that doubt in favor of the affected tribes.
There have always been judges who circumvented the canons by purporting to find
no ambiguity in inherently ambiguous documents—the equivalent of judges’
purporting to see “plain meaning” in language that is not plain at all.  Even when that
has happened, however, judges have, until recently, usually written their opinions as
if the canons were being taken seriously.167  The canons were not supposed to be
optional, to be applied only by tribal-friendly courts, but the canons seem to be falling
into disfavor with the Supreme Court as well as with lower courts.168  Even the rote
recitation of the canons’ significance is becoming a thing of the past in judicial
opinions.  The demise of the canons, if that is what is happening, will have important
implications for understanding taxation in Indian country.
2.  Chickasaw Nation: Are the Canons on Their Way Out?
By resolving ambiguities in favor of tribes, the canons have been a powerful
protection for tribal interests.  In the last few years, however, the Supreme Court has
been increasingly skeptical about the application of the canons, particularly where
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169. For example, although in general Congress must make it “unmistakably clear” if it wishes to permit
state taxation of tribal land, once Congress acts to clearly make land subject to state taxation, reacquisition
of the land by a tribe will not automatically exempt the land from taxation.  Cass County v. Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 114 (1998).  In that case, Congress must make any new
exemption “unmistakably clear.”  Id.
170. 534 U.S. 84 (2001); see generally Jensen, Chickasaw, supra note 15.
171. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2000).
172. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that tribe was liable
for taxes); Choctaw Nation v. United States,  No. 99-7072, 2000 WL 350241 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2000)
(unpublished opinion relying on Chickasaw Nation).
173. See Little Six Inc. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rehearing en banc denied, 229
F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (over three dissents), cert. granted and case remanded for reconsideration, 534
U.S. 1052 (2001).
174. In such a situation, we might argue about whether garbled statutory language ought to be interpreted
in accordance with a congressional intention that seems to conflict with that language.  But at least we
would know what to argue about:  What principles of statutory interpretation should apply?
interpretation of treaty language is not at issue.169  The leading case on point, which has
a tax connection, is Chickasaw Nation v. United States,170 decided in 2001, where a
majority of the Court treated the canons as little more than rules of convenience.  The
Court strained to find no ambiguity, and hence no role for the canons, in an inherently
ambiguous situation: the Court interpreted a statute that on its face made no sense in
a way that subjected two tribes to federal wagering taxes.
Chickasaw Nation is worth extended discussion because the fate of the canons is
worth extended discussion.  The decision has not been sufficiently studied by American
Indian law scholars because the interpretive issue was so technical, and so mind-numbing,
that few have been willing to wrestle with the details.  It was, after all, a tax case.
At issue in two consolidated cases was tribal liability for federal excise and
occupational taxes associated with pull-tab games operated on tribal lands—games
facilitated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).171  The issues were not
straightforward.  The Tenth Circuit had affirmed entries of summary judgment against
the two affected tribes,172 but, in a decision handed down shortly thereafter, the Federal
Circuit decided differently, holding that tribes were exempt from the taxes.173
Litigation should have been unnecessary because Congress should have been clear
about the extent of any tribal liability for the wagering taxes.  The drafters of IGRA could
not have been unaware of taxation’s significance to the development of Indian gaming,
but they botched the statute.  In the controlling provision, Congress juxtaposed two
phrases that cannot be reconciled.  Give weight to one phrase and the tribes appear to be
exempt from the taxes, just as states would be.  Give weight to the other phrase and the
opposite result follows.  With their contradictory dictates, the words do not work.
The problem was not only linguistic imprecision; the congressional intentions
were also unclear.  In some situations, we know what legislators must have meant when
they drafted seemingly inconsistent statutory language.174  But little in the legislative
history or the structure of IGRA—and certainly nothing in common sense—helped
determine which of the two contradictory phrases to honor in Chickasaw Nation and
which to discard.  It was not clear what, if anything, Congress had in mind about tribal
tax liability.
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175. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1) (2000).
176. Section 1441 provides, in general, for withholding of tax on certain payments to nonresident aliens.
I.R.C. § 1441 (West 2007).  Section 3402(q) provides for withholding on certain gambling winnings. Id.
§ 3402(q).  Section 6041 imposes reporting obligations on payors for certain payments exceeding $600,
id. § 6041, and section 6050I imposes certain reporting obligations in connection with cash received in
amounts greater than $10,000, id. § 6050I.
177. Withholding is required generally for winnings over $5,000 if “the amount of such proceeds is at
least 300 times as large as the amount wagered.”  Id. § 3402(q)(3).  The statute excepts slot machines, keno,
and bingo from the withholding obligations.  Id. § 3402(q)(5).
178. Id. §§ 4401-4424.
179. Id. § 4402(3).
180. Id. § 4401(a)(1).
181. Id. § 4402(3).
182. Id. § 4411(a).
183. Id. § 4402(3).
The critical passage in IGRA is codified at section 2719(d)(1) of Title 25:
The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] (including sections 1441,
3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35 of such Code) concerning the reporting and
withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering
operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursuant to this
chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this
title that is in effect, in the same manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and
wagering operations.175 
This language is legalese at its worst, complete with a “concerning,” a “with respect
to,” a “pursuant to,” and all the rest of it in one sentence.  But, taken as a whole—until
we focus on the particulars, that is—the IGRA passage seems relatively straight-
forward: tribes are to be treated the same as states for certain purposes.
Sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I of the Internal Revenue Code all deal
with reporting or withholding.176  At a minimum, the IGRA provision means that, if
states have to report and withhold when someone hits a state gambling jackpot (which,
in the state context, means winning the lottery), then tribes should have to do so as
well.  The federal government’s imposing such requirements on states and tribes may
be an imposition on sovereign or quasi-sovereign bodies, but the purpose of reporting
and withholding is perfectly appropriate: to prevent gambling winners from escaping
income tax liability.  If states do not have to report and withhold, then tribes should not
have to either.177
The fight in Chickasaw Nation was not about withholding obligations, however;
it was about tribal tax liability.  Chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code,178 entitled
“Taxes on Wagering,” imposes taxes on those who conduct gambling operations, with
some exceptions, including one for state-conducted lotteries.179  Section 4401 imposes
“on any wager authorized under the law of the State in which accepted an excise tax
equal to 0.25 percent of the amount of such wager,”180 but section 4402 then generally
exempts “state-conducted lotteries” from the excise.181  Section 4411 imposes a
“special tax of $500 per year to be paid by each person who is liable for the tax
imposed under section 4401,”182 but, because of section 4402, the occupational tax
would not apply to a state-conducted lottery.183  Nothing is said in chapter 35 about the
liability of American Indian tribes one way or the other.
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184. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1) (2000).
185. Since chapter 35 does not mention American Indian tribes, if tribes are exempt from the obligations
under that chapter, it has to be because of the cross-reference in IGRA.  Section 7871 (added by the Indian
Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605) provides for treating
Indian tribal governments as states for certain specified purposes, such as the charitable contribution
deduction; permitting taxpayers to deduct tribal taxes in computing federal taxable income; the issuance
of public (but not private) activity bonds; and exemption from specified excise taxes.  But none of the listed
purposes even arguably applies to wagering operations.  Tribes are also not states for purposes of Commerce
Clause analysis.  See supra note 11; cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 153 (1982)
(rejecting argument that tribal severance tax would violate negative implications of Commerce Clause if
that analysis were to apply to tribes, and noting “conceptual difficulties” in treating tribes like states for this
purpose).  A list of qualifying tribal governments can be found in Rev. Proc. 2002-64, 2002-2 C.B. 717,
718-24.
186. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (No.
00-507); Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 90.
187. Two other interpretational issues can arise under chapter 35: what constitutes a “wager” for
purposes of determining whether the excise tax potentially applies, and what constitutes a “lottery”
potentially eligible for the exemption for “state-conducted lotteries”?  The government conceded in
Chickasaw Nation that the tribes’ pull-tab games were “lotteries” for purposes of the statute, and therefore,
depending on the reading of IGRA § 2719(d)(1), potentially eligible for an exemption.  Transcript of Oral
Argument at 26, Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-507).
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-507), quoted in
Carolyn Wright LaFon, High Court Urged to Adopt ‘Strained’ Interpretation of Poorly Drafted Statute,
93 TAX NOTES 186, 187 (2001).
Return to the language of IGRA section 2719(d)(1) quoted above.  In the list of
provisions “concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes” that should apply to
tribes just as they apply to states, the statute refers to “chapter 35 of such Code.”184
That is, it refers to chapter 35 as if it were another example of provisions that
“concern[] the reporting and withholding of taxes,” but that is not what chapter 35 is
about.  Either the reference to chapter 35 does not belong in the parenthetical, or, if it
does belong, the phrase “reporting and withholding obligations” is an incomplete
description of what the provision applies to.
As it is, section 2719(d)(1) is hopelessly garbled.  Since states generally do not
have to pay “taxes on wagering” on their lotteries, did Congress mean that tribes
should also be exempt from such taxes?  If the reference in IGRA to “chapter 35”
means anything at all—which, to be sure, is not clear—it presumably means that tribes
should also be exempt.185  Or did Congress intend, with the reference to “reporting and
withholding of taxes,” to exempt tribes from certain reporting and withholding
obligations and nothing else?  Both possibilities cannot be right, and the legislative
history was not much help in determining what Congress had in mind.
In a reply brief, and then at oral argument, the tribes argued that the non-
parenthetical language should be reconceptualized to provide the same treatment for
tribes as for states: “concerning (a) the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect
to the winnings from gaming or (b) wagering operations.”186  Such a reading would
have given the tribes a broad exemption from federal wagering taxes, just like the
states for their lotteries,187 but at oral argument Justice Antonin Scalia characterized
that reading as “implausible” and “strained.”188
Strained it was, but the tribes were not making up the reference to “chapter 35.”
Statutory language generally ought to be treated as if it means something, but the
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189. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-507).
190. The Tenth Circuit had suggested that the reference might have been intended to pick up the
definitions of “wager” and “lottery” from chapter 35.  Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871,
883 (10th Cir. 2000).  In its brief supporting the petition for certiorari, the government also advanced that
interpretation.  Brief for the United States on Petition for Certiorari at 6, Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U.S. 84 (2001) (No. 00-507).  In its brief on the merits, the United States repeated that point, but
seemed to downplay it.  Brief for the United States at 14-15, Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-507).
With the concession at oral argument that the reference had no discernable meaning, the government
apparently abandoned the attempt to come up with a meaning.
191. Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880.
192. See supra note 3.
193. Brief of Amici Curiae Towns of Ledyard et al. at 15-21, Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-
507).
194. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94-95.
195. Id. at 90.
196. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 89.
government lawyer could provide no good reason why “chapter 35” was in the
parenthetical.189  At bottom, the government’s position was that “chapter 35” should
be ignored in reading IGRA section 2719(d)(1), and doing that requires interpretive
straining as well.190
If Congress had done its job, this would not have been an issue to begin with, but,
even so, this could have been an easy dispute to resolve.  With two contradictory
phrases, the canons of construction could have provided the tiebreaker: if we really do
not know what Congress had in mind, the tribes win.  Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit,
in one brief paragraph, rejected using the canons in construing IGRA.  There was no
ambiguity needing resolution, said the court, and therefore no role for the canons.191
At least six amicus briefs were filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of tribes
and tribal corporations urging that effect be given to the canons.  And three
Connecticut towns that are affected—negatively, they said—by the Foxwoods casino
of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe192 filed an amicus brief arguing, among other things,
that the canons had been too broadly applied in the twentieth century and that it was
inappropriate to apply the canons to discern congressional intent in Chickasaw
Nation.193  The scope of the canons was thus the critical issue before the Court.
3.  How the Supreme Court Dismissed the Canons in Chickasaw Nation
The Supreme Court discussed the canons at length in Chickasaw Nation—it took
seriously the question of the canons’ application—but, like the Tenth Circuit, it
concluded that the canons were irrelevant in this situation.194  All members of the Court
agreed that something went wrong in drafting section 2719(d)(1) of IGRA, and that
something would have to give in interpreting the statute.195  But the Court concluded
that the statute should not be read to exempt the tribes from taxation: “We agree with
the Tribes that rejecting their argument reduces the phrase ‘(including . . . chapter 35)
. . .’ to surplusage.  Nonetheless, we can find no other reasonable reading of the
statute.”196
To avoid giving weight to the canons, the Supreme Court had to decide that
Chickasaw Nation was not a case involving ambiguity, and that is what the Court did.
Despite the garbled statute, the dissents of two members of the Court, and a Federal
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197. Id. at 94.
198. Id.  Surplusage can be ignored, agreed the dissenters, but that is because “[s]urplusage is redundant
statutory language.”  Id. at 97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The reference to “chapter 35” was not redundant,
and it was not appropriate to ignore language just because it had complicated matters: “[T]he Court’s
reading negates language that undeniably bears separate meaning.”  Id. at 97-98.  If it had meaning, the
language pointed in the direction of exemption from taxation.
199. The original Senate bill provided that “[p]rovisions of the Internal Revenue Code . . . concerning
the taxation and the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to gambling or wagering operations
shall apply to Indian gaming operations . . . the same as they apply to State operations.” S. 555, 100th Cong.
at 37 (1987), quoted in Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 91 (majority opinion).
200. Justice Breyer did not know the sequence of events, since drafting was done in closed-door
sessions, but concluded that “[i]t is far easier to believe that the drafters, having included the entire
parenthetical while the word ‘taxation’ was still part of the bill, unintentionally failed to remove what had
become a superfluous numerical cross-reference.”  Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 92.  A contrary inter-
pretation, wrote Breyer, “would read back into the Act the very word ‘taxation’ that the Senate committee
deleted.” Id. at 93.
201. Section 2719(d)(1) unquestionably contains a mistake, and we cannot tell from the face of the
statute or the legislative history, wrote Justice O’Connor, whether Congress erred in including the reference
to “chapter 35” in the parenthetical, or whether the error was in not broadening the phrase “reporting and
withholding of taxes” to encompass an exemption from wagering taxes.  Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at
96-97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   The error might very well have been in adopting “too restrictive a general
characterization of the applicable sections.”  Id. at 97.  “If the parenthetical was added after the restriction,
one could just as easily characterize the restriction as an unintentional holdover from a previous version
of the bill.”  Id.
202. Kathleen Nilles, tax counsel to the House Ways and Means Committee from 1990 until 1994 (after
enactment of IGRA), thinks the statute was garbled because of turf battles between tax-writing committees
and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.  See LaFon, supra note 188, at 188.  The reference to
“taxation” in the initial Senate version of the bill, see supra note 199, may have been deleted “in light of
the extreme sensitivity of tribal leaders to any suggestion that tribes as governments are subject to tax. . .
. Unfortunately, the professional staff of the Senate Finance Committee did not have an opportunity to
correct the Indian Affairs Committee’s work.” J. Christine Harris, Tribes Might Ask Congress to Clarify
Intent, Based on Chickasaw, 93 TAX NOTES 1262, 1263 (2001) (quoting Nilles).  For what it is worth
(nothing, the Court would say), Nilles has said that
Circuit decision to the contrary, the majority concluded that “we cannot say that the
statute is ‘fairly capable’ of two interpretations.”197  The glitch was a mistake, not an
ambiguity; the reference to “Chapter 35” was surplusage, and low-level surplusage at
that: “a numerical cross-reference in a parenthetical.”198
Justice Stephen Breyer also said that legislative history supported this determina-
tion: early drafts of what became IGRA specifically provided for tribes to be treated
like states for purposes of both tax liability and reporting obligations,199 and at those
times a parenthetical reference to “chapter 35” would have made sense.  But then the
language that would have exempted tribes from tax liability was deleted during
committee deliberations.  Extrapolating from the evidence, Justice Breyer concluded
that the deletion was intentional—Congress did not mean to exempt tribes from
wagering tax liability—and that the parenthetical reference to chapter 35 survived only
because of inadvertence.200  The dissenters, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and David
Souter, thought that the Court had made the legislative history seem more straight-
forward than it was, and that it was not at all clear which of the two inconsistent
phrases was the error.201 Indeed, there was a plausible explanation as to why the
reference to “taxation” was deleted that supported the tribes’ position.202 
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[i]t is obvious to me that [§ 2719(d)(1)] was intended to provide the same treatment to tribes
and states under the various code provisions relevant to gaming winnings and gaming
operations.  That is, where states are required to withhold and report on certain types of
gambling winnings paid out to patrons, tribal governments have parallel obligations.  And,
where states are exempt from certain taxes (e.g., states are exempt under a provision of
chapter 35 from the federal wagering excise tax), tribes are also exempt.
LaFon, supra note 188, at 187-88.
203. What better evidence of ambiguity could there be than different courts’ interpreting the same
language in diametric ways?
204. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115
(2001)).  The canon at issue in Circuit City was ejusdem generis—a nice principle, to be sure, but
historically of far less importance than the Indian canons.  And, despite the suggestion that canons “need
not be conclusive,” the Court in Circuit City applied the canon.   See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
205. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94.
206. Id.
207. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000), quoted in Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 99 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
208. In a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, written three years after enactment of IGRA,
Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, had stated that “it was the intention
of the Congress that the tax treatment of wagers conducted by tribal governments be the same as that for
wagers conducted by state governments under Chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code.”  Letter from
Daniel K. Inouye to Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 12, 1991),
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 112a, 113a, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S.
84 (2001) (No. 00-507).  Although Inouye was the self-proclaimed “primary author” of IGRA as chair of
A conclusion of no ambiguity, though it may have been counterintuitive,203 at least
provided an explanation, consistent with prior law, as to why the canons were not to
be given weight in Chickasaw Nation: no ambiguity, no need for canons.  But the
Court did not just stop at the no-ambiguity point.  It also threw in some gratuitously
disparaging comments about the canons, and that is why the case is so important.  In
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court, these central principles of American Indian law
were reduced to little more than rules of convenience that, in these cases, were
apparently quite inconvenient.  For example, quoting a case that had nothing to do with
American Indian law, Justice Breyer wrote that the Indian canons “are not mandatory
rules.  They are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’”204
The Indian canons can be overcome, Justice Breyer wrote, by “other circum-
stances evidencing congressional intent.”205  Moreover, “[i]n this instance, to accept
as conclusive the canons on which the Tribes rely would produce an interpretation that
we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute Congress wrote.”206
At one level, those statements were unobjectionable and consistent with prior law:
if we know what Congress intended, of course we do not need the canons.  But let us
remember that “the statute Congress wrote” was the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
the purpose of which, in Congress’s own words, was “to provide a statutory basis for
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”207  Tribal self-deter-
mination was the overriding goal, and interpreting IGRA section 2719(d)(1) with that
purpose in mind points toward tribal exemption from taxes, because exemption would
reduce tribal tax bills and prevent state lotteries from having a competitive advantage.
Given the goals of IGRA, how could Justice Breyer be so certain that Congress
intended tribes to be subject to the wagering taxes?208
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the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Justice Breyer dismissed the letter as reflecting after-the-fact
views of one Senator, who had not explained the evolution of the statutory language.  Chickasaw Nation,
534 U.S. at 92-93.  One can understand the Court’s reluctance, in general, to use non-contemporaneous
statements to interpret statutory language, but Inouye’s explanation was consistent with the purposes of
IGRA.
209. The scope of the tax canon can be very broad indeed.  For example, it has been suggested to me
that, under the structure of the Internal Revenue Code, nonresident aliens (including those who have no
contact whatsoever with the U.S.) are presumptively taxable, even though most of us would think that tax
liability cannot possibly be imposed on a nonresident with no income attributable to the United States.
Nevertheless, the “tax imposed” on individuals by the Internal Revenue Code applies to “every individual,”
“every married individual,” or “every head of a household,” I.R.C. § 1 (West 2007) (emphasis added), and
it is only because of the rules of subchapter N, id. §§ 861-999, which pare away income until nothing is
left, that a nonresident alien with no U.S. source income escapes taxation.  Most of us do not think in these
terms because, if Congress were to try to impose an income tax on those having no contact with the United
States, constitutional considerations would come into play.
210. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 95.
211. Id. at 100 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
212. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
213. See infra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
214. For example, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from gross income the income of individual tribal
members, as well as the income of tribes, derived from “fishing-rights related activity,” meaning treaty-
protected or executive-order-protected fishing activity.  I.R.C. § 7873 (West 2007).  See also Jensen,
Warbus, supra note 15 (discussing § 7873).
4.  Dueling Canons: Tax Versus Indian
The majority in Chickasaw Nation not only avoided giving weight to the Indian
canons; it also effectively concluded that when a tax canon (the one requiring that
exemptions from taxation be construed narrowly) conflicts with the Indian canons, it
is the tax canon that should prevail.209  Facing canons aimed in different directions, the
Court could not “say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—particularly
where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at
issue.”210
As the dissenters pointed out, that proposition was contrary to prior law: the
“Court has repeatedly held that, when these two canons conflict, the Indian canon
predominates.”211  The case of Squire v. Capoeman,212 discussed below, was the
quintessential example of the Indian canons’ trumping the tax canon, and, like
Chickasaw Nation, it was a case involving interpretation of a statute, not a treaty.213
The Court’s dismissal of this prior authority seemed to be an indication that the Indian
canons are no longer in favor.
In addition, the Court went out of its way in Chickasaw Nation to find an illusory
conflict between the two sets of canons.  Whatever the merits of the tax canon in
ordinary circumstances (and with ordinary taxpayers), it should not have been
applicable to a dispute involving the taxation of American Indian tribes.
Applied to non-Indian citizens or residents, the tax canon makes sense.  If they are
not to be taxed on certain economic benefits, it should be because an exemption clearly
applies.  Each individual is presumed to be taxable, and any arguable exemption from
taxation should be construed narrowly.  Similarly, as will be discussed in detail later,
individual American Indians are subject to federal taxes unless a specific provision in
the Internal Revenue Code or a treaty provides otherwise.214  In general, members of
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215. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); infra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
216. See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (holding that neither an unincorporated Indian tribe nor a
corporation organized under § 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is subject to federal income tax
on its income, regardless of the location of the activities that produced the income); infra note 236 and
accompanying text (noting extension of exemption to corporations formed under Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act).
217. See infra Part IV.A.
218. See supra text accompanying note 210.
219. 302 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
220. Id. at 1077.
federally recognized tribes are taxed like other American citizens, which is perfectly
appropriate.215
But contrary to the Court’s supposition in Chickasaw Nation, there is no
presumption that tribes (as distinguished from tribal members) are subject to otherwise
generally applicable federal taxes.  Sometimes Congress is specific about tribal tax
liability, sometimes it is not.  When Congress is not specific, it is not necessarily the
case that tribes are deemed to be taxable.  For example, it is taken for granted that
American Indian tribes do not pay federal income taxes, and that exemption extends
to tribal corporations formed under the Indian Reorganization Act as well.216  Someone
who reads what the Chickasaw Nation Court had to say about the tax canon would
assume that Congress must have provided, somewhere in the income tax subtitle of the
Internal Revenue Code, for the exemption of tribes and federally chartered tribal
corporations. Not so.  There is no specific statutory exception for tribes or federally
chartered tribal corporations.217  Whatever the relevance of the tax canon in other
contexts, there is no presumption that tribes and tribal corporations are taxpaying
entities.
With the equivocal status of tribes under federal tax law, the Chickasaw Nation
Court should have questioned whether Congress really intended to impose the
wagering taxes on tribes.  Instead, it saw certainty in a situation that, given existing
authority, could not have been certain.
5.  Are the Tax Canons Limited to Analyzing Treaties?
The canons were developed to analyze treaties and only later were extended to the
interpretation of other legal documents.  If the Chickasaw Nation Court meant to
suggest that the canons should have full effect only when treaty analysis rather than
statutory or regulatory interpretation is at issue218—a defensible position as a matter of
first principles but one not consistent with prior law—lower courts have not so
restricted the understanding of Chickasaw Nation.
In Ramsey v. United States,219 for example, decided in 2002, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that a tribal member was not exempt from federal highway-related taxes.
The district court had determined that provisions in the treaty between the United
States and the Yakama Nation reserved to the Yakama the right to travel public
highways without restriction and without being subject to licensing and other fees, and
that the treaty language, although general, was enough to preclude the federal taxes.220
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that “express exemptive language” was
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221. Id. at 1078-80.  It was an individual whose tax liability was at issue in Ramsey, but taxation of
individual tribal members affects tribal interests.  Moreover, the Supreme Court had applied the canons in
cases involving tribal members rather than tribes. See, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); see
infra Part IV.B.
222. And except, perhaps, when a “rule of convenience” is needed.  See supra text accompanying note
204. But it is difficult to predict when a court will want help from a nonbinding rule of convenience.
223. Lower courts generally continue to apply the canons to interpret ambiguous provisions in treaties.
See, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 680 (2006).
224. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 102 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 341 (3d ed. 2001)).
225. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
226. See infra Part V.C (discussing legal versus economic incidence).
227. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102-03.
necessary to exempt a tribal member from a federal excise tax, and without the express
language, it would not defer to tribal interests.221 In short, the tax canon prevailed.
Like the result in Chickasaw Nation—indeed, because treaty language was
involved in Ramsey, this case actually goes beyond Chickasaw Nation—that conclu-
sion basically turned the traditional understanding of the canons on its head.
6.  What Is Left of the Canons After Chickasaw Nation? 
The bottom line is that, although the canons have not been explicitly repudiated
by the Supreme Court, it may well be that their time has come and gone, except,
perhaps, for treaty interpretation.222  That is a major change in American Indian law.223
My criticism of Chickasaw Nation is not that the tribes should have prevailed
because congressional intent about tribal taxation was clear.  Indeed, the point is
exactly the opposite.  It is because we do not know for sure what Congress was doing
about wagering taxes in IGRA (and even Congress might not have known what it was
doing) that the Indian canons should have been used as a tiebreaker.  And the tie was,
as dissenting Justice O’Connor put it, “between two equally plausible, or, in this case,
equally implausible, constructions of a troubled statute . . . .  Breaking interpretive ties
is one of the least controversial uses of any canon of statutory construction.”224  If the
canons did not apply in Chickasaw Nation for the benefit of the affected tribes—when
the Court was interpreting a statute clearly intended to further tribal economic develop-
ment—when would they ever apply outside the treaty context?
Furthermore, dismissal, or perhaps ignorance, of the canons has continued at the
Supreme Court level after 2001.  In Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,225
decided in 2005, the Court ruled on the validity of a Kansas fuel tax that, in form, was
applied to non-Indian distributors who received deliveries of gasoline outside a
reservation and then transported the gas to a tribal station, most of whose customers
were non-Indians patronizing a tribal casino.
Under existing authority, if the legal incidence of a tax falls on a non-Indian rather
than a tribe or tribal member, the tax is likely to be upheld, regardless of the economic
effect on the tribes—especially if the taxed activity occurred outside Indian country.226
Described that way, the tax in Wagnon seemed unexceptionable.  The Court said the
language of the Kansas statute made it clear that the legal incidence of the fuel tax was
on the non-Indian distributor.227  Legal incidence is a formalistic concept, and the
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228. The provision is now found in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(b) (West 2006).
229. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102-03.
230. See Kaul v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 970 P.2d 60 (1998); see also Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 104.
231. To be fair, I should note that the Kansas court had interpreted an earlier version of the Kansas Code,
which did not yet include the language quoted above.  See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 105.  But dissenting
Justices Ginsburg and Souter argued that the working of the statute should have been examined to
determine legal incidence, and that the legislature arguably anticipated “that distributors would shift the
tax burden further downstream.”  Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In this case, the burden would be
shifted to the tribal gas station. Id. at 119-20.
232. In Wagnon, the canons would have been applied to interpret not only a state statute, but also a state
judicial opinion interpreting that statute, and doing so would have extended the canons beyond their
original purposes.  On the other hand, if Wagnon involved an unclear statute, and with tribal prerogatives
at issue, it was peculiar that the Court did not even try to explain why the canons were irrelevant.
233. See also supra Part II.C & infra Part V.I (discussing Yakima Nation, Cass County, and Sherrill,
other cases where traditional deference to tribal interests was not shown).
Kansas legislature had provided that “[t]he incidence of this tax is imposed on the
distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel.”228  That language could have been
enough to decide the legal incidence issue, and therefore the case.
Writing for the Court, however, Justice Thomas was not content with formalism.
He piled on: “[E]ven if the state legislature had not employed such ‘dispositive
language,’ we would nonetheless conclude that the legal incidence of the tax is on the
distributor.”229
But authority was not nearly as clear as the Thomas opinion suggested.  A murky
1998 Kansas Supreme Court opinion could have been interpreted to support the idea
that the incidence was on the tribal retailer,230 and who better to explain the meaning
of Kansas statutes than the Kansas Supreme Court?231  And what better way to handle
murkiness than by invoking the canons of construction?  When read with the canons
in mind—or just with sensitivity to the Indian overtones of the dispute—the Kansas
statute could have led to a tribal victory.  But the Wagnon majority (and the dissenting
justices as well) made no mention of the canons.232
The dismissal of the canons is hard to understand in circumstances like Wagnon
and Chickasaw Nation, if only because tiebreakers are valuable to courts.  It is true that
the Court in Chickasaw Nation used its own tiebreaker, but it gave more weight to the
tax canon than it could bear, and it advanced a cramped view of when the Indian
canons should apply.  With these and other cases on the books, however,233 the Indian
canons are unlikely to provide comfort to tribal interests in disputes involving taxation
questions in Indian country, except perhaps if treaty language is at issue.
7.  The Impact of the Decline of the Canons on Potential 
Investors in Indian Country
In a perverse sense, a diminution in the importance of the canons increases
predictability about some aspects of taxation in Indian country.  If a prudent investor
assumes that the canons will not apply, and that any possible national or state tax will
therefore proceed unimpeded, uncertainty about national and state taxation disappears
as well.  But greater certainty comes at the cost of higher taxation, and, therefore, a
greater likelihood that an investment will not be made to begin with.
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234. See infra Parts VI.B.3-4 (discussing waivers of tribal taxing power).
235. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 17, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000)).  This
would ordinarily require an approval article or certificate signed by the Secretary of the Interior.  See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS,
GAMING TAX LAW FOR INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (IRS Pub. 3908 (2007)) [hereinafter GAMING TAX
LAW]; see also Internal Revenue Service Office of Indian Tribal Governments, FAQs Regarding Status of
Tribes (Taxable vs. Nontaxable vs. Not Subject to Tax), http://www.irs.gov/govt/tribes/article/0,,id=
102543,00.html  [hereinafter FAQs Status] (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
236. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (2000)).  Section
503 of Title 25 deals with incorporation under the OIWA.
237. Federal recognition is apparently important here; many tribes, and groups claiming tribal status,
are not recognized.  See FAQs Status, supra note 235 (treating federal recognition as critical to special tax
status).  Under section 7701(a)(40)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, “Indian tribal government” refers to
“the governing body of any tribe, band, community, village, or groups of Indians, or (if applicable) Alaska
Natives, which is determined by the Secretary [of the Treasury], after consultation with the Secretary of the
Interior, to exercise governmental functions.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(40)(A) (West 2007).  Although that
provision does not mention federal recognition either, the idea is implicit in the definition.
238. Taylor, supra note 10, at 252.
On the other hand, the demise of the canons could mean, in a particular case, that
a tribal taxing scheme is less likely to be applicable to an investor.  In that respect,
certainty might not be increased, but tax liability associated with a particular invest-
ment might be ratcheted down.
Regardless of whether the canons are completely dead, and we do not know for
sure, the risk-averse investor should probably assume a worst-case scenario.  With all
of the uncertainty, it is only if an investment makes economic sense assuming full
federal, state, and tribal tax liability that an investor should proceed—if, that is, there
is no way to negotiate away some of the potential liability.234
IV.  FEDERAL POWER TO TAX WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY
It is now time to consider how the various doctrines affect taxation.  This Part
begins the process by considering the application of federal taxes to various persons
in Indian country.  In general, unlike the situation with state and tribal taxes, the
consequences will not depend much, if at all, on whether the taxed events take place
inside or outside Indian country.
A.  Federal Taxation of Tribes and Affiliated Business Entities
This discussion includes four topics: federal income taxation of tribes and
affiliated entities; exceptions to the usual rule of federal income-tax exemption;
thoughts on why the exemption exists; and how other federal taxes might apply to
tribes and their affiliates.
1.  Income Taxation
Federally recognized tribes and tribal corporations formed under section 17 of the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)235 or under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act
(OIWA)236 are exempt from federal income taxation.237  Surprisingly, however, as
Professor Scott Taylor has noted, the reasons for this are not “altogether clear.”238 Under
the federal plenary power doctrine, Congress could provide for the exemption of tribes
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239. In fact, some commentators have said that should happen, at least for income from Indian gaming,
which bears little or no relationship to traditional tribal values and which competes with taxable gaming
enterprises.  See, e.g., Stephanie Dean, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should the Federal Government Be
Able to Tax Native American Gambling Revenue?, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 178-85 (1999).
On issues affecting taxation of Indian gaming generally, see Cowan, Leaving Money, supra note 15.
240. COHEN, supra note 16, at 674.
241. See id. at 674-75 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58 (“Income tax statutes do not tax
Indian tribes.  The tribe is not a taxable entity.”), amplified by Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, 20).
Earlier versions of Cohen also cited a 1941 memorandum from the Interior Department, Memorandum from
the Acting Solicitor of the Dep’t. of the Interior (May 1, 1941), reprinted in U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR,
OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 1917-
1974, at 1044 (n.d.), a document that Cohen himself may have prepared or helped prepare.  See COHEN
(1942), supra note 130, at 265.
242. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58.
243. Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.  A subsequent ruling extended the principle to corporations
formed under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 503 (2000).  Rev. Rul. 94-65, 1994-2 C.B.
14.
244. See supra Part III.E.4.
245. See supra Part III.E (discussing demise of Indian canons).
246. For example, tribes are treated as states for limited purposes.  See I.R.C. § 7871 (West 2007); infra
notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
247. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2007) (setting out tax tables applicable to individuals and other legal persons).
The Service has concluded that, among other things, tribes are not individuals for purposes of the restrictive
rules governing who can be an S corporation shareholder. Rev. Rul. 2004-50, 2004-1 C.B. 977; see also
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (West 2007).  Nor are they 501(c)(3) organizations because they are governments
and federally chartered corporations,239 but the Internal Revenue Code is silent on the
issue.
The most recent revision of Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law says
simply, “The income of Indian tribes is generally exempt from federal taxation,”240 and
then cites not the Code, but pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service—a 1967
Revenue Ruling and a 1994 ruling that amplified the earlier ruling.241  Under the 1967
ruling, income that is tax-exempt at the tribal level will, assuming no statutory or treaty
protection, be taxed to tribal members if and when it is “distributed or constructively
received” by them.242  The 1994 ruling states that “[n]either an unincorporated Indian
tribe nor a corporation organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 is subject to federal income tax on its income, regardless of the location of the
activities that produced the income,”243 but the ruling does not tie the conclusion to
language of the Code.
The Service’s position seems to be antithetical to the tax canon under which legal
persons are deemed to be subject to taxes, including the income tax, unless Congress
specifies otherwise.244  That canon was deemed controlling in the Supreme Court’s
2001 decision in Chickasaw Nation, which held that, under a totally incomprehensible
provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, federal wagering taxes do apply to
Indian tribes.245
It might be that statutory analysis could have led to the conclusion reached in the
published rulings—that the income tax does not apply—at least for the tribes them-
selves.  Although the Internal Revenue Code refers to tribes or tribal governments for
some specific purposes,246 tribes are not classified under the basic income tax liability
rules.  What rate table might apply to a tribe?  Is a tribe an individual (no),247 a trust or
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and their purposes are not exclusively those listed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  See Rev. Rul. 60-384, 1960-2 C.B.
172 (setting out circumstances in which a governmental agency does not qualify as a 501(c)(3)
organization).  And the 2004 ruling not surprisingly concluded that tribes are not section 401(a)
organizations because they are not qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans.  Rev. Rul. 2004-
50, 2004-1 C.B. 977.
248. See I.R.C. § 1(e) (West 2007) (setting out tax tables applicable to trusts and estates).
249. See I.R.C. § 11 (West 2007).  Without attempting a full definition, section 7701(a)(3) simply notes
that “[t]he term ‘corporation’ includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.”  Id.
§ 7701 (a)(3).  In a nice primer on federal taxation of Indians, the Congressional Research Service has
hypothesized that the Internal Revenue Service does not think tribes are taxable because they are not among
the entities characterized as corporations.  See Kim Yule, Federal Taxation of Tribes and Members, 2007
TAX NOTES TODAY 210-14 (Oct. 26, 2007). 
250. The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Chickasaw Nation contained a lengthy discussion about whether
the tribe was a “person” for wagering tax purposes.  See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871,
878-80 (10th Cir. 2000).
251. Such a conclusion would require us to think about whether the members of a tribe ought to be
immediately taxable on their shares of tribal income.
252. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 42, at 196; Tebo, supra note 6, at 34 (“Who wants to do business
with someone who can’t be sued if the relationship goes sour?”).  By its terms, section 17 of the Indian
Reorganization Act (headed “Incorporation of Indian tribes; charter; ratification by election”) makes it
sound as though incorporation is an all-or-nothing process—that is, a tribe incorporates and becomes an
“incorporated tribe” or it does not: 
The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe, issue a charter of incorporation
to such tribe:  Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified by the
governing body of such tribe.  Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power
to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose
of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restrict-
ed Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefore interests in corporate property, and such
further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent
with law; but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding
twenty-five years any trust or restricted lands included in the limits of the reservation.  Any
charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress.
25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).  However, it is clear in practice that a tribe may incorporate only some of its
activities.  In addition, even if a tribe incorporates, the cases generally conclude that it maintains its separate
status as a sovereign.  See, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d
315, 320 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that consent-to-sue clause in corporate charter adopted under § 477 did
not affect sovereign immunity of tribe as constitutional entity under 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000)); Gold v.
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Indian Reservation, 478 F. Supp. 190, 196 (D. Or. 1979) (holding
that “the more persuasive cases hold that a tribe’s corporate charter does not waive the tribe’s sovereign
estate (also presumably no),248 a corporation (probably not, but perhaps),249 or some-
thing else that might be subject to the income tax if the Internal Revenue Service
decided to be aggressive?250  This is a grand metaphysical issue worthy of extended
analysis, which will not be undertaken here.  Suffice it to say that a tribe’s
classification as a taxable entity is not obvious; it could conceivably be characterized
as a form of pass-through organization not subject to an entity-level income tax.251
But even if a tribe is not one of the legal persons to which the income tax applies,
a tribal corporation is presumably a corporation, or so it would seem. Forming a
business corporation can aid dealings with investors: a tribe can waive sovereign
immunity for the corporation—thereby making investors comfortable that legal
recourse will be available if things go wrong—while exempting other tribal assets from
the waiver.252  Nevertheless, the “check-the-box” regulations provide that “tribes
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immunity for governmental conduct”); see also Gaines v. Ski Apache, 8 F.3d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a tribe’s constitutional rather than corporate entity operated a ski resort and that the tribe was
not recognized as a corporation under 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000)).  But see Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe,
374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962) (holding that a corporate charter governed a tribe’s governmental and corporate
conduct).
253. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(3) (as amended in 2004).
254. See Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15, at 16 (“The federally chartered Indian tribal corporation
shares the same tax status as the Indian tribe and is not taxable on income from activities carried on within
the boundaries of the reservation.”), amplified by Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (extending principle to
income earned outside the reservation).
255. When the Service concludes that a person is not taxable, the person is not taxed, regardless of what
the Code says.  Some might grumble about another’s exemption from taxation, but who would have
standing to complain?  Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (setting out limits on taxpayer standing).
256. Tribes’ status as states for purposes of tax-exempt bonds has turned out to be less helpful than some
might have hoped because of the requirement that the proceeds of qualifying bonds be used only for
“essential governmental functions.”  I.R.C. § 7871(b) (West 2007); see infra note 291; see also Aprill,
supra note 15, at 348 (noting that “tribal governments were given bonding authority they were unable to
use and denied bonding authority they would have welcomed”).
257. See Jacobs, supra note 25, at 1.  In 2006, Congress added section 4965 to the Code, imposing an
excise tax on tax-exempt entities (including Indian tribes) that are party to “listed transactions”—basically
tax shelter transactions designated as such by the Service in published guidance.  I.R.C. § 4965 (West
2007).  In communications with the author, Professor Cowan wondered whether this step represented a new
congressional willingness to apply nonprofit tax provisions generally to Indian tribes.
258. For example, Professor Cowan describes a scenario in which a tribe would serve as an intermediary
in the sale of a corporate business.  Cowan, Leaving Money, supra note 15, at 367-68.   If the seller wanted
to sell stock and avoid more highly taxed gain on an asset sale, but the buyer wanted an asset purchase to
get a stepped-up basis in the assets, a tribe might purchase stock, liquidate the corporation, and then sell
incorporated under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 . . . or under
section 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act . . . are not recognized as separate
entities for federal tax purposes.”253  Nothing in the Code requires treating a federally
chartered tribal corporation as equivalent to the tribe itself, but for years the Service
has concluded that such corporations are not taxable.254
That tax-exempt result is almost certainly consistent with congressional intent.  If
we were to rely on statutory language alone, the Internal Revenue Service might be
criticized for taking a more conservative position than the Code requires.255  Neverthe-
less, although we ordinarily ought not assume that Congress has ratified, or acquiesced
in, administrative practice, the Service would be foolhardy to think it could collect
income tax revenue from tribes and federally chartered tribal corporations without
congressional action.
Does the tax status of tribes and federally chartered tribal corporations matter to
potential non-Indian investors in Indian country?  Absolutely.  The exemption belongs
to the tribes and the corporations, rather than to investors, but it is possible to structure
transactions so as to economically transfer the benefits of the exemption (or the tax
benefits associated with tribally-owned property) to non-Indian investors.  Leveraging
the tribal tax exemption is a significant part of Indian business and legal practice today,
at least outside the gaming context.256  Not surprisingly, it has also been possible to use
the tax-exempt status of tribes in abusive ways,257 requiring the Treasury and the
Service to adopt special rules to shut down shelters that take excessive advantage of
the tribal tax exemption.258
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the assets to the ultimate buyer—with the tribe compensated for its efforts by a fee, of course.  Id.  These
results, in the “too good to be true” category, satisfied everyone but Uncle Sam.  In 1998, the Treasury
issued regulations to shut down such transactions, treating a stock sale to a tax-exempt entity as if it were
a sale of assets. Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-4(a)(1) (1998).  If the seller has to recognize gain as if the assets had
been sold for fair market value, a transaction with a tax-exempt entity becomes pointless.  For this purpose,
tribes are treated as “tax-exempt entities,” as are federally chartered tribal corporations.  Id. § 1.337 (d)-
4(c)(2)(iv)-(v).  Tribes resisted the regulatory language, fearful of an implication that they were not tax-
exempt for other purposes, such as the rules for unrelated business income.  See Cowan, Leaving Money,
supra note 15, at 368 n.112; infra Part IV.A.2.b.
259. A list of tribal governments that the Internal Revenue Service accepts for these purposes can be
found in Rev. Proc. 2002-64, 2002-2-C.B. 717.  On federal recognition, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note
42, at 312-14.
260. See FAQs Status, supra note 235.
261. See supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.  The published rulings do not specifically say that
nonrecognized tribes are taxable. A 1967 revenue ruling had simply said that “Indian tribes” are not taxable,
with no reference to federal recognition. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58.  In 1994, another revenue
ruling that “amplified” Rev. Rul. 67-284 discussed three situations, only one of which explicitly involved
a recognized tribe, concluding that such a tribe is tax-exempt.  Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, 20.  In the
second hypothetical, which involved a corporation formed under the Indian Reorganization Act, recognition
was implicit: the IRA would not have applied to a nonrecognized tribe.  Id. at 20.  But in the third
hypothetical, involving a tribal corporation formed under state law, federal recognition would have been
irrelevant to the analysis.  Whether or not the tribe was recognized, the state corporation was a distinct,
taxable entity.  Id. At no point did the Service specifically conclude that a nonrecognized tribe is subject
to the federal income tax. 
262. See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. at 20 (“[A] corporation organized by an Indian tribe under state
law . . . is subject to federal income tax on any income earned, regardless of the location of the business
activities that produced the income.”).
2. Limits on the No-Income Taxation Rule
a.  Non-Qualifying Entities
The rules described above were premised on a tribe’s being federally recog-
nized,259 or so one might assume.  For a nonrecognized tribe, according to the Internal
Revenue Service’s website, the published rulings do not apply.260  And a tribe that is
not recognized would be unable to form a federally chartered corporation under the
IRA or the OIWA.
I am not convinced, however, that a nonrecognized tribe is automatically a taxable
entity.  As I suggested earlier, it is not clear how a tribe, assuming it has income to
begin with, would be classified for federal income tax purposes.261  The published
rulings do not provide for tax exemption, but a nonrecognized tribe might not be
subject to the income tax anyway.
If a tribe forms a corporation, the results are generally clear.  It is only tribal
corporations formed under the IRA or the OIWA that qualify for exemption under the
rulings.  Tribal corporations and other entities formed under state law enjoy no such
protection even if the tribe is federally recognized, regardless of whether income is
earned inside or outside Indian country.262  The justification for this result is
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263. As the Service puts it, “Generally, the choice of corporate form will not be ignored.”  Id.  (citing
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943)).  For a corporation formed under state law, the
tax applies only to income earned after October 1, 1994.   See id.; see also GAMING TAX LAW, supra note
235, at 3.  If a tribe can demonstrate good faith, it may be able to dissolve an otherwise taxable corporation
—effectively treating its formation as a mistake—and to reorganize as an exempt corporation.  See Rev.
Rul. 94-65, 1994-2 C.B. 14, 15.
A limited liability company that is wholly owned by a tribe should generally be ignored for federal
income tax purposes.  A single-member LLC is a disregarded entity—for tax purposes it is as if the LLC
did not exist—unless it elects to be taxed as a corporation.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended
in 2006); COHEN, supra note 16, at 676; cf. FAQs Status, supra note 235 (“If a tribal entity is not owned
100% by the tribe, then it is subject to the usual federal taxes, based on the type of entity that is used.”).
For tribal investments in other entities—corporations, partnerships, or limited liability companies—any
income would be tax-exempt if the tribe is tax-exempt.
264. Tribes are paying some corporate income tax.  The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administra-
tion recently reported that, on corporate tax returns submitted to the Service, tribes and tribal entities
reported total income of nearly $219 million from 2000 until 2004.  See Indian Tribes’ Income and Tax
Payments Have Increased, TIGTA Says, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-18 (Mar. 21, 2007).
265. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 675 (citing Ellen P. Aprill, The Integral, the Essential, and the
Instrumental: Federal Income Tax Treatment of Governmental Affiliates, 23 I. J. CORP. L. 803, 810
(1998)).  The Internal Revenue Service has supposedly been studying this issue for several years, but no
definitive guidance has been issued.  See id.  For purposes of state taxation, a corporation formed under
the laws of one tribe has no special status for work done outside the reservation of the chartering tribe.  See
Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999) (holding that a tribal corporation formed
under laws of the Blackfeet Tribe in Montana was subject to state privilege tax for work done on
reservations in Arizona).
266. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2007) (including in the category of business
entities that are automatically treated as corporations for federal income tax purposes a “business entity
organized under . . . a statute of a federally recognized Indian tribe, if the statute describes or refers to the
entity as incorporated or as a corporation, body corporate, or body politic”).
267. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
268. I.R.C. § 513(a) (West 2007); see also I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a)(1) (West 2007).
straightforward: a state charter creates a legal entity distinct from the tribe,263 and no
authority exists to exempt such a corporation from income taxation.264
The income tax status of corporations formed under tribal law is not dealt with in
the published rulings, but the result presumably depends on the extent to which the
corporation is an “integral part” of the tribe.265  Whatever distinctions are drawn under
tribal law, if a tax-exempt tribe and a corporation are substantively one and the same,
the corporation ought not to be subject to the federal income tax.  If that is not the case,
the corporation should be subject to federal taxation like any other corporation.266
b.  Unrelated Business Income
Only with tribal colleges is there even a possibility that the rules dealing with
taxation of unrelated business income might apply to otherwise untaxed tribal
entities.267  Why the rules dealing with unrelated business income do not apply more
broadly is another question.  A non-profit organization is generally subject to taxation,
at rates applicable to corporations, on income that is “not substantially related” to the
institution’s exempt purposes.268  The tax on unrelated business income is intended to
raise revenue, of course, but also to prevent unfair competition with taxable entities
engaged in the same sort of enterprise.  If my university converts the library into a shoe
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269. The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[g]ross income does not include . . . income derived from
any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.”  I.R.C. § 115 (1) (West 2007).  Professors Bittker
and Lokken note that this statutory language “by negative inference suggests that proprietary or
‘nonessential’ functions and the activities of state-owned corporations may give rise to taxable income.”
1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 1.2.8,
1-41 (3d. ed. 1999).  The issue is not a frontburner one, however.  My impression is that state and local
governments are much less likely to engage in the sorts of commercial activities that, for non-governmental,
nonprofit institutions, might be treated as unrelated businesses.  And, even if we were to decide that certain
income ought to be taxable to a state government, we would have to decide how a state should be
characterized to determine what tax rates would be applicable.  Cf. supra notes 246-51 and accompanying
text.
270. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(A) (West 2007).
271. See id. § 511(a)(2)(B).  This specific reference to colleges and universities implies that such
entities, which are agencies or instrumentalities of state governments, would otherwise not be subject to the
Unrelated Business Income tax.
272. See id. § 7871(a)(5) (treating tribal colleges like state colleges for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 511(a)(2)(B)); Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 15, at 114 n.110.
273. See supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
274. Cowan, Leaving Money, supra note 15, at 350.  As Cowan notes, when the no-taxation doctrines
developed in American Indian law, the issue was of little practical import as almost all tribes were so poor
that there was no revenue to be raised.
275. Id.
manufacturing plant, the university will have to pay taxes on the income associated
with shoe manufacturing.
Does the same concern not exist with governmental bodies, whether state,
municipal, or tribal, that engage in activities that compete with taxable enterprises?  I
can think of no good theoretical reason (although there are obviously political ones)
for treating governments differently from private nonprofits in this regard, and the
Internal Revenue Code does not imply that all income of a state or municipality is
automatically tax-free.269  Nevertheless, the tax on unrelated business income is, in
general, irrelevant to state and local governmental bodies,270 other than state colleges
and universities.271
In the American Indian law context, the tax on unrelated business income applies
only to the extent that a tribal college engages in business activity unrelated to its
exempt purpose, thus conforming the rules applicable to tribal colleges to those for
nontribal ones.272  Since Congress specifically dealt with tribal colleges in the Code,
one might infer that Congress considered other tribal income to be exempt, regardless
of the activities that created it.
3.  Some Thoughts on Why the Exemption Exists
One can imagine why Congress might have decided that sovereign tribes and their
federally chartered corporations ought not to be subject to the income tax—to prevent
transfers to Washington of dollars from tribes lucky enough to have net income—but,
as I have noted, it is impossible to find language in the Internal Revenue Code that
evidences such a decision.273  Professor Cowan writes that “the decision of whether to
tax the tribes primarily involves fundamental concerns of fairness and equity”274—
questions of policy, that is, not of constitutional law.275
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276. FAQs Status, supra note 235.
277. The new edition of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law notes that “[c]ongressional policy
has long supported tax exemption for the income of state governments.  The governments of the District
of Columbia, territories, and possessions are also excluded, despite broad congressional authority to tax.”
COHEN, supra note 16, at 675 n.23.
278. The Supreme Court has said that federal immunity from state taxation “is shared by the Indian
tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservation lands in trust.”  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)).
279. See supra Part III.C (discussing tribal sovereignty).
280. See JENSEN, TAXING POWER, supra note 8, at 174-80 (discussing these issues at length).
281. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
282. Id. at 523 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982)).
One thing can be said with relative certainty: if the plenary power doctrine is good
law, exempting tribes from income taxation is not required by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, I suspect the assumption that tribes cannot be directly subject to an
income tax grew out of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, which once
was thought to have constitutional underpinnings, and which used to have far greater
scope than it has today.  Indeed, the website of the Office of Tribal Governments
within the Internal Revenue Service says simply, as if no further explanation were
necessary, “As governmental entities, federally recognized tribes are not subject to
income taxes.”276
It was once understood that states could not tax the federal government and the
federal government could not tax state and local governments.277  In some limited
respects, the rules applicable to the federal government were applied to American
Indian tribes,278 even though tribes have never been considered to be subdivisions of
the national government.279  The principle was extended to employees or instrumentali-
ties of those governments as well, and, in some cases, to other private parties
contracting with the governments.  This limitation on the taxing power was attributed
to principles of federalism, and deemed to be constitutionally required.280
As a matter of constitutional law, intergovernmental tax immunity in other
contexts is largely dead.  In 1988, the Supreme Court articulated the current state of
the law in South Carolina v. Baker,281 in a passage that contrasts the extent to which
states cannot tax the federal government to the similar, but not identical, rules running
in the other direction:
States can never tax the United States directly but can tax any private parties with
whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States,
as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom
it deals. . . . A tax is considered to be directly on the Federal Government only “when
the levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely
connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically by viewed as separate
entities.” . . . The rule with respect to state immunity is essentially the same, . . .
except that at least some nondiscriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly
from the States even though a parallel State tax could not be collected directly from
the Federal Government.282
Thus, despite old case law to the contrary, Congress’s power to tax those who
contract with state and local governments (including employees of those governments)
is now unconstrained, except by limitations that would apply in any case to the national
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283. Id.
284. States can tax the federal government, but only if Congress gives permission.  The Supreme Court
stated in Cotton Petroleum that “it is well settled that, absent express congressional authorization, a State
cannot tax the United States directly.”  Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).  And the federal immunity from state taxation
“is shared by the Indian tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservation land in trust.”  Id.
(citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)).
285. This issue is merely theoretical because Congress does not seek to tax such income.  In Code
section 115(1), Congress excluded from the federal income tax base “income derived from any public utility
or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision
thereof.”  See supra note 269.  If Congress does not seek to tax income from an essential governmental
function, the constitutionality of such a tax cannot be tested.  Furthermore, in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
14,407 (Jan.-June, 1935), the Service concluded in effect that states were beyond the reach of the Internal
Revenue Code.  That memorandum was superseded by Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29, but only because
the new ruling came to the same conclusion.  See Cowan, Leaving Money, supra note 15, at 375.
286. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174 (“[T]he doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity . . . has
now been ‘thoroughly repudiated’ by modern case law.”) (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 520); see also id. at
187 (“[W]e decline to return to this long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated doctrine.”).
287. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001); see also supra Part III.E.
288. See supra Part IV.A.1; note 216 and accompanying text.
289. We would have to figure out what sort of entity a tribe is for purposes of each taxing statute. See
supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.  For example, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Chickasaw Nation
contained a lengthy discussion about whether the tribe was a “person” for purposes of taxes on wagering.
See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 878-80 (10th Cir. 2000).
taxing power.  The constitutional rules governing “direct” taxation of state and local
governments are less clear, but, given the Court’s statement in Baker that “at least
some nondiscriminatory taxes can be collected directly from the States,”283 such an
exercise of federal power is not altogether precluded.284  And that appears to be so even
if the tax reaches what historically might have been considered an essential govern-
mental function.285
Intergovernmental tax immunity is now largely, and maybe even completely, gone
as a matter of constitutional law,286 and, in any event, it was never thought to have been
required in the American Indian law context.  Nevertheless, one can understand the
force of analogy and how tribal exemption from income taxation came to be taken for
granted, even if not constitutionally or statutorily mandated.
4.  Other Federal Taxes
Although federally recognized tribes are exempt from income taxation, they may
be subject to other federal taxes such as federal excises on wagering.287  But no
generally applicable principle is at work here.  The authority in this area seems to be
a result more of historical accident than of an application of accepted principles.  And,
as I noted earlier, historically there was no presumption that tribes are subject to other-
wise generally applicable federal taxes.288
When Congress is not specific about tribal tax liability, it is not necessarily the
case that tribes are deemed to be taxable.  Some excise taxes clearly apply to Indian
tribes, some do not, and some have uncertain application.  Under the federal plenary
power doctrine, Congress can decide whether a particular tax ought to apply to tribes
or tribal members, but, as we all know, Congress does not always make its intentions
clear.289  
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290. I.R.C. § 7871(a)(2) (West 2007).  The listed levies include taxes on special fuels, manufacturers’
excise taxes, the communications excise tax, and a tax on the use of certain highway vehicles.
291. Id. § 7871(b).  For an extended discussion of problems Indian nations have in tapping capital
markets available to state and local governments, see Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles
and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009 (2007).  What
constitutes an “essential governmental function” for these purposes is not always clear, of course. Some
cases are easy.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-48-024 (Aug. 4, 2006) (holding that a tribe’s ownership
and operation of a government office building, emergency services building, and cultural center and
museum, as well as various infrastructure improvements, constituted “essential governmental functions”).
But others are not.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-04-019 (Oct. 24, 2006) (holding that
construction and operation of a convention facility and associated hotels were not “essential governmental
functions”).  One issue is whether tribal casinos might be treated as performing such a function for at least
some purposes, given the incentives created by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  See COHEN, supra note
16, at 867; Taylor, supra note 10, at 256-57.  In any event, because section 7871 makes no reference to
“chapter 35,” one of the key terms at issue in Chickasaw Nation, tribes would not be treated as states for
purposes of federal taxes on wagering.  See supra note 185.
In 2006, the Service issued a notice of proposed rulemaking dealing with the definition of “essential
governmental function” as it applies to tribal governments issuing bonds. 71 Fed. Reg. 45,474 (Aug. 9,
2006).  If the interest is to be tax-free, “substantially all of the proceeds” of the bonds must “be used in the
exercise of any essential governmental function.” I.R.C. § 7871(c)(1) (West 2007).  The legislative history
of the act that added section 7871 to the Code indicated that tax-exempt financing was not intended to be
available for “commercial or industrial activities (or other activities other than essential governmental
functions).”  S. REP. NO. 97-646, at 14 (1982).  It is anticipated that the proposals
will provide that for purposes of section 7871(c) and section 7871(e), an activity will be
considered an essential governmental function that is customarily performed by State and
local governments if: (1) There are numerous State and local governments with general
taxing powers that have been conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt
governmental bonds, (2) State and local governments with general taxing powers have been
conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt governmental bonds for many
years, and (3) the activity is not a commercial or industrial activity.  The proposed
regulations will further provide that examples of activities customarily performed by State
and local governments include, but are not limited to, public works projects such as roads,
schools, and government buildings.
71 Fed. Reg. at 45,475; see also I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 2002-47-012 (Aug. 12, 2002) (advising that
tribal construction of a golf course was not related to “an essential governmental function”). 
292. See also COHEN, supra note 16, at 686-88 (discussing application of excise taxes to tribes).
293. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3121(b)(7) (West 2007) (generally excluding from definition of “employment,”
“service performed in the employ of a State, or any political subdivision thereof”).  The drafters were not
Code Section 7871 provides that, for some particular excise taxes, tribal govern-
ments shall be treated as states,290 which means in those cases that tribes should
generally be exempt from the taxes if the affected “transaction involves the exercise
of an essential governmental function of the Indian tribal government.”291  Perhaps one
can infer from this provision that other excise taxes, including those in chapter 35 at
issue in Chickasaw Nation, apply to tribes without limitation.  Before Chickasaw
Nation, I would have said that a tax, the application of which was doubtful, would not
apply to a tribe.  With Chickasaw Nation on the books, however, and the canons of
construction substantially diminished, one might expect tribes to be subject to newly
enacted federal excise taxes unless Congress makes exemption explicit.292
The application of other federal taxes to tribes can also be unclear.  For example,
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), the basic Social Security statute, is
silent about Indian tribes, although it does exempt states and various non-profit
organizations from its scope.293  As the authors of the new edition of the Cohen
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oblivious to Indian issues.  See, e.g., id. § 3121(a)(21) (specifically excluding from definition of “wages”
the remuneration of a tribal member “on which no tax is imposed . . . by reason of section 7873”); see also
infra note 318 (describing § 7873, which has nothing necessarily to do with employment by an Indian
tribe).  In contrast, Congress did act explicitly to exempt tribes from the obligations of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) so long as the tribes elect to participate in the State Unemployment Act
system.  See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 166, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-627 (codified at I.R.C. § 3306(c)(7) (West 2007)); see also Announcement 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B.
715 (providing guidance to tribes on FUTA obligations).
294. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 685-86.  As Professor Taylor notes, the Service’s position on these
issues—that the taxes apply unless there is a specific exemption—is the opposite of the position the Service
takes with application of the income tax to tribes.  See Taylor, supra note 10, at 253-54; see also Robyn
L. Robinson, A Discussion of the Application of FICA and FUTA to Indian Tribes’ On-Reservation
Activities, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 63 (2000-2001) (questioning how the Service can take one position
with the income tax and another with FICA).  As I noted earlier, the Service simply says that, “[a]s govern-
mental entities, federally recognized tribes are not subject to income taxes.” FAQs Status, supra note 235.
295. COHEN, supra note 16, at 684-86.
296. See id. at 686.
297. See Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 696 (1931) (“The intent to exclude must be definitely
expressed, where, as here, the general language of the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the
subject matter.”); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). In Choteau, the Court also noted that no treaties
bore on the issue in that case.  Choteau, 283 U.S. at 694; see also Allen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1310 (2005) (holding that tribal member who worked for the Chippewa tribe as an elected member
of the tribal council and as executive assistant to the tribal president was taxable on income from those
positions, despite a claim that income of an official of a sovereign government was tax-exempt).
298. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 1974).  Congress may provide relief from double (or
triple) taxation—through the foreign tax credit, for example—but such relief is not constitutionally
required.
299. See supra note 155.  The Internal Revenue Service’s Office of Tribal Governments has recently
issued a warning that scam artists, in an attempt to get financial information from unsuspecting tribal
governments and members, are informing American Indians that they are nonresident aliens and are
therefore exempt from federal taxation.  See Scam Alert, ITG NEWS (IRS Office of Indian Tribal
Governments, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 29, 2001, at 1.  In Metallic v. Commissioner, No. 06-2387, 2007
WL 1559693, at *1 (1st Cir. May 31, 2007) (per curiam), the court rejected arguments of a member of the
Micmac tribe that (1) a 1776 treaty protected him from federal taxation and (2) if the treaty did not apply,
he was exempt anyway because, as a member of the Canadian Micmacs, he was not a U.S. citizen.  On the
latter point, the court noted that, whether or not Metallic was an American citizen, he was resident in the
United States, and the federal income tax reaches the income of resident aliens.  Id.
Handbook note, although tribes are generally assumed to be subject to statutes of
“general application” unless Congress provides a specific exemption, FICA is not such
a statute.294  It is riddled with exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions.  On the other
hand, FICA is a statute of broad application, and tribal members can benefit from it.
The Internal Revenue Service’s position is that tribes acting as employers are required
to withhold and make contributions to the FICA system,295 and it behooves tribes to
treat FICA obligations as applying to them.  All, or nearly all, do so.296 
B.  Federal Taxation of Tribal Members 
Absent treaty or statutory language to the contrary, tribal members are subject to
federal taxes of general application, such as the income tax.297  American citizens are
taxed in the United States on their worldwide income,298 and American Indians are
American citizens.299
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300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
301. Professor Taylor had made that argument, however, with respect to federal taxes other than the
income tax.  See Taylor, supra note 10, at 262-63.
302. At that time, all tribes were distinct nations and had the power to treat with the United States. See
supra Part III.D.  That remained the case when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
303. See supra note 155.
304. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
305. Id. at 3.  On allotment, see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.  The Capoemans held land
that had been allotted to Mr. Capoeman, and they therefore had a special tie to that land.  But no patents
have been issued for allotted lands since 1934, and lands held in trust at that time have continued to be held
in trust by the United States.  As a result, the Capoemans did not have and, barring a statutory change,
would never have fee simple title. Squire, 351 U.S. at 4.
306. See Rev. Rul. 54-456, 1954-2 C.B. 49 (holding that exemption of tribal members from income tax
must be attributable to Code or treaties). But see Rev. Rul. 57-407, 1957-2 C.B. 45 (holding that income
of a tribal member attributable to the sale of tribal land held in trust by the United States for him—i.e.,
before a patent in fee had been issued—was not taxable).
307. Squire, 351 U.S. at 5-6.
308. Id. at 6.
309. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
310. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000)).
The constitutional references to “Indians not taxed,” included in provisions
dealing with apportionment of representation and direct taxation,300 should not be
understood to create a presumption against taxation of American Indians.301  The intent
of the constitutional provisions was not to count, and therefore not to tax, Indians who
were not citizens of the United States.  At the founding and later, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, that was nearly all American Indians, except for a few who
had been naturalized.302  When American Indians became citizens,303 however, the
importance of the constitutional phrase dissipated.
The general principle—that American Indians are subject to the federal income
tax—is thus as straightforward as can be, but in certain circumstances it is possible that
treaty or statutory language will exempt particular persons or particular items of
income from taxation.  Such a possibility was considered in the Supreme Court’s 1956
decision in Squire v. Capoeman.304
Squire dealt with the tax liability of an Indian couple who claimed exemption from
federal income taxation on the proceeds of timber sold from their allotted lands—lands
for which they had not been issued a patent in fee simple.305  The government’s primary
position was that, as Americans, the Capoemans were subject to federal income
taxation,306 but that was too simple.  As the Court explained, “The government urges
us to view this case as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty, relevant
statutes, congressional policy concerning Indians, or the guardian-ward relationship
between the United States and these particular Indians.”307  While it is true, wrote Chief
Justice Earl Warren, that “in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or
remedial legislation, [Indians] are subject to the payment of income taxes as are other
Americans,”308 Squire v. Capoeman was no ordinary tax case.
The Capoemans’ situation was not ordinary because there were statutory prov-
isions relating to allotted lands that arguably exempted their timber income.  Therefore,
the Court examined provisions of the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes
Act)309 and a 1906 amendment to that Act310—enactments that defined the nature of the
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311. Squire, 351 U.S. at 7-10.
312. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000) (emphasis added).  In its nearly full form, the proviso to Section 6 of the
General Allotment Act, as amended, reads as follows:
That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is hereby authorized,
whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing
his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and
thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed
. . . .
34 Stat. at 183.
313. Squire, 351 U.S. at 8; see supra note 59 (noting analysis of same language in connection with state
taxation of tribal lands formerly held in trust).
314. Squire, 351 U.S. at 8.
315. See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).  The canons were applied in Squire even though
it was the federal income tax liability of individual Indians, not tribal rights, that was at issue.
316. Squire, 351 U.S. at 9 (quoting COHEN (1942), supra note 130, at 265).  The result in Squire
depended on the land’s having been allotted.  The Service’s position is that, absent statutory or treaty
language to the contrary, income derived from unallotted land is fully taxable to a tribal member.  See Rev.
Rul. 58-320, 1958-1 C.B. 24.
317. The “derived directly” language has a substantial body of rulings, case law, and commentary
interpreting it.  For example, Revenue Ruling 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, lists several types of income that
will be treated as “derived directly” from allotted and restricted lands: rentals (including crop rentals),
royalties, proceeds from sale of natural resources from the land, and so on.  Id. at 57.
Income from reinvesting proceeds from such activities is not exempt, however, and just using land
also does not satisfy the “derived directly” test.  If that were not so, almost any income would be exempt.
For example, relying on Critzer v. United States, 597 F.2d 708 (Ct. Cl. 1979), the Service has said that
income from operating a motel or smoke shop on allotted land is not “derived directly” from the land and
is therefore taxable.  See FAQs Status, supra note 235.  And, in Campbell v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH)
1121 (1997), aff’d, 164 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999), the Tax Court held that a per capita distribution of
gambling proceeds to tribal members was not income derived directly from land.  The use of the land for
a casino did not reduce the land’s economic value.  Id. at 1125.
It is important for exemption that the income be attributable to land that had been allotted to the
tribal member claiming an exemption.  If not, the income is taxable.  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson,
625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a tribal member is taxable on income from grazing cattle under
a tribal license on tribal land allotted to other Indians, although income from grazing on the member’s own
allotted land was tax-free); Holt v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding tribal member taxable
on income earned from sale of cattle he raised on tribal land); see also 1 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 7:216 (2005) (noting distinction “between income from restricted allotted lands and
income from restricted purchased lands,” the latter of which is taxable).
Capoemans’ interest in the lands from which the timber had been taken.311  The Dawes
Act could have been interpreted to preclude all taxation of allotted land until a patent
had been issued.  It was only after the issuance of a patent that “all restrictions as to
sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.”312  This language
suggested to the Court “a congressional intent to subject an Indian allotment to all
taxes only after a patent in fee is issued to the allottee,”313 and that had not happened
with the Capoemans.
Indeed, said the Court, if there was any doubt about how the Dawes Act should be
read in these circumstances, the canons of construction removed that doubt.314  With
the “doubtful expressions” of the Act read favorably to the Capoemans,315 no federal
tax could be imposed on income from the allotted land.  Moreover, relying on writings
of Indian law scholar Felix Cohen, the Court interpreted the exemption to apply not
only to an ad valorem tax, but also to “income derived directly” from the land,316 a
broad category that included the net proceeds from the timber sales.317
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318. Squire, 351 U.S. at 6.  The Internal Revenue Code does contain provisions exempting certain sorts
of income from taxation, such as that from treaty-protected fishing-rights activities, but those rules are
exceptions to the general principle—hence the need to provide specific exceptions.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7873
(West 2007) (stating that no tax can be imposed on income derived by “a member of an Indian tribe directly
or through a qualified Indian entity,” or by “a qualified Indian entity,” from “a fishing rights-related activity
of such tribe”); see also Warbus v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 279, 282-83 (1998) (interpreting § 7873); Jensen,
Warbus, supra note 15. In three cases decided before enactment of section 7873, the Tax Court had ruled
that income from treaty-protected fishing activities was taxable.  See Estate of Peterson v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.
249, 252 (1988); Earl v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 1014, 1020 (1982); Strom v. Comm’r, 6 T.C. 621, 628 (1946),
aff’d per curiam, 158 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1947).   In enacting section 7873, Congress sidestepped the status
of fishing income derived prior to enactment.  Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-647, § 3044(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3642 (“Nothing in the amendments [establishing § 7873] shall
create any inference as to the existence or non-existence or scope of any exemption from tax for income
derived from fishing rights secured as of March 17, 1988 . . . .”).
319. See supra Part III.E.
320. Squire, 351 U.S. at 6-8.
321. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 1974).  Such individuals might be eligible to credit
foreign taxes paid against U.S. tax liability, but that is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional
dictates.
The Squire Court accepted the general proposition—the “tax canon”—that
“exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed.”318  But that proposition merely
began the analysis.  In an Indian law context, individuals searching for “express”
exemptions should do their research mindful of the Indian canons, or at least that was
true until Chickasaw Nation was decided.319  The Court in Squire analyzed the
controlling statutes in a way favorable to the Indian taxpayers to see whether an
“express” exemption existed.320  And, when the canons of construction are applied, the
usual requirement that an exemption from taxation be “express” should not be
interpreted to mean “beyond any doubt.”  That someone can come up with a different
spin on statutory language should not mean, by itself, that a provision is not “express.”
For someone rereading the case today, the most noteworthy aspect of Squire is
how different the analysis was from that applied by the Court in 2001 in Chickasaw
Nation.  In 1956, the canons were taken seriously in statutory interpretation, and the
tax canon was trumped by the Indian canons.  Would Squire be decided differently
today?  I suspect not, given the tie of the timber sales to the allotted land held in trust.
The exemption from taxation was not absolutely clear, but the language of the allot-
ment acts pointed in that direction, with little extrapolation required.  Nevertheless, at
a minimum, a modern version of Squire v. Capoeman would use language very
different from that in Chief Justice Warren’s 1956 opinion.
C.  Federal Taxation of Nonmembers of Tribes
In general, nonmembers of a tribe who do business within Indian country and who
are subject to United States taxation will be liable for federal taxes just as they would
be for transactions entered into elsewhere in the United States.  U.S. citizens and
resident aliens are taxed in the United States on their worldwide income,321 and that
principle should apply with undiminished force to income that is earned in the United
States within the boundaries of Indian country.  For someone not otherwise subject to
U.S. taxation, income earned within Indian country should be taxed to the investor in
the same way that investment income earned elsewhere in the United States would be
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322. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(1) (West 2007).  For such property put in service before 2008, the recovery
period is reduced from what it otherwise would have been.  For example, the cost of five-year property is
recovered over a three-year period, and seven-year property had a four-year recovery period.  Id. § 168(j)(2).
323. See id. § 168(j)(8).  The incentive appeared to have expired at the end of 2005, but, in the Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 112, 120 Stat. 2922, 2940, Congress extended
the accelerated depreciation rules, with retroactive effect, through the end of 2007.
324. Unless Congress provides otherwise, however, the special rules continue to apply to property placed
in service before 2008.
325. This point is subject to the always applicable caveat that Congress could provide otherwise if it
wishes.  In fact, just about every sentence in this Article is subject to that caveat.
326. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
taxed.  The fact that U.S. source income is derived from Indian country should not be
relevant to federal income taxation.
Despite these general rules, the Internal Revenue Code has at various times
included specific incentives for investment in Indian country, such as accelerated
depreciation for “qualified Indian reservation property.”322  The advisors for a would-
be investor must carefully scrutinize the Code to see what special benefits exist at any
particular time, as these things come and go.  The special depreciation rules for
“qualified Indian reservation property,” for example, by their terms apply only to
property placed in service before January 1, 2008,323 so that, unless Congress acts once
again, the special rules will not apply to any property placed in service on or after that
date.324 
V.  STATE POWER TO TAX WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY 
I now turn to state taxing power.  After a brief detour to consider state taxation
outside Indian country, this part of the Article discusses the many important doctrines
that can affect taxing power within Indian country, including legal incidence,
infringement of tribal self-government, and preemption.   The discussion also considers
how some particular factors—such as the role of tribal sovereignty; the economic
burdens a state tax may place on a tribe; and the extent to which a state is trying to tax
value created by a tribe or tribal members—may affect the analysis of state taxing
power.  The penultimate section discusses some special factors affecting both members
and nonmembers on land held in fee within the boundaries of Indian country.  The final
section considers the surprising extent to which a state may tax tribal land, even if the
state is forbidden to reach tribal members or tribal assets more generally.
A.  A Preliminary Detour: Taxation of Transactions Outside Indian Country
Outside Indian country, state taxing power should generally be unconstrained by
doctrines of American Indian law.325  Even a state tax imposed on a recognized tribe
will be upheld to the extent it is imposed on tribal operations outside Indian country.
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,326 the Supreme Court concluded in 1973 that
revenue from a ski resort owned and operated by the Mescalero Apaches, but located
outside the reservation, was subject to a New Mexico gross receipts tax. No doctrine
that might have limited state taxing power in other circumstances—in particular the
infringement and preemption tests, to be considered presently—came into play in that
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327. Note, however, that the federal government does not impose its income tax on a federally
recognized tribe, regardless of where the income is earned, see supra Part IV.A, and Congress could have
preempted the application of state taxes to Indian tribes for activities outside Indian country.  It has not done
so, however.
328. But do not forget the caveat: Congress could provide otherwise and preempt a state tax applied to
off-reservation income.  Cf. infra text accompanying note 331 (noting that either of two tests could prevent
state tax on “activity undertaken . . . by tribal members”).
329. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); see also id. at 220 (“Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”); infra Part V.D.
330. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); infra Part V.G.
331. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
case.327  The same principle should apply to a tribal member’s activities that take place
outside Indian country.328  For example, a tribal member who works off-reservation
should be subject to any state tax on that income, even if the tribal member lives on the
reservation. And persons who are not members of a tribe should be subject to state
taxation for off-reservation activities totally without regard to American Indian law.
B.  Moving Inside Indian Country: The Basic Tests 
For persons within Indian country, or for transactions that occur there, the analysis
is much more complex, particularly for nonmembers of the host tribes.  State power,
including the power to tax, may be limited within Indian country if either the exercise
of state power would “infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves”329 or
the exercise would be preempted by federal law,330 now generally a matter of weighing
federal and tribal interests against state interests.  The infringement and preemption
tests are related: often they will point in the same direction, and someone resisting state
power will generally argue both that the power is preempted and that its exercise would
infringe on tribal self-government.  But the two tests are technically independent.
Either test by itself, the Supreme Court has said, “can be a sufficient basis for holding
state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal
members.”331
As in Part III, the discussion here will consider state power to tax tribes and tribal
members on the one hand—there is little such power—and then consider state power
to tax nonmembers of a tribe, which is substantially greater.  But a set of threshold
questions must first be considered. If it might matter on whom or what a tax falls—and
it might—how do we determine who or what that is?  And how do we determine
whether the potentially taxed activities occurred inside or outside Indian country?
C.  Legal and Economic Incidence: On Whom, on What, 
and Where Does a Tax Fall?
State taxation of tribes and tribal members is generally not permitted in Indian
country, and state taxation of nontribal members generally is permitted.  Lawyers are
inclined to throw a “generally” or two into almost anything they say, just as a matter
of course, but the use of “generally” twice in the last sentence was intentional.
Exceptions to generally applicable rules in Indian country almost always exist, and, in
any event, Congress can change the rules.
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332. Outside American Indian law, it also legitimizes a state tax that falls, in form, on a private party,
even though the economic burden is borne by the federal government.  See United States v. New Mexico,
455 U.S. 720 (1982) (holding that legal incidence controls in such a case, even if negative consequences
to the federal government are obvious because of contractual arrangements with the nominally taxed party).
But see Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 855-57 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that treating tax on gross receipts of a non-Indian contractor doing school construction
in Indian country as preempted gave greater protection to Indian tribes than was provided to the federal
government in New Mexico).
333. Nothing is always the case in this area, however, and, as was noted earlier, a state tax on tribal land
may be valid in special circumstances—if the land is alienable, see County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998), or it has lost its Indian character and the federal government has
not placed the land in trust, as was true in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S.
197 (2005). See supra Part II.C; infra Part V.I.
334. That is not always true, however. Federal preemption has been found in some cases in which a state
tax fell on a non-Indian.  See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685
(1965); infra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
335. For example, in California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9
(1985), the Supreme Court said the conclusion that the legal incidence fell on a purchaser was “nothing
more than a fair interpretation of the taxing statute as written and applied.” Id. at 11.
In addition, that apparently simple statement—dividing the universe into tribes and
tribal members, on the one hand, and everyone else, on the other—masks some critical
issues.  We do not know what set of rules to apply until we decide who is being taxed.
How do we determine when a tax is treated as falling on a tribe or tribal member?  Two
other related questions also can affect which body of rules to apply.  With goods and
services moving in a stream of commerce, how do we tell what is being taxed, and how
do we determine whether a taxed transaction occurs inside or outside Indian country?
The who-is-being-taxed question is supposed to be answered by looking at the
“legal incidence” of the tax.  The cases have generally distinguished between legal
incidence—who, under state law, has the formal obligation to satisfy the tax—and
economic incidence—who really bears the economic burden of the levy.
“Legal incidence” is a formalistic concept that does not look to economic realities,
but it has enormous effect in this context.332  If the legal incidence of a state tax
associated with events inside Indian country falls on a tribe or tribal member, the tax
is likely to be invalid.333  In contrast, if the legal incidence falls on a nontribal member,
the tax is likely to be valid, even if the tax has arguably disastrous economic effects for
the tribe.334  For example, if the statute says that a sales tax is imposed on a product’s
purchaser, and an on-reservation purchaser is not an Indian, the tax is likely to be valid
even if the Indian tribe bears the economic burden of the tax.
If a state statute is silent about legal incidence, a decision maker evaluating a tax
must examine the workings of the statute.  The question is ultimately one of intent: on
whom did the state legislature expect the legal obligation to fall?  That is not
necessarily an easy question, but, with some state taxes, presumptions as to legal
incidence are likely to control if nothing is explicit in the statute.  For example, unless
statutory language provides to the contrary, a court is likely to assume that a legislature
intended for a sales tax to be passed on to the ultimate purchasers of the taxed product,
regardless of whether that in fact happens, or could have been expected to happen,
economically.335
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336. 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
337. Given the limitations on state power in Indian country, there are obviously problems in enforcing
state taxes on on-reservation sales, particularly if the sales are made at tribal outlets.  Such problems have
nevertheless not been considered to disable state taxing power.  In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), the Supreme Court suggested five things states could do
if their enforcement power on reservations is otherwise limited: impose liability on individual agents of
tribes for failing to collect the taxes; seize untaxed cigarettes in shipment to reservations; collect taxes from
wholesalers off reservations; enter into collection agreements with tribes; and seek congressional legislation.
Id. at 513-14.
In Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994), the Court
upheld a New York regulatory scheme applied to wholesalers who sold untaxed cigarettes to reservation
Indians.  The Court noted that some of the broadest interpretations of Warren Trading Post, a case that
forbid a state tax on a licensed Indian trader doing business on a reservation, see infra notes 409-12 and
accompanying text, had been cut back by the cigarette tax cases:
In particular, these cases have decided that States may impose on reservation retailers
minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians. . . .
It would be anomalous to hold that a State could impose tax collection and bookkeeping
burdens on reservation retailers who are themselves enrolled tribal members, including
stores operated by the tribes themselves, but that similar burdens could not be imposed on
wholesalers, who often (as in this case) are not.
Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. at 73.
338. An earlier case, Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), had similarly concluded
that a state cigarette tax was valid despite its effect on on-reservation sales.  The Court in Colville
considered, among other things, whether the result in Moe would have been different had the tribes in that
case also imposed their own cigarette taxes; the answer was no.  Colville, 447 U.S. at 152.
339. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
340. Id. at 458-59 (citation omitted).
A number of cigarette tax cases stand for the proposition that state taxes may be
imposed on nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at on-reservation tribal outlets—the
legal incidence was on the non-Indian purchasers—even if the economic effect of the
taxes was detrimental to the affected tribes.  In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation,336 for example, the Court in 1980 upheld a state tax
on reservation cigarette sales to nonmembers—the state conceded it could not tax sales
to tribal members—when it was unquestionably the case that enforcement of the tax
would cost the tribes substantial revenue.337  The tribes, which generally operated as
retailers of the cigarettes, depended on an exemption from state taxation to compete
with off-reservation vendors, to make it worthwhile for nonmembers to drive the
additional distance to make on-reservation purchases.  With the state tax in place, the
market for on-reservation sales to nonmembers dried up, and the tribes lost profits from
sales and revenue from the tribes’ own cigarette taxes.338  The economic burden of the
state tax thus fell on the tribes, but that did not affect the result.
The Court reemphasized the significance of legal incidence in 1995, in Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation:339 
The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . is who
bears the legal incidence of a tax. If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a
tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be
enforced absent clear congressional authorization. . . . But if the legal incidence of the
tax rests on non-Indians, no categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax . . . .340
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341. Id. at 459-60.
342. Id. at 460 (quoting Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae 2).
343. Not all taxes are totally under state control, however.  If a state tried to characterize the legal
incidence of a tax that reached a tribal member’s income as falling on a nonmember, presumably a court
would reject that characterization.  In addition, occasionally the Supreme Court has held that taxes on non-
Indians associated with activity within Indian country were preempted despite the legal incidence of the
taxes.  See infra Part V.G.1.
344. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. at 460.  But see supra note 343 (suggesting limits on the extent
to which a state can recharacterize the incidence of some taxes).
345. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
346. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
347. The Potawatomi Nation had argued that, in fact, the tax was imposed on “distributors’ use, sale,
or delivery of the motor fuel—in this case, the distributors’ (on-reservation) sale or delivery to the Nation.”
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 107.  However, the Court rejected that argument.
For American lawyers, weaned on substance-over-form doctrines, the legal
incidence test might seem like nonsense on stilts.  How in the world can we ignore
potentially cataclysmic economic effects in evaluating the legitimacy of a tax?
Whether or not the concept is nonsensical, however, a great deal turns on it.
The concept has the benefit of leading to generally predictable results.
Predictability has something to be said for it, especially for courts wishing to avoid
complicated, case-specific economic analysis.  As the Supreme Court explained in
Oklahoma Tax Commission,
[O]ur focus on a tax’s legal incidence accommodates the reality that tax
administration requires predictability. . . . If we were to make “economic reality” our
guide, we might be obliged to consider, for example, how completely retailers can
pass along tax increases without sacrificing sales volume—a complicated matter
dependent on the characteristics of the market for the relevant product.341 
In contrast, legal incidence “provide[s] a reasonably bright-line standard which, from
a tax administration perspective, responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the
permissible scope of state taxation authority.”342
The legal incidence test thus has an element of good sense behind it (although the
Supreme Court might have overstated the extent of predictability that results), and it
is not as though the Court failed to understand the consequences of its formalistic
decisions.  Relying on legal incidence as a key test effectively gives states the power
to determine the legitimacy of many state taxes within Indian country.343  If a state
characterizes the legal incidence of a tax as falling on a tribe or tribal member for on-
reservation activities, making the tax all but automatically invalid, the state can often
redress the problem by rewriting the statute.  As the Court has noted, a “[s]tate
generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.”344  Presumably a
state is less free to rewrite the laws of economics.
In 2005, the importance of legal incidence was reemphasized with a vengeance in
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,345 discussed earlier in connection with
the reduced importance of the Indian canons.346  A state tax was levied on the receipt
of fuel by non-Indian distributors (off-reservation, or so it was assumed),347 who then
delivered the fuel to a tribally-owned gas station on the Potawatomi Nation’s reserva-
tion.  The district court and the Tenth Circuit had both done preemption analyses, but
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348. Id. at 100-01.
349. Id. at 113-14.
350. Id. at 110 (“The Bracker interest-balancing test has never been applied where, as here, the State
asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the reservation.”).  However, the questions as to legal
incidence (Indian versus non-Indian) and as to what was being taxed (on-reservation versus off-reservation
activity) were not necessarily as straightforward as the majority suggested.  See infra notes 353-55 and
accompanying text.
351. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110 (quoting Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32,
37 (1999)).  The Court in Blaze Construction had similarly concluded that preemption analysis was
unnecessary when the legal incidence of a state tax fell on a corporation that, although tribal in nature, was
not created by the tribes (or tribal members) on whose reservations work was done.  Blaze was formed
under the laws of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana and was owned by a member of that tribe.  The company
had no special status on Arizona reservations. Blaze Construction, 526 U.S. at 34-36.
352. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1980)).
353. Id. at 119-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674 (9th
Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit looked carefully at a tax on motor fuel delivered by non-Indian distributors
to tribally-owned stations for on-reservation sale.  Although the tax was paid to the state by the distributors,
the court determined that the legal incidence was on the tribes (and the tax was therefore invalid) because
the arrangement was a “collect and remit” scheme: the distributor was merely collecting tax the legal
obligation for which was on the tribe.
354. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 120-21.
had come to different conclusions about the relative importance of the governmental
interests involved.348  Both courts thought they were following Supreme Court dictates,
but the Court concluded that, in these circumstances, no preemption analysis was
necessary at all.349
The legal incidence was on the non-Indian distributors, and the tax related to
transactions that occurred off the reservation.  That, concluded the Court, was all one
needed to know to decide the case.350  Preemption analysis was required only where
“‘the legal incidence of the tax fell on a nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with
tribes or tribal members’ on the reservation”351—that is, when “a State asserts authority
over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”352  In
Wagnon, preemption analysis was deemed to be unnecessary because the taxed person
was non-Indian and the taxed transaction occurred outside Indian country.
Dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy questioned almost every proposition
advanced in Wagnon.  The legal incidence was not clear, they argued, when one looked
at how the statute was intended to work: the legislature had anticipated that distributors
would shift the tax burden downstream, and that anticipation should be taken into
account in determining legal incidence.353  Furthermore, Justices Ginsburg and
Kennedy stressed that legal incidence had historically been controlling only when a tax
fell on a tribe or tribal member.  Such a state tax would be impermissible, unless
Congress provided otherwise, but in other cases legal incidence should lead to no
categorical rule, and preemption analysis should kick in.354
But formalism controlled to determine legal incidence, and it also controlled to
determine what was being taxed and where the what was.  The Wagnon Court had
determined that the tax was on the distributors’ receipt of gasoline, which occurred off-
reservation, and shut its collective eyes to what everyone knew would happen with the
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355. See supra note 347 (noting tribes’ argument in Wagnon that tax was effectively an on-reservation
sale or delivery to tribal gas station); see also COHEN, supra note 16, at 695 (noting that a tax on the
ownership of a vehicle will be treated as a tax on the reservation if that is where the owner of the vehicle
resides).
356. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
357. The Court noted that “it is undisputed that the economic burden of the asserted taxes will ultimately
fall on the Tribe,” id. at 151 (footnote omitted), as if that point were legally relevant.  The Court then pulled
back in a footnote. See id. at 151 n.15.
358. Indeed, that was one of the points made in dissent by Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy in Wagnon:
Bracker had pointed to the importance of economic burdens, and, the justices said, there is a serious
question with taxes that are “formally imposed on nonmembers [but] that nonetheless burden on-
reservation tribal activity.”  Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 123.
359. See infra Part V.G.2.a.
360. See supra Part III.C.
361. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
362. Id. at 223.
363. Id. at 220.  Williams was effectively a bad debt suit by a licensed Indian trader against one of his
Indian customers.  Id. at 218.  The suit was brought in Arizona state court, however, and the tribal member
resisted state court jurisdiction.  Id.  The Supreme Court held the dispute had to be resolved in tribal court.
Id. at 223.  To do otherwise would have interfered with tribal self-government, and as the Court noted, “The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”
Id.
gas.  After all, there would have been no transactions with the distributors, and thus
nothing to tax, unless the gas was destined for redelivery elsewhere.355
Having said that it is legal rather than economic incidence (and thus formalism
rather than substance) that generally controls, I should note that the Court hinted in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,356 decided in 1980, that economic incidence
is not altogether irrelevant.357  The Court in some later cases followed through, in a
haphazard way, on that hint: having the economic burden of a state tax fall on a tribe
might be a factor pointing in the direction of federal preemption of the tax.358  I will
return to that question in the discussion of the particulars of the preemption doctrine,359
following a brief discussion of the infringement test.
D.  The Infringement Test: Seldom Decisive in the Tax Context
Although the Supreme Court has said that the infringement and preemption tests
are independent limitations on state power, the cases involving state taxation within
Indian country have overwhelmingly applied preemption doctrine, with at most a
passing reference to infringement.
The infringement test, obviously derived from notions of tribal sovereignty,360 was
enunciated in the 1959 decision in Williams v. Lee.361  The critical question is whether
an exercise of state power would “infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves.”362  Or to make the same point in a slightly different way, “absent
governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”363
Important as that issue may be in the abstract—it sounds significant—the test has
seldom been decisive in tax cases. Several factors are responsible for this.  To begin
with, as noted in the discussion of legal incidence, it is taken for granted that, unless
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364. There can of course be disputes about legal incidence—about whether a tax is really on a tribe (and
thus invalid) or on someone else (and thus potentially valid).  See supra Part V.C.
365. As with state taxes on tribes, taxation of tribal members is also generally deemed to be preempted
if the taxed activities occur in Indian country.   Whether a tax imposed on tribal members for on-reservation
activities would really infringe on tribal self-government might seem to be a more difficult determination,
but this issue also has disappeared.  In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164
(1973), the Supreme Court invalidated the application of a state income tax to a member of the Navajo
Nation, all of whose income came from on-reservation activities.  The result in the case depended on
preemption analysis, see infra notes 389-92 and accompanying text, but the Court also responded to
Arizona’s argument that the tax was valid because it did not infringe on tribal self-government.
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179-80.   The Court made several points, one of which was that the infringement
test was irrelevant in such a situation, stating that “[s]ince appellant is an Indian and since her income is
derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity is totally within the sphere which the relevant treaty
and statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the Indians themselves.”  Id. at 179-80.  Moreover,
the Court said, inaccurately and counterintuitively, that the infringement test had “dealt principally with
situations involving non-Indians.”  Id. at 179.  Finally, although the Court relied on preemption in
McClanahan, it also suggested that a tax on individual Indians might well have violated the infringement
test as well.  See id.  ( “[W]e are far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes upon reservation
members without their consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal self-determination.”); id. at 181
(“[T]he question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians [not
tribes per se] to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” (alteration added) (quoting Williams, 358 U.S.
at 220)).
366. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
367. Id. at 172.  In Ramah Navajo School Board Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982),
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that in some cases infringement might preclude application of a state law,
“[b]ut apart from those rare instances in which the State attempts to interfere with the residual sovereignty
of a tribe to govern its members,” tribal sovereignty merely provides a “backdrop” for preemption analysis.
Id. at 848.
368. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172; infra Part V.G.2.a.
369. See supra Part V.B.
Congress provides otherwise, states cannot tax Indian tribes directly.  A direct tax on
a tribe might very well be treated as infringing on tribal self-government as well, but
that does not matter if, under accepted authority, the tax is preempted anyway.364
Once we move away from state taxes on tribes or tribal members,365 the infringe-
ment test becomes less significant as tribal sovereignty over nonmembers has
diminished in importance.  As the Supreme Court said in McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission,366 in 1973, “[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent
tribal sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-
emption.”367
Furthermore, the balancing test mandated in preemption analysis is supposed to
take into account tribal interests—weighing federal and tribal interests against state
interests, and doing so with tribal sovereignty as a “backdrop.”368  A state tax on non-
Indians that did in fact infringe on tribal self-government would almost certainly be
treated as being preempted as well.  After all, can one imagine a stronger tribal
interest?   In addition, as was true with a tax levied directly on a tribe, the infringement
test would be unnecessary to reach the no-tax result.  Although technically indepen-
dent, the infringement and preemption tests generally point in the same direction,369
and, in the tax context at least, preemption has effectively swallowed infringement.
Finally, although state taxation of nonmembers can affect tribal revenues indirectly
(and sometimes directly), the Supreme Court has said that a negative effect on tribal
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370. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
371. Id. at 156 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)) (citation omitted); see also Wagnon
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 114-15 (2005) (noting that concurrent state and tribal
taxing authority may place “economic burdens on the competing sovereign” without altering “the
concurrent nature of the taxing authority” (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 184 n.9 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, concurring in the result
in part, and dissenting in part))); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989)
(“Under current doctrine, . . . a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the
United States or an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the
United States or tribe.”).
372. But see Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
state severance tax on coal and a gross receipts tax on coal mining damaged the marketability of Montana-
produced coal to such an extent that the “substantial burden” imposed on a tribe infringed on tribal self-
government and was preempted by federal law).
373. For example, in Jefferson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 631 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2001), a tribal
couple who lived outside a reservation but received per capita distributions attributable to gambling
proceeds unsuccessfully argued that the Minnesota income tax, as applied to them, infringed on tribal self-
government. See also infra note 394 (noting loss on preemption issue as well).
374. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
375. See supra Part V.C.
revenue is not enough, by itself, to result in infringement or preemption.  For example,
in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,370 the Court
wrote in 1980 that a state “does not infringe the right of reservation Indians to ‘make
their own laws and be ruled by them’ merely because the result of imposing its taxes
will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are receiving.”371  If that
were not so, any state policy that had negative effects on tribal economic well-being
might be treated as violating the test.  Perhaps that should be the law, but Supreme
Court decisions have never supported such a position.372
Of course, someone who is resisting the imposition of a state tax in Indian country
is going to argue both infringement and preemption.  One tailors his arguments to fit
existing doctrine—the infringement test is still nominally part of the law—and puts
together the best possible case for infringement.373  But resolution of such a dispute is
almost certainly going to depend not on infringement analysis, but on preemption, the
subject to which we now turn.
E.  Federal Preemption Doctrine: Introduction
Determining whether an exercise of state power is preempted by federal law is
supposed to require discovering congressional intent,374 a principle that is easier to
state than to apply.  If it is clear that Congress intended for federal law to preempt state
law—assuming, of course, that Congress has the constitutional authority to begin with
—then, under the Supremacy Clause, the state cannot exercise its power.
Sometimes the results of this analysis are straightforward.  As is discussed in the
next section, except for some special situations, states cannot tax tribes or tribal
members for activities conducted in Indian country.  It may not always be clear
whether the incidence of a tax falls on a tribe or its members, and it may not always be
clear that what is being taxed is within Indian country.375  But if those difficult issues
are resolved in a way that gives the critical factors a tribal flavor, the governing
principle is easy.
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376. See supra Part V.G.
377. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
378. Id. at 175.
379. For a list of the types of state taxes that have been held invalid under this principle, see COHEN,
supra note 16, at 693.
380. The inapplicability of state tax to tribes also appears to have a connection to the largely abandoned
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.  See supra Part IV.A.3. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), the Court wrote that federal immunity from state taxation, which exists unless
Congress gives permission for the national government to be taxed, “is shared by the Indian tribes for whose
benefit the United States holds reservation land in trust.”  Id. at 175 (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)).
For nonmembers, the results can be clear.376  As the Court explained in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,377 “Under current doctrine, . . . a State can impose a
nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the United States or an Indian tribe
does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the United States
or tribe.”378  It therefore makes sense to start with the presumption that a state may levy
its taxes on tribal nonmembers doing business in Indian country.
But any such presumption is potentially rebuttable.  Historically, a number of
Supreme Court cases concluded that state taxes directed at activities in Indian country
were forbidden even though the legal incidence was on nonmembers of the host tribe;
the federal regulatory structure was so pervasive that state power was preempted.  And
several cases have suggested that, if the economic burden of a tax, the legal incidence
of which is on a nonmember, in fact falls on a tribe or its members, that economic
burden may be taken into account in preemption analysis.  We need not close our eyes,
that is, to significant negative effects on a tribe. In a close case, economic incidence
may tip the balance in favor of preemption of a state tax.
The extent to which economic incidence and other factors might point toward
preemption today should not be overstated, however.  It has been quite a while since
the Supreme Court determined that an exercise of state taxing power was preempted,
and preemption as a limit on state taxation of nonmembers may be disappearing into
the mists.  In that respect, state taxation in Indian country is getting simpler and more
predictable, but at a significant cost both to potential investors and, because of the
resulting disincentive to invest in Indian country, to the tribes themselves.
F.  Federal Preemption Doctrine: State Taxation of Tribes and Tribal Members
1.  Federal Preemption Generally
State taxes are generally inapplicable to tribes, federally chartered tribal
corporations, tribal property, and tribal members as long as the activity or property that
would otherwise be taxed is within Indian country.379  This is technically the result of
preemption analysis, the details of which will be discussed below,380 but little or no
thought is required.  If the legal incidence of a tax falls on a tribe or tribal member—
except for cases like County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
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381. 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (permitting state taxation of formerly allotted tribal land now held in fee by
tribes or tribal members); see also Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103
(1998) (extending Yakima Nation); infra notes 507-10 and accompanying text.
382. 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (holding that the state of New York could tax tribal land that had lost its
Indian character and that the United States was not holding in trust).
383. See supra Part II.C; infra Part V.I.
384. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
385. Id. at 215 n.17 (citation omitted) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759,
765 (1985)); see supra Part III.A.2.
386. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
387. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 215 n.17.
Indian Nation381 or City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York382 that permit
state taxation of tribal land in special circumstances383—the result of preemption
analysis is now a given.  The results are just accepted.
Thus, except for certain ad valorem taxes on real property of a tribe or tribal
member, the state-may-not-tax principle is close to a per se rule. In fact, the Supreme
Court characterized it in that way in 1987, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians:384
In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes and tribal members, we have
adopted a per se rule.  In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, we held that Montana could not
tax the Tribe’s royalty interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees
under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.  We stated: “In keeping with its
plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress can authorize the imposition of state
taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians.  It has not done so often, and the Court
consistently has held that it will find the Indians’ exemption from state taxes lifted
only when Congress has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear.”385 
The existence of a per se rule (or what was a per se rule until Yakima Nation, Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,386 and City of Sherrill came along)
was evidenced in many cases over the years.  Going through a preemption analysis
every time a state tried to tax a tribe or tribal member for activities within Indian
country would be a waste of time:
We have repeatedly addressed the issue of state taxation of tribes and tribal members
and the state, federal, and tribal interests which it implicates.  We have recognized
that the federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and that
the state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak.  Accordingly, it is unnecessary
to rebalance these interests in every case.387 
And whatever the rules in other areas, taxation is sui generis:
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones [permitting New Mexico to tax tribal income
earned outside a reservation], we distinguished state taxation from other assertions of
state jurisdiction.  We acknowledged that we had made repeated statements “to the
effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application
would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or
reserved by federal law.  Even so, in the special area of state taxation, absent cession
of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory
authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried
on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
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388. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)); see
supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
389. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
390. See, e.g., Treaty with the Navajo, Aug. 12, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, 668 (setting aside reservation “for
the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians”); Act of June 20, 1910 (Arizona Enabling Act), ch.
310, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (noting that Arizona agrees to “disclaim all right and title to . . . all lands lying within
said boundaries” of Indian tribes, and providing that “nothing herein . . . shall preclude [Arizona] from
taxing, as other lands and other property are taxed, any lands and other property outside of an Indian
reservation owned or held by any Indian”) (emphasis added)); Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 109 (2000) (providing
guidance about state taxation in federal areas, but noting that “[n]othing in sections 105 and 106 . . . shall
be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax from any Indian not otherwise taxed”).  Moreover,
Arizona had not exercised Public Law 280 jurisdiction, see infra Part V.F.2, which might have strengthened
its claim to authority within Indian country (although it would not have been dispositive on this particular
issue).  McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 177-79.
391. The state tax should be deductible for purposes of the regular federal income tax, see I.R.C. §
164(a)(3) (West 2007), but that result is not constitutionally required.
392. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 173-79.
393. See, e.g., George v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 548 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1989) (holding that New York could
tax income earned by an Onondaga Indian who lived and earned income off the reservation).
394. In Jefferson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 631 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2001), a tribal couple who lived
off a reservation but received per capita distributions from the tribe’s gambling proceeds argued that the
Minnesota income tax, as it applied to them, was preempted by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument, concluding that nothing in the applicable section of
IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(D) (2000), precluded state taxation of such per capita payments to off-
reservation tribal members.  Jefferson, 631 N.W.2d at 396.
Commission lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not
permissible absent congressional consent.”388 
Nothing more needs to be said.
As the excerpt from Cabazon Band indicates, the most important case on point is
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,389 decided in 1973, in which the
Supreme Court looked at a multitude of authority—including a treaty, statutes, and
case law,390 all read in light of the Indian canons of construction—to conclude that
Arizona was preempted from taxing a Navajo Nation member’s income that had been
earned on the reservation.
The McClanahan result is striking.  Outside American Indian law, different
governments can generally tax the same person or the same transaction without
preemption being a problem.  No one, for example, doubts that both the national
government and a state government can impose income taxes that reach the same
income; in fact, except for a few states that have no income tax, that situation is the
norm.391  Nothing in the constitutional structure requires that a state tax automatically
give way to a federal one.  The two can coexist, and they ordinarily do.  Nevertheless,
the state income tax in McClanahan was held to have been preempted as it applied to
a tribal member working on the reservation.392
The no-tax principle does not apply if, for example, a tribal member earns his
income outside Indian country.393  And it is not clear whether an enrolled member of
a tribe who earns income within a reservation but lives outside it may have his income
taxed by the state.394  Difficult questions thus remain at the margin, but the general rule
of McClanahan is as clear as can be.
2008] TAXATION AND INDIAN COUNTRY 67
395. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
396. Id. at 480-81; see infra Part V.I (discussing state taxation on fee land within Indian country).
397. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992) (permitting state taxation of formerly allotted tribal land now held in fee by tribes or tribal
members); see also Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (extending
Yakima Nation to alienable land generally); supra Part II.C; infra notes 507-11 and accompanying text.
398. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
399. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000).
400. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000).
401. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
402. Id. at 385-89.
403. It is peculiar that Public Law 280 granted the affected states criminal jurisdiction, at one extreme,
and jurisdiction over private causes of action, at the other, but no jurisdiction over civil regulatory matters,
which might be conceptualized as the great middle.  The result in Bryan is defensible, however, in light of
statutory language and the Court’s unwillingness, in 1976, to encroach on tribal prerogatives without
express congressional authority.  If it were starting from scratch, today’s Court might not be so sensitive
to tribal interests, but Bryan is settled law.
In 1976, in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,395 which is best known
for concluding that a state could tax on-reservation cigarette sales to nonmembers, the
Court also held that several other state levies—cigarette sales taxes, personal property
taxes, and vendor licensing fees—could not apply to tribal members even if the taxes
related to events occurring, or personal property held, on fee lands within a
reservation.396  One of the striking things about later cases that considered state
taxation of tribal land was that Moe effectively provided personal property greater
protection from state taxation than is now available for alienable tribal land, which can
be reached by a state ad valorem property tax.397 
2.  Does Public Law 280 Matter in Taxation of Tribes and Tribal Members?
As part of an assimilationist move in the early years of the Eisenhower
administration, Congress enacted what is still known as Public Law 280,398 giving
specified states the power to exert criminal jurisdiction “over offenses committed by
or against Indians” to the same extent those states would have jurisdiction over similar
offenses committed outside Indian country.399  Public Law 280 also provided the states
jurisdiction “over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties.”400  When applicable, Public Law 280 thus gave some states significant power
within Indian country.
But the power was not unlimited.  The details of Public Law 280 have changed
over the years, but the basics have not.  Public Law 280’s treatment of criminal
jurisdiction is irrelevant to taxing issues within Indian country, and in the 1976
decision of Bryan v. Itasca County,401 the Supreme Court interpreted the term “civil
causes of action” to be limited to private causes of action.402  If civil regulatory
jurisdiction is outside the scope of Public Law 280, the statute does not increase a
state’s taxing power within Indian country.403
Nor does other language in Public Law 280 support an assertion of state taxing
authority.  Both the criminal provision and the civil provision specifically note that
“[n]othing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of
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404. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see Bryan, 426 U.S.
at 390.
405. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390-93.
any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject
to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States.”404
That language is atrociously put together.  The phrase “that is held in trust by the
United States” sits far away from the language it must have been intended to modify,
as presumably it is not the “community” that might be held in trust. The language was
clearly intended to prevent state taxation of land held in trust by the United States, but
it was also interpreted in Bryan to prevent application of a state tax to personal
property held by Indians within Indian country, even though personal property would
ordinarily not be understood as “being held in trust by the United States.”405  In short,
the results were those one would have expected if Public Law 280 had not been on the
books at all. 
Public Law 280 thus should have no effect on the issues discussed in this section
of the Article.  With Public Law 280 interpreted in that way, even states that have
exercised jurisdiction may not tax tribes or tribal members in connection with
activities, including income-generating activities, within reservation boundaries.
G.  Federal Preemption Doctrine: State Taxation of Non-Indians
The taxation (or actually non-taxation) of tribes and tribal members is fairly clear
under preemption analysis.  But the real issues affecting state taxation arise with
persons in Indian country who are not members of the host tribe.  This section first
discusses several older cases that invalidated state taxes affecting non-Indians in
situations where the federal regulatory power was pervasive.  It then considers the
currently mandated balancing analysis in preemption analysis.  Finally, it considers
whether preemption analysis really matters anymore.
1.  Pervasiveness of the Federal Regulatory Scheme
Preemption analysis is supposed to depend on intent: did Congress intend to
preempt exercises of state power within Indian country?  If Congress was clear that it
intended to do that, under the federal plenary power doctrine the analysis is over: state
power may not be exercised.  But Congress is seldom so explicit.
When first developed, preemption analysis in American Indian law required an
examination of the pervasiveness of federal regulatory control: the more pervasive the
federal involvement, the greater the likelihood that state power would be preempted.
Conceptually the easiest case for preemption, so understood, is when the federal
government and the state government impose inconsistent regulatory schemes on the
same activity.  If the two systems cannot coexist—if there is no way for them to mesh
—the federal system prevails, assuming, of course, that the federal government is
acting within its constitutional powers to begin with.
One might have thought that taxation is an area in which preemption would not
occur, except perhaps for a tax that is primarily regulatory, rather than revenue-raising,
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406. This distinction is obviously not an “either/or” one.  Any tax system has both regulatory and
revenue-raising aspects.
407. See supra notes 389-92 and accompanying text.
408. PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 12.
409. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
410. PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 8.
411. Warren Trading Post was decided six years after Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the case
that enunciated the infringement test.  See supra Part V.D.  Infringement was a totally implausible argument
in Warren Trading Post as the tax on an Indian trader had no conceivable connection with tribal self-
government.  Had it not been for the development of a different doctrine, preemption, the state tax would
have been easily upheld.
in nature.406  Nevertheless, although in other contexts different sovereigns can tax the
same activity without raising preemption problems—the federal and state governments
tax the same activities all the time—in American Indian law preemption can constrain
a state’s imposition of something as ordinarily noncontroversial as an individual
income tax.  In McClanahan, it might have been difficult to see any conflict between
federal and state income taxes, but the Court held that Congress had intended to
preempt state taxation of a tribal member’s income anyway.407
a.  Effect on the Power of States to Tax Nonmembers of Tribes
Many of the key cases that relied on the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
structure to preempt state taxing power involved state attempts to tax non-Indians
doing business with tribes or tribal members.  Although states are generally permitted
to impose their taxes on nonmembers of a tribe, that is not always the case.  If the
federal government has a comprehensive regulatory regime in place, the state taxation
is suspect.  In addition—or maybe this is just another way of saying the same thing—a
state’s basis for imposing its own tax is weakened considerably if it plays little or no
role in regulating the activity sought to be taxed.  If the state has effectively conceded
the field to the federal and tribal governments, tribal interests are likely to prevail.  As
Pirtle and colleagues have explained, “The Supreme Court has . . . recognized that
there comes a point at which the state’s interest in an activity is so limited that it has
no corresponding right to tax that activity.”408
The cases relying on the extent of federal regulation come from a two-decade
period between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, and it is not clear that today’s
Supreme Court, were it to revisit these issues, would find preemption on the same
facts.  Those old cases are on the books, however, and it remains the case that
Congress can preempt state taxing power if it wishes to do so.
In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,409 the first great
Indian law preemption case, the Supreme Court in 1965 concluded that Arizona’s two-
percent transaction privilege tax was invalid as it applied to a federally licensed
“Indian trader,” not an Indian himself, doing business on a reservation: the tax
“intruded into the area of federal licensing and regulation of Indian traders on
reservations.”410  Viewed by itself, the privilege tax, which was basically a gross
receipts tax, was not at all intrusive.411  But the Court examined the tax in the context
of federal regulation of Indian traders—regulation traceable to the early years of the
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412. I find the pervasiveness analysis unpersuasive when a gross receipts tax is involved.  Warren
Trading Post was clearly the product of a Court much more tribal-friendly than the current one.  If today’s
Court were to start over in its consideration of taxation in Indian country, a case like Warren Trading Post
might very well be decided differently.  Nevertheless, Congress has had four decades to change the rules
governing state taxation of Indian traders, and it has not done so.
413. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 691.
414. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
415. Id. at 149.
416. Id. (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
417. Id. at 150.
418. See id. at 148-49 (noting that the state was “unable to identify any regulatory function or service
[it] performed . . . that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal roads within
the reservation”); see also Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 174 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“The State has no interest in raising revenues from the use of Indian roads that cost it nothing
and over which it exercises no control.”).
419. The Court said that it was “undisputed that the economic burden of the asserted taxes will
ultimately fall on the Tribe,” Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151, as if that point were legally relevant.  In a footnote,
however, the Court wrote that “the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by
itself mean that the tax is preempted, as Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes [one of the cigarette sales tax
cases] makes clear.”  Id. at 151 n.15 (citation omitted); see also infra Part V.G.2.c (discussing the
significance of economic incidence in preemption analysis).
420. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
Republic—and the level of regulation was such that the Court saw no scope for state
action at all, even the imposition of a relatively unintrusive tax.412  The state, quite
simply, had been left “with no duties or responsibilities”413 that would justify enforcing
a tax.
In several other cases involving state taxation of nonmembers, a preemption result
also depended on the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory structure, rather than on
the effects on a tribe or tribal members.  For example, in White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker,414 the Court held in 1980 that two state taxes—a motor vehicle license tax
(effectively a gross receipts tax) and a use fuel tax, the legal incidences of which were
on a non-Indian logging company—had been preempted.  The federal government had
“undertaken to regulate the most minute details” of timber operations in Indian
country,415 and, had state taxation been permitted, it would have undermined federal
policy governing logging on Indian lands, “guaranteeing Indians that they will ‘receive
. . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding.’”416  In addition—
in language pointing to the balancing that would be explicitly used in later cases—the
Court noted that the roads over which the logging company drove were “built,
maintained, and policed exclusively by the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its con-
tractors.”417  The state really had nothing to do with the logging or road maintenance
operations.418
The economic burden of the taxes in Bracker had been shifted, via contract, to the
White Mountain Apache Tribe.  The Court noted that fact, suggestively hinting that it
might have been relevant, but then dropped a footnote suggesting that economic
incidence was really not that important.419  It was the extent of federal regulation, not
the economic burden, that controlled.
Similarly, in Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission,420 also decided
in 1980, the Arizona transaction privilege tax that had been at issue in Warren Trading
2008] TAXATION AND INDIAN COUNTRY 71
421. PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 13.
422. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
423. Id. at 839 (“Federal regulation of the construction and financing of Indian educational institutions
is both comprehensive and pervasive.”).  The Court referred to the “detailed regulatory scheme governing
the construction of autonomous Indian educational facilities,” characterizing it as “at least as
comprehensive as the federal scheme” in Bracker.  Id. at 841.
424. In form, the school board reimbursed the construction company, but the funds came from
congressional appropriations.  Id. at 835-36.
425. Id. at 843 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965)).  The
economic incidence was actually on the federal government, but the Court noted that a different result
would have negatively affected Indian education: “This burden, although nominally falling on the non-
Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting the ‘quality and
quantity’ of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction of
Indian schools.”  Id. at 842.
426. 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994).
427. Id. at 435.
Post was held invalid as it applied to an on-reservation sale of farm machinery—a one-
shot deal—to the Gila River Indian Tribe.  The price of the machinery was increased
by the amount of the tax, and there was thus an unhappy economic consequence for the
tribe.  But, as with Bracker, that was not the central point of the case.  As Pirtle and
colleagues explain, “[The] economic incidence was important, not because an
economic burden on a tribe will automatically invalidate a state tax, but because the
federal government had shown by its regulation of Indian traders that it was concerned
with prices paid by Indians for goods on the reservation.”421  
Finally, in Ramah Navajo School Board Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue,422 the Court
in 1982 held that a New Mexico gross receipts tax imposed on a non-Indian
corporation contracting with a tribal school board to build a school was invalid because
the federal regulatory structure governing Indian education, including school
construction, was all-encompassing.423  Under the terms of the contract, the economic
incidence actually fell on the federal government,424 but, as in Bracker, that was not
deemed to be controlling.  As was also the case in Bracker, however, the state had been
invisible in the activity being regulated, Indian education.  The Court noted that the
State, “[h]aving declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian
children, . . .  is precluded from imposing an additional burden on the comprehensive
federal scheme intended to provide this education—a scheme which [as in Warren
Trading Post] has ‘left the State with no duties or responsibilities.’”425
Ramah was decided nearly a quarter of a century ago, and these days a federal
regulatory scheme is seldom determined to be pervasive enough to preempt a state tax
in Indian country.  The pervasiveness argument has nevertheless not disappeared,
especially in lower court decisions, and it seems to have particular promise in taxation
related to Indian gaming.  In Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson,426 for
example, the Ninth Circuit concluded in 1994 that the system of regulation established
by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act preempted state licensing fees on non-Indian
companies that had contracted with tribes to conduct betting operations in Indian
country.427 
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428. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 852 (“The BIA simply does not
regulate the construction activity which the State seeks to tax.”).  The majority’s response effectively
conceded the substance of Rehnquist’s criticism, but suggested that the same sort of criticism could have
been leveled in Bracker, see id. at 841 n.5 (majority opinion), which was probably true.
429. Id. at 842.  That point was correct, but a negative economic effect on tribes has generally not
invalidated a tax, the legal incidence of which fell on non-Indians.  See infra Part V.G.2.c.
430. Federal interests are aligned on the tribal side either because of the plenary power doctrine or
because the federal government is obligated to look out for the best interests of the tribes.  See supra Parts
III.A-B.  A pervasive regulatory scheme might be seen as the application of balancing in a situation in
which congressional intent is clear.
b.  Characterizing the Subject of Regulation
These cases illustrate that, when pervasiveness is at issue, it can matter how the
subject of regulation is characterized.  For example, a tax on a logging company is
invalid if the federal regulation of logging is pervasive.  But the state was not
attempting to tax the company in Bracker because the company was engaged in
logging, or so one might argue.  The state was taxing the company because it used
roads within the state.  Even viewed in that way, however, the tax might have been held
invalid: nearly all roads on the White Mountain Apache reservation were built with
federal and tribal, not state, funds.
In contrast, in Ramah Navajo School Board, the connection between tax and
regulated activity was attenuated.  Federal regulation of Indian education might have
been pervasive—about that, for better or for worse, there was little doubt—but the non-
Indian contractor had little to do with education per se.  It was building a school, but
it might just as well have been building an outhouse.  As Justice Rehnquist complained
in dissent, “[T]he regulations on which the Court relies [to find preemption] do not
regulate school construction, which is the activity taxed.  They merely detail
procedures by which tribes may apply for federal funds in order to carry out school
construction.”428  Nevertheless, the Court treated school construction as the regulated
(and taxed) activity and noted that a different result would have depleted funds
available for Indian education.429
Would the analysis in a case like Ramah proceed in the same way today?  One
cannot be sure, of course, but Ramah was decided at a time when the Indian canons,
and judicial sympathies for American Indian tribes more generally, were in full force.
State taxes with potentially unhappy consequences for tribes or tribal members were
disfavored. That seems no longer to be the case.
2.  The Move to Balancing in Preemption Analysis
The early preemption cases focused on the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
structure.  Although ultimately the question remains one of congressional intent, that
conception of preemption gave way to a weighing of federal and tribal interests against
state interests.430
The shift to balancing did not occur all at once.  It developed, as the preemption
cases discussed above were being decided, to analyze a somewhat different situation:
How should a court evaluate the validity of a state tax in a situation in which the
federal regulatory scheme is not all-encompassing?
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431. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995) (citation omitted) (quoting
Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 73 (1993)).
432. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
433. Id. at 145.
434. See id.; see also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).  The Moe
Court determined that a state tax was not preempted in a situation when the tribes did not seek to impose
their own taxes.  Id. at 483.  The Colville Court considered, among other things, whether tribal taxes
bolstered the case for preemption.  Colville, 447 U.S. at 154-58.  The case might have been bolstered, but
not enough to change the result.
435. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
436. Id. at 176 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
437. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
438. Id. at 172; see also id. (referring disparagingly to “platonic notions of tribal sovereignty”).
McClanahan was nevertheless a great victory for preemption, concluding that the state of Arizona could
not tax the income of a tribal member earned on the reservation.  See supra notes 389-92 and accompanying
text.
If the federal and tribal interests outweigh state interests, a state tax on a
nonmember in Indian country is invalid.  But if the state interests predominate, a state
tax on a nonmember is permissible.  As the Supreme Court wrote in 1995, “[I]f the
balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to
the contrary, the State may impose its levy and may place on a tribe or tribal members
‘minimal burdens’ in collecting the toll.”431
With judicial sympathy for tribal interests on the wane, the result of balancing is
likely to be that a state may proceed with a tax that falls on nonmembers.  The
probability that federal regulation is pervasive enough, or the federal and tribal
interests strong enough, to preclude taxation of nonmembers is small, although, as
Warren Trading Post and other cases discussed above indicate, it is not zero.  For
example, the Court has upheld state taxes on on-reservation sales of cigarettes to
nonmembers of tribes—with very negative economic consequences for the tribes—and
it made no difference in the result that a tribe had its own taxing scheme in place as
well.432  The effect of the state tax was not only to eliminate the tribal profit from on-
reservation sales to nonmembers, it was also to eliminate revenue from the tribal tax.433
No sales, no taxes or other revenue—but, to the Court, no matter.434
a.  The Role of Tribal Sovereignty in Preemption Analysis
Tribal sovereignty by itself will not resolve issues of state taxation within Indian
country; sovereignty alone cannot stop state power at reservation boundaries.  In 1989,
in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,435 the Court said, “Questions of pre-
emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of preemption that have
developed in other areas of the law, and are not controlled by ‘mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty.’”436
But sovereignty is not supposed to be irrelevant: the balancing occurs against the
“backdrop” of tribal sovereignty.  As the Court wrote in 1973, in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission,437 “The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant . . . not
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read.”438
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439. One thinks of all those sophisticated New Yorkers applauding the scenery, and ignoring the music,
at the Metropolitan Opera.
440. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (treating backdrop
as presumption that state lacks power over tribal members within reservation boundaries).
441. See Laurence, supra note 95, at 418.
442. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
443. See, e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding state
tax invalid because of pervasive regulatory effect of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).  And, after Cotton
Petroleum, the Supreme Court ruled that some state taxes could not be applied to tribal members.  See, e.g.,
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)
(holding that state tax on transfers of real property was invalid, even though ad valorem tax on some real
property was not).
444. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
Does the relegation of sovereignty to a “backdrop” leave any significant role for
sovereignty in preemption analysis?  Although this characterization is obviously not
a positive development from a tribal perspective, backdrops are not unimportant
phenomena.  Scenery can affect one’s impression of a performance on stage,439 and
sovereignty can affect how one views the strengths of the various governmental
interests.  However “backdrop” is understood—perhaps it is just another way of saying
that governing legal documents should be read with the Indian canons, or the federal
government’s trust obligation, in mind—sovereignty could tip the balance in a close
case to preempt an exercise of state taxation.
If nothing else, the backdrop of sovereignty has historically meant that state power
is presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian country,440 and that is not a
meaningless consideration.  In many older cases, tribal sovereignty and federal
preemption pointed in the same direction—keeping the state out441—and, in a
particular case, the effect of sovereignty might have been lost in the preemption
verbiage.  It might be impossible to determine how much of an older, tribal-friendly
decision was attributable to retained sovereignty, and how much was attributable to
federal preemption, but that does not mean that a reference to sovereignty was dictum
or that sovereignty as a backdrop was necessarily unimportant.
b.  Cotton Petroleum as the Archetypical Balancing Case
Perhaps the most important modern preemption case is Cotton Petroleum Corp.
v. New Mexico,442 decided in 1989 and sometimes characterized as the death of
preemption.  At a minimum, Cotton Petroleum reflected a Court much less supportive
of tribal interests than had been true only seven or eight years earlier.  Preemption
analysis is still mandated today, at least in some circumstances, but, after Cotton
Petroleum, a finding that state taxing power has been preempted is much less likely to
occur.  In fact, the Supreme Court has invalidated no exercise of state taxation over
nonmembers in the post-Cotton Petroleum world, although preemption still has had
some effect in lower court decisions.443
I described the basic facts of Cotton Petroleum earlier.444  To reiterate briefly, the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the state of New Mexico both taxed Cotton Petroleum, a
non-Indian lessee, on the extraction of oil and gas on the Jicarilla reservation. Cotton
Petroleum challenged the state severance tax on several grounds, one of which was that
state taxation was preempted.  In addition, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, which
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445. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
446. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176-77 (citations omitted).
447. The backdrop of tribal sovereignty played no helpful role: “There is . . . simply no history of tribal
independence from state taxation of these lessees to form a ‘backdrop’ against which the 1938 Act must
be read.” Id. at 182.
448. Id. at 177 (“[W]eighing the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, Cotton concludes that the
New Mexico taxes unduly interfere with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency
and are not justified by an adequate state interest.”).
449. Id. at 179; see also id. at 180 (“We thus agree that a purpose of the 1938 Act is to provide Indian
tribes with badly needed revenue, but find no evidence for the further supposition that Congress intended
to remove all barriers to profit maximization.”).
450. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
451. As the Cotton Petroleum Court wrote, “[T]he Indian Reorganization Act . . . the Indian Financing
Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq., [and] the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. . . . ‘evidence to varying degrees a
congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government and economic development,’ [but] they no more
express a congressional intent to pre-empt state taxation of oil and gas lessees than does the 1938 Act.”
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 183 n.14 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980)).
governed the leases at issue, had been interpreted in 1985 as not authorizing state
taxation of mining lessees on Indian lands.445
Some of what the Cotton Petroleum Court said fit easily within the old analytical
framework.  Courts are required to engage in a particularized inquiry in any case
involving state taxation in Indian country (other than a case involving taxation of a
tribe or tribal member), and issues should be looked at in a tribal-friendly way:
[I]n examining the pre-emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we are
cognizant of both the broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of
tribal independence in the field at issue. It bears emphasis that although congressional
silence no longer entails a broad-based immunity from taxation for private parties
doing business with Indian tribes, federal pre-emption is not limited to cases in which
Congress has expressly—as compared to impliedly—pre-empted the state activity.
Finally, we note that although state interests must be given weight and courts should
be careful not to make legislative decisions in the absence of congressional action,
ambiguities in federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal independence.446
That passage could just as well have been written in 1975.
The Court continued to repeat the words in 1989, but, by that time in American
Indian law history, the Court did not mean it.  The Court purported to be applying
preemption analysis with the Indian canons at work—“as a rule,” at least—but that did
not happen. The balancing was decidedly unbalanced.447
Cotton Petroleum argued, among other things, that state severance taxation was
inconsistent with broad federal goals to further tribal self-determination,448 and at an
abstract level that was true.  But according to the Court, that did not mean states had
lost all power to tax, even if the result was economically harmful to a tribe: “It is
however quite remarkable, indeed unfathomable in our view, to suggest that Congress
[in the 1938 Act] intended to remove all state-imposed obstacles to profitability.”449
After Cotton Petroleum, statutes that support the idea of tribal self-determination in
general—the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,450 for example—are apparently
irrelevant in the “particularized” analysis.451  They are ignored in balancing.
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452. See supra notes 414-29 and accompanying text.
453. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186.  In contrast, said the Court, both Bracker and Ramah “involved
complete abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity.”  Id. at 185.
454. Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
455. Id. at 189.
456. Id.
457. The Court explained:
There are . . . two sufficient reasons for rejecting this argument.  First, the relevant services
provided by the State include those that are available to the lessees and the members of the
Tribe off the reservation as well as on it.  The intangible value of citizenship in an organized
society is not easily measured in dollars and cents; moreover, the District Court found that
the actual per capita state expenditures for Jicarilla members are equal to or greater than the
per capita expenditures for non-Indian citizens.  Second, there is no constitutional require-
ment that the benefits received from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer
—or by those living in the community where the taxpayer is located—must equal the
amount of its tax obligations.
Id. at 189-90 (citations omitted).
458. Id. at 189.
Furthermore, unlike the situations in Bracker and Ramah,452 the state did play a
regulatory role on the Jicarilla Apache reservation, or so the Court said, thus
establishing a state interest beyond merely raising revenue.  The Court was less than
persuasive on this point, however.  The state claimed to be regulating “the spacing and
mechanical integrity of wells located on the reservation,”453 but little or no evidence
indicated that the state had really carried out its regulatory function.  The purported
state interest seemed to have been an afterthought, fabricated for purposes of litigation,
but the Court nevertheless concluded that “the federal and tribal regulations in this
case, [although] extensive, . . . are not exclusive.”454
Even if the state did perform some regulatory function, its interest seemed to be
trivial compared to the strong federal interest in economic development in Indian
country.  The particular nevertheless outweighed the general.  Another of Cotton
Petroleum’s arguments—that “tax payments by reservation lessees far exceed[ed] the
value of services provided by the State to the lessees”— was similarly unavailing.455
The Court characterized this argument as “Cotton’s most persuasive,”456 but required
no proportionality between tax collected and services provided by the state, at least as
long as the state was doing (or purporting to be doing) something.457 
With that standard, it is hard to imagine any state tax failing a preemption test,
unless it can be demonstrated, with no significant doubt, that Congress clearly forbade
state taxation or that the state played no regulatory role whatsoever.  The negative
effects from the state tax in Cotton Petroleum were ultimately attributable to multiple
governments’ having responsibility for the same geographic area:
It is, of course, true that the total taxes paid by Cotton are higher than those paid
by off-reservation producers. But neither the State nor the Tribe imposes a
discriminatory tax. The burdensome consequence is entirely attributable to the fact
that the leases are located in an area where two governmental entities share
jurisdiction.458
Since that situation always exists in Indian country, the implications—positive for
states, negative for tribes—are clear.
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459. One might think the possibilities are best when the taxed activity is associated with Indian gaming.
But see Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (concluding that preemption
analysis was unnecessary to evaluate state fuel tax as it applied at Indian gas station patronized primarily
by gambling patrons); infra notes 485-96 and accompanying text.
460. In contrast, a state tax on private persons who contracted with the federal government to do road
improvement in Indian country was held not to be preempted by federal law.  See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue
v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999).  The balancing of federal and tribal interests against state interests
in such a case is different than if the contract had been entered into with the tribes themselves and approved
by the appropriate federal officials.
461. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
462. See supra notes 414-19 and accompanying text.
463. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151.
464. Id. at 151 n.15 (citation omitted).
c.  Does Economic Incidence Matter in Balancing?
After Cotton Petroleum, nothing may matter much in balancing: a minuscule state
interest may justify the imposition of a state tax on nonmembers in Indian country.  But
if one can come up with a set of facts for which preemption is still a possibility, might
an economic burden on a tribe make a difference in the balancing analysis?
The answer is a resounding maybe.459  Quite a few cases have said that a negative
effect on tribal resources is not sufficient to result in preemption of a state tax;
symmetrically, a state’s loss of revenue if it cannot impose a tax on on-reservation
activities is not enough of an interest for the state automatically to prevail.  But the
Supreme Court has said (or hinted) a number of times that the economic effect of a tax
might be relevant, even if not decisive standing alone, in preemption analysis.  In a
case in which the argument for federal preemption of a state tax is otherwise marginal,
a conclusion that the economic incidence falls on a tribe might tip the balance in favor
of preemption.  Thus, if an agreement between a tribe and a non-Indian contractor
makes the tribe bear the economic burden of state taxes imposed on the contractor, it
is possible that, if other factors point toward preemption, the state tax will be
invalidated.460
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,461 decided in 1980, the tribe
contracted with non-Indian companies to perform logging services on the reservation.
The legal incidence of a motor vehicle license tax fell on the companies, but the tribe
contractually agreed to reimburse the companies for any taxes paid.  The Court
ultimately concluded that federal regulation of logging in Indian country was so
pervasive that the state tax was preempted,462 but the Court also suggested that the
economic incidence of the tax might be taken into account in the preemption analysis.
After noting the “significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty,” the Court
said that it was “undisputed that the economic burden of the asserted taxes will
ultimately fall on the tribe.”463  In a footnote, the Court then seemed to say that this fact
really did not matter much: “Of course, the fact that the economic burden of the tax
falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that the tax is preempted, as Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes makes clear.”464  But it is hard to understand how the textual
sentence could have survived the editing process if it did not mean something, and the
footnote says only that economic burden is not enough by itself to result in preemption.
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465. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
466. See PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 13.
467. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
468. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 842 (footnote omitted).  Justice Rehnquist in dissent said the Court was giving
extraordinary weight to the economic effects of a tax on Indian education, and was ignoring the Bracker
footnote. Id. at 854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  At some level, however, it is difficult not to pay attention
to economic effects.
469. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 184 (1989).
470. Id. at 185 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 17).
471. Id. at 191 (citing, inter alia, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)).
472. The Court noted that
It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the New Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect
on the demand for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the
In Central Machinery v. Arizona Tax Commission,465 also decided in 1980, the
Court seemed to take economic incidence into account in a case in which the Arizona
transaction privilege tax was held invalid in its application to an on-reservation sale of
farm machinery to the Gila River Indian Tribe.  The price of the machinery to the tribe
was increased by the amount of the tax, a fact noted by the Court.466
In 1982, in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue,467 the Court
evaluated a tax on a contractor building schools on the Navajo reservation.  The
economic incidence of the tax was really on the federal government, but the Court
noted that a different result would have negatively affected Indian education: “This
burden, although nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes
the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting the ‘quality and quantity’ of
educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the
construction of Indian schools.”468  Economic incidence mattered, if only a little.
Even in Cotton Petroleum, where the result was a devastating loss for tribal
interests, the Supreme Court appeared to accept the idea arguendo that economic
burden might be a relevant consideration.  Although “the economic burden of the taxes
ultimately fell on the Tribe” in both Bracker and Ramah,469 the Court noted that “the
District Court [in Cotton Petroleum] found that ‘[n]o economic burden falls on the
tribe by virtue of the state taxes,’ and that the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes
without adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development.”470  The Court
elaborated: 
There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an adverse effect on the
Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees.  It is, of course, reasonable to infer that
the existence of the state tax imposes some limit on the profitability of Indian oil and
gas leases—just as it no doubt imposes a limit on the profitability of off-reservation
leasing arrangements—but that is precisely the same indirect burden that we rejected
as a basis for granting non-Indian contractors an immunity from state taxation [in
several other cases].471 
One might question that determination as well as whether an appellate court should
defer to a lower tribunal’s factual findings on this sort of issue.  But, if the Court really
thought that economic burden was always irrelevant, it is difficult to see the point of
that discussion.  Economic burden mattered, in theory at least, even in a case where the
Court assumed that little or no such burden existed.472
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ability of the Tribe to increase its tax rate.  Any impairment to the federal policy favoring
the exploitation of on-reservation oil and gas resources by Indian tribes that might be caused
by these effects, however, is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s
claim of pre-emption.  To find pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens on this
broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those present in Bracker
and Ramah Navajo School Bd., would be to return to the pre-1937 doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity.  Any adverse effect on the Tribe’s finances caused by the
taxation of a private party contracting with the Tribe would be ground to strike the state tax.
Absent more explicit guidance from Congress, we decline to return to this long-discarded
and thoroughly repudiated doctrine.
Id. at 186-87 (footnote omitted); see Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural Resource
Development and State Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 387, 398-99 (1997).
473. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
474. Id. at 155; see also Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.
1995) (permitting state taxation when “the goods and services sold are non-Indian, and the legal incidence
of Arizona’s taxes falls on non-Indians”).  But see Indian Country, U.S.A. Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 986 (10th Cir. 1987) (prohibiting state sales taxation of bingo
enterprise owned by tribe and operated under contract because tax would have fallen on value generated
on the reservation).   In Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the concept of reservation-generated value very narrowly, permitting state taxation of
tribal economic development on reservation trust land.  See also PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 41(“[I]n
general, (1) importing off-reservation manufactured goods onto a reservation for the purpose of resale by
non-Indians to non-Indians, or (2) manufacturing goods or otherwise creating substantial value on the
reservation by non-Indians will, by themselves alone, not defeat a state tax.”).
475. 455 U.S. 130 (1982); see supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; see also supra Part VI.B.3.
476. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138.
d.  Tribal Value as a Factor in Balancing
Another factor that might be important, if preemption analysis is still breathing,
is the extent to which a state tax reaches value created by a tribe in Indian country.
The cigarette tax cases contained suggestions that, if a state seeks to tax activity that
is distinctly Indian, or at least that is more clearly attributable to value added on the
reservation than was true with the sale of cigarettes, the tribal interest in resisting state
taxation might be sufficient to trump any arguable state interest.  For example, in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,473 the Court
wrote that “[i]t is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to
persons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which
the Tribes have a significant interest.”474
I doubt that retailers generally would be happy with the implication that they add
no value to the economies in which they operate, but one can nevertheless understand
the Court’s conclusion that the activity in Colville was not distinctively Indian.  The
tribe was marketing nothing but its assumed tax exemption.  The case for preemption
of the state taxes would have been stronger if the tribe had grown the tobacco,
manufactured the cigarettes, or indeed done anything more than merely market items
produced off the reservation by nonmembers of the tribe.
For example, in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,475 the severance taxes imposed
by the Jicarilla Apaches were associated with on-reservation value—minerals to be
extracted from the reservation.  In Merrion, the issue was tribal taxation, the case for
which was strengthened by on-reservation value.476  But if state taxation had been at
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477. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
478. See supra notes 225-32, 345-55 and accompanying text.
479. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 983-84 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub
nom. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).  The Tenth Circuit concluded that
this interest outweighed any general state interest in raising revenue. Id. at 986-87.
480. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 495-96 and accompanying
text.
481. Congress can always straightforwardly preempt the application of a state tax.  In that respect, as
long as there is a federal plenary power doctrine, preemption will not be dead.
482. 526 U.S. 32 (1999).
483. Id. at 34.
484. Id. at 37.
issue, the source of the value would presumably also have been relevant in analyzing
the tax’s validity.
In Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,477 discussed earlier in connection
with the decline of the Indian canons and with legal incidence,478 the tribe lost its
argument that a state fuel tax should have been preempted.  The Tenth Circuit had
nevertheless interestingly concluded that the state was taxing value generated on the
reservation, a factor pointing toward preemption, because a tribal casino attracted
nonmembers who patronized a tribal gas station and thus effectively created a new
market for fuel.479  Although this point did not impress a majority of the Supreme
Court, it drew the favorable attention of two dissenting justices.480
3.  Are Balancing and Preemption Generally Things of the Past?
Cotton Petroleum has been seen by commentators as the near-death of preemption
analysis—or at least preemption analysis that involves balancing481—and there is
something to that view.  In form, the Court engaged in balancing, but the state interest
given controlling weight seemed absurdly trivial.  If pretending to regulate well
spacing and the mechanical integrity of wells is enough to prevent preemption, a state
is almost always going to prevail, a marked change from prior practice.
Moreover, a modern court might not even get as far as balancing.  Perhaps the best
evidence that preemption is in disfavor with today’s Supreme Court is the extent to
which it has altogether dispensed with preemption analysis.  For example, in Arizona
Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co.,482 decided in 1999, the Court
concluded that an Arizona state transaction privilege tax on a corporation’s gross
proceeds from building reservation roads for the Bureau of Indian Affairs was valid.
The corporation was formed in Montana under tribal law of the Blackfeet Tribe  and
was owned by a tribal member, but the company worked on other reservations.483  On
those other reservations, Blaze had a status no different from that of a non-Indian
corporation.  The Court held simply that “[t]he need to avoid litigation and to ensure
efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation of
federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on
Indian reservations.”484  The legal incidence was on Blaze, and that was enough to
make balancing unnecessary.
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485. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
486. Id. at 99.
487. Id. at 100.
488. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1311 (D. Kan. 2003).
489. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 984-86 (10th Cir. 2004).
490. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144
(1980)).
491. Id.
492. Id. at 107.
493. Id. at 116-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
494. Id. at 123.
The most explicit downgrading of balancing came in the 2005 decision of Wagnon
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation.485  At issue was a tax applied to the receipt of fuel
by off-reservation, non-Indian distributors who then delivered the fuel to a tribal gas
station on the Potawatomi Nation’s reservation.  Seventy-three percent of the fuel was
sold to non-Indian patrons of a tribal casino.486  The tribe also imposed its own tax on
motor fuel.487
Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit balanced interests, as they thought
they were required to do under Supreme Court precedent, but they came to different
conclusions.  The district court ruled for the state, holding that the tribe could not oust
a state from taxation simply by enacting its own tax when the legal incidence was on
the non-Indian distributor.488  The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the Kansas
tax was an affront to tribal sovereignty.  The state was taxing value generated on the
reservation (the creation of a new fuel market through creation of the casino), and the
tribe’s interest in taxing this value outweighed the state’s general interest in raising
revenues.489
Clearly there were conflicting interests at stake, but the Supreme Court concluded
that no balancing was necessary.  The balancing test was created, wrote Justice
Thomas, to address questions that arise when “a State asserts authority over the
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation,”490 and that was not the
case in Wagnon.  The legal incidence was on the non-Indian distributors, and the tax
related to a transaction that occurred off the reservation.  Justice Thomas wrote that
interest balancing “has never been applied where, as here, the State asserts its taxing
authority over non-Indians off the reservation.”491
As discussed earlier, there were legitimate questions in Wagnon about legal
incidence and about what was being taxed, with the tribe arguing that it was the
“distributors’ use, sale, or delivery of the motor fuel—in this case, the distributors’ (on-
reservation) sale or delivery to the Nation.”492  The Court’s ultimately dispositive
conclusions on these issues gave no deference to the traditionally special treatment of
American Indian tribes.
If nothing else, deference should have required looking at the respective interests
of the various parties.  As dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy stressed, a
situation in which tribal and state taxes cannot coexist is the sort of case where
preemption analysis is necessary.493  Moreover, the Court had hinted in Bracker and
other cases that economic burdens on a tribe might matter, particularly where the taxes
involved are “formally imposed on nonmembers [but] nonetheless burden on-
reservation tribal activity.”494
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495. 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see supra notes 336-38, 370-72, 473-74 and accompanying text.
496. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 126.
497. See infra text accompanying notes 533-34.
498. In Wagnon, Justice Thomas emphasized that the state tax was imposed on non-Indians off the
reservation, and balancing was therefore unnecessary.  Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110.  It is unclear what the
Court would conclude if the land where the relevant transaction occurs is part of a reservation but is
nontribal in nature.
499. 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
500. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
501. Id. at 476.  The levies at issue were cigarette sales taxes, personal property taxes, and vendor
licensing fees.  See supra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
502. The Moe Court had specifically noted that “Congress by its more modern legislation has evinced
a clear intent to eschew any . . . ‘checkerboard’ approach within an existing Indian reservation, and our
cases have in turn followed Congress’s lead.” Moe, 425 U.S. at 479.  As a result, “state jurisdiction did not
Besides, as the dissenters noted, this was a much stronger case for preemption than
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,495 one of the
cigarette sales tax cases.  In Colville, the Court had determined, with some reason, that
the tribe was seeking to market only its tax exemption.  In contrast, the gas station in
Wagnon was largely an amenity for the tribal casino’s customers, not a discount station
marketing itself to the world.  One might have characterized fuel sales as part of the
gaming enterprise—an enterprise in which there was a decidedly strong federal and
tribal interest.496
One need not accept all the dissenters’ assertions to realize that, at a minimum,
Wagnon was a case in which serious consideration of the governments’ respective
interests would have been perfectly appropriate.  Twenty-five years ago, the Court
almost certainly would have taken preemption analysis seriously.  But no longer.
H.  State Power to Tax on Non-Indian Land Within Indian Country
Because of the checkerboard pattern on many American Indian reservations—non-
Indian land held in fee simple within reservation boundaries—it is not at all
inconceivable that a state could be seeking to impose its taxes on transactions that
occur on non-Indian land.
If the legal incidence falls on a non-Indian doing business on non-Indian land
within Indian country, it is almost certainly the case that the state tax will be valid.
Although preemption may operate in some limited circumstances to restrict state
taxation of non-Indians, the non-Indian land would be a powerful factor in the
balancing test.  The land might be part of Indian country, but the non-Indian character
of the events is likely to be decisive497—if a balancing test would even be applied after
Wagnon.498
If a state were seeking to tax a tribe or tribal member in connection with activities
that occurred on nontribal land, the result is less clear.  We know, because of
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,499 that a state may tax a tribe for revenue generated
outside a reservation, but that is a different situation.
The Supreme Court concluded, in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes,500 that a state could not tax a tribal member on fee lands within Indian
country.501  If we were still operating in a world with robust Indian canons, that result
would continue today.502  I would have assumed that a state could not tax a tribe in
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depend on the ownership of particular parcels of land because that would result in ‘an impractical pattern
of checkerboard jurisdiction.’”  PIRTLE ET AL., supra note 59, at 54 (quoting Moe, 425 U.S. at 479).
503. 544 U.S. 197 (2005); see supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
504. This is so even though personal property held by a tribal member on such land would be immune
from state personal property taxation.  See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
505. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
506. Id. at 149 (noting that the allottee, once the patent in fee had been issued, had become a citizen and
“[h]is property, unless exempt, became subject to taxation in the same manner as property belonging to
other citizens”).
507. 502 U.S. 251 (1992); see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
508. See Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 261-65; supra note 59.
509. The lack of specific statutory authority led the Court to conclude that a state tax on the transfer of
such property was impermissible under the per se rule prohibiting state taxation of tribes or tribal members
in Indian country.  Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 268-69.
510. 524 U.S. 103 (1998); see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
connection with activities conducted within Indian country, albeit on nontribal land,
and the same result would apply to a tax imposed on a tribal member in such
circumstances.  With the Indian canons no longer robust, however, that result may be
subject to some doubt.
I.  State Power to Tax Tribal Land Held in Fee
As I have repeatedly noted, some of the tribal land within Indian country may have
lost its trust status. Can a state tax that land directly?  With state taxation of real
property in Indian country, the conceptual difficulties have, if anything, increased.  We
know, from City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,503 that a state may
tax tribal land within Indian country that is not held in trust by the United States and
that has lost its Indian character.  Moreover, although tribal land held in trust is
absolutely exempt from state ad valorem taxes, parcels of land in Indian country that
were once held in trust but are alienable today, even if held by tribes or tribal members,
may be reached by a state tax.504
The history on this point began with Goudy v. Meath,505 a 1906 case holding that
a state tax on an allottee’s property was permissible after the land had become
alienable.506  By the time a similar issue arose again in 1992, in County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,507 Goudy was close to
ancient history; much had happened legally in the meantime.  In Yakima Nation, the
Supreme Court engaged in an unpersuasive statutory analysis, looking to language of
the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the 1906 Burke Act that had amended the
earlier act, to conclude that Congress had specifically permitted taxing the land for an
allottee governed by those acts who had been issued a patent in fee.508  The Court
found an express grant in statutory language that was not express at all.509
At least the result in Yakima Nation depended on a statute, even though the statute
was interpreted with the briefest of nods to the Indian canons.  In Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,510 decided in 1998, the Court effectively jettisoned
any need to find specific congressional authorization for state taxation of former trust
land that had been reacquired by a tribe.  The Court rejected the significance of the
Burke Act proviso discussed in Yakima Nation as authority for state taxation.  It is now
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511. Cass County, 524 U.S. at 113 (quoting Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. at 263).  One lower court has
concluded, however, that Congress’s intention to make land alienable must be reflected in a statute.  Treaty
language does not represent a clear congressional intention, particularly when read using the canons of
construction.  See Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 680 (2006); supra note 61.
512. See supra Part III.C.
513. COHEN (1942), supra note 130, at 142 (footnote omitted).
514. See supra Part III.C.
515. Tribal power does not necessarily stop at reservation boundaries, at least with respect to a tribe’s
own members.  Just as the United States can tax the income of its citizens earned outside the U.S., a tribe
ought to be able to tax the income of a member who lives on, but works outside, the reservation.  A tribe
might be willing to credit any state taxes paid on that income, but whether to do that is a matter of policy,
not a requirement.
516. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
517. Id. at 381-82.
apparently enough to permit state taxation of land held in fee in Indian country, even
if the land is held by a tribal member or the tribe itself, that Congress has made the
land alienable. Taxability follows alienability, unless “a contrary intent is ‘clearly
manifested.’”511
VI.  TRIBAL TAXING POWER
Since time immemorial it has been understood that an American Indian tribe has
the power of a sovereign to tax—unless, of course, Congress says otherwise.512   Felix
Cohen made the point as follows: “One of the powers essential to the maintenance of
any government is the power to levy taxes.  That this power is an inherent attribute of
tribal sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of
Congress is a proposition which has never been successfully disputed.”513
A.  Tribal Power to Tax Members
Cohen’s point remains true today, but it needs to be qualified.  For one thing, it
needs to be understood in light of shrinking notions of tribal sovereignty.514  But even
the cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted tribal sovereignty narrowly do
not call into question a tribe’s power to tax its own members.515  In the Supreme
Court’s 1886 decision in United States v. Kagama,516 which contains some of the
Court’s most negative statements about tribal sovereignty, the Court nevertheless
conceded that tribes are “a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations.”517  At a minimum, regulating tribal relations encompasses
taxation of members.
B.  Tribal Power to Tax Nonmembers
The powers associated with tribal sovereignty unquestionably include the power
to tax tribal members, but taxation of nonmembers involved in Indian country is
subject to several qualifications and embellishments.
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518. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
519. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
520. See infra notes 541-42 and accompanying text.
521. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); supra notes 136-40 and
accompanying text.
522. See infra notes 530-37 and accompanying text (discussing significance of consensual
relationships).  Had the Supreme Court not decided Oliphant as it did—concluding that tribes could not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers—one might have thought that those who voluntarily enter
Indian country have consented to criminal jurisdiction as well.  An American who visits France understands
very well that he is not exempt from the Gendarmes’ power.  Criminal jurisdiction in the Indian law context,
however, should be understood as the most special of special cases because of legitimate concern that
1.  Tribal Taxation of Nonmembers Generally
Tribal power to tax is strongest within Indian country, just as state power is most
limited there. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1980,
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical com-
ponent to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the pre-
emption inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an
important factor to weigh in determining whether state authority has exceeded the
permissible limits.  “The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority
of the Indian governments over their reservations.”518
Power over reservations encompasses more than just power over members.  As a result,
it should ordinarily be the case that tribes can tax persons doing business in Indian
country—even if the persons are not members of the tribe—as long as the activities
being taxed actually occur on tribal land.
Not all Supreme Court justices today accept that proposition.  In a 2001 case,
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,519 three justices suggested that tribes may not be able
to tax nonmembers at all unless Congress explicitly gives permission.520  The analysis
should nevertheless proceed as follows: taxation is an inherent power of a sovereign;
Congress has not exercised its plenary power to take that sovereign power away; and
the power to tax nonmembers who transact business in Indian country ought not be
deemed “inconsistent with the tribes’ dependent status,” a concept used to conclude
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.521
As painful as taxes can be, the application of tribal taxing power is nothing like
the application of criminal laws.  No one who enters Indian country should be
surprised that a government responsible for that geographical area has the power to tax
there.  Who, for example, would question having to pay a tribal sales tax on a purchase
made on a reservation, just as a visitor to Colorado would expect to be subject to a
Colorado sales tax?  You might not like the tax, but you would not question Colorado’s
(or a tribe’s) power to impose it.
The sales tax example illustrates a “consensual relationship,” which, as we shall
see, is a term of art in this area, and it is hard to be outraged about the imposition of
such a tax.  One of the tradeoffs for being able to transact business in Indian country
is liability for tribal taxes, unless the investor negotiates for an exemption.  And in
most cases, a non-Indian investor in Indian country should be treated as having entered
into a consensual relationship with tribal authorities to conduct business.522
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constitutional protections, including the Bill of Rights, do not apply directly to limit the power of tribal
authorities, including tribal courts.  In fact, it would have been striking if the Supreme Court had said that
a criminal court within the boundaries of the United States could operate in a way unconstrained by the
Constitution.  The same due-process concerns do not apply with taxation, however.
523. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980)
(emphasis added).
524. See supra Part II. Railroad and highway rights-of-way within reservation land are also nontribal
land for these purposes.  See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997) (holding that a
“right-of-way North Dakota acquired for the State’s highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for
nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land”) (footnote omitted); see also Big Horn
County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an easement granted by the
federal government, with tribal consent, to a utility, resulted in the land’s being treated, under Strate, as
nontribal land); Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a rail line within Indian country was nontribal land).
525. For that matter, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), and City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), see supra Parts II.C & V.I, a state can tax tribal land within Indian
Everything said to this point needs qualification, of course.  In the next section,
I discuss whether tribal taxing power might be lessened if the activity involving
nonmembers takes place on nontribal land within Indian country.  The answer is yes.
In Part VI.B.3, I consider another issue of potential importance to investors: if a tribe
does have the power to tax nonmembers but has not exercised that power, and
investors have come into Indian country on the assumption that no tribal tax will reach
them, can the tribe then change the “rules of the game” by hitting the unsuspecting
investors with a new tax?  And if the answer here too is probably yes, what, if anything,
can a worried investor do to protect himself against the imposition of new taxes that
could make his investment uneconomic?  Finally, Part VI.B.4 considers whether a
tribal agreement not to tax a would-be investor—a waiver of the taxing power—would
have binding effect.
2.  Tribal Land Versus Nontribal Land Within Indian Country
As I argued above, under traditional notions of tribal sovereignty a tribe has the
power to tax persons doing business within Indian country if Congress has not pro-
vided otherwise.  Maybe the tribe would want to exempt non-Indian investors from
taxation so as to stimulate economic activity, but that is a decision for the sovereign
tribe to make.
A major caveat applies, however.  The extent of tribal power over nonmembers
depends on whether the relevant activities take place on Indian or non-Indian land
within the boundaries of Indian country.  The Supreme Court wrote in 1980 that “the
power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe
or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status,”523 but
not all reservation land is “trust land.”  Blocks of non-Indian land are sprinkled
throughout many reservations.  The non-Indian land is technically part of the
reservations, and it fits within the statutory definition of “Indian country.”524  Under
recent Supreme Court cases, however, tribal power is substantially diminished over
that land.525
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country in certain circumstances.  The Yakima and Oneida Nations would presumably also have been able
to tax the tribal land at issue in those cases, however.
526. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
527. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
528. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
529. Even if a tribe’s power to tax nonmembers derives only from a landowner’s power to exclude
people from his property, and not from inherent sovereignty, a tribe should be able to condition entry to
tribal land on the willingness to pay tribal taxes.  See infra note 550 and accompanying text (discussing
power to exclude as authority for tribal tax).
530. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.  In support of this proposition, the Court cited to the infringement
test of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).  See supra Part V.D.  Additionally, the Court cited
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (holding, prior to the enactment of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000)), that
an adoption proceeding in which all parties were tribal members had to proceed in tribal court because a
contrary result would have infringed on tribal self-government).
531. Perhaps the result would have been different if the Crow Nation, which had historically been
dependent on the buffalo, had been able to demonstrate that fishing had been more central to tribal history.
See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 42, at 540-41.
Although it did not involve taxation, the key case on this issue is Montana v.
United States,526 where the Court in 1981 considered the extent to which the Crow
Nation could regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land held by non-Indians
in fee simple within reservation boundaries.  After the 1978 decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,527 the tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,528
even for acts that occurred on tribal land.  However, the tribal power at issue in
Montana was civil in nature.  The Crow Nation nevertheless lost.  Although the tribe
retained its sovereign power over members of the tribe, civil jurisdiction over non-
members was much more limited, especially on non-Indian fee lands within reservation
boundaries:529
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.  A tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians
on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.530
In Montana, no consensual relationship existed between the non-Indians and the tribe
or its members, and, somewhat strangely, the tribe had not established the importance
of hunting and fishing regulation to its own welfare.531
What does Montana mean for tribal taxation of nonmembers?  Montana was
obviously not a tribal-friendly decision, but, if an investor enters into an agreement
with a tribe to do business in Indian country, the tribe clearly has the power to tax that
investment—even if the taxed activity takes place on fee land.  Two critical questions
must be answered in the case of such an investment.  With whom does a business
person establish a commercial relationship—the tribe, a tribal member, or someone
else?  And where will the operations be carried out?  
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532. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
533. Id. at 653.
534. Id. at 651 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 465-66).
535. Id. at 654.  Moreover, the hotel was near the reservation boundary, close to highways used by
tourists on the way to the Grand Canyon.  Id. at 648.  Although the “consensual relationships” language in
Montana by its terms seems not to be limited to issues arising on non-tribal land, see supra note 530 and
accompanying text, the Court pretty clearly had nontribal land in mind.  On tribal land, the existence of a
consensual relationship between tribe (or tribal member) and investor was presumed; a tribe’s power over
its territory ordinarily ought to permit the tribe to tax non-Indians doing business on tribal land.
536. See supra note 530 and accompanying text.  The authors of the Cohen Handbook suggest that
Atkinson Trading’s definition of “consensual relationships” appears to be limited to “explicit contractual
relationships with a tribe or its members.”  COHEN, supra note 16, at 718.  That assertion may be too strong,
but, in any event, it points to the desirability of a tribe’s securing such explicit relationships.  In addition,
it should be remembered that the issue arose because the land was nontribal land.
537. Effect on tax revenue has generally been unimportant in evaluating either state or tribal taxation.
See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
538. Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 656.
539. An ad valorem property tax, however, might not be treated as attributable to a “consensual
relationship.”  Cf. Big Horn County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding, inter alia, that an ad valorem tax is “not a tax on the activities of a nonmember” and therefore
In Atkinson Trading,532 the Court in 2001 unanimously held that the Navajo Nation
could not impose a hotel tax on guests at a hotel operated by a licensed Indian trader
and located on fee simple land within reservation boundaries.   Following Montana,
the Court stated that the Navajo Nation’s sovereign power to tax nonmembers,
“whatever its derivation[,] reaches no further than tribal land,”533 unless the power to
tax relates to “consensual relationships” between the tribe and the nonmembers, or the
power over nonmembers is necessary to deal with “conduct [that] threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.”534  If the hotel had been on tribal land, the tribe’s taxing power
would have been unquestioned, but that was not the case.535
Atkinson Trading is important, but its influence on tribal taxation should be
limited.  The Montana “consensual relationships” exception ordinarily ought to cover
most nonmembers doing business in Indian country; taxation is specifically mentioned
in Montana’s discussion of possible “consensual relationships.”536  Thus, most
instances of investment in Indian country are likely to be subject to tribal taxation
(absent an agreement to the contrary), even if the activities actually occur on fee simple
land.  The occupancy of hotel space by nonmembers was not a sufficiently strong
commercial dealing—indeed, it was not a commercial dealing with the tribe or tribal
members at all—to bring the consensual relationship exception into play.  Nor was
tribal self-government implicated: whatever drain on tribal resources occurred from
invalidating the tribal tax was insufficient to imperil the tribe’s political integrity or
economic security.537
As an Indian trader, Atkinson Trading was licensed to do business with the Navajo
Nation and was subject to regulation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  If the tribe had
sought to secure an equivalent amount of revenue by imposing a tax on the hotel itself,
would such a tax have been permitted?  The Court did not specifically address that
issue,538 but it is hard to imagine that such a tribal tax, if structured in the right way and
approved by the Interior Department, would have been invalid.539  A consensual
2008] TAXATION AND INDIAN COUNTRY 89
does not constitute a “consensual relationship” with a tribe or tribal member); Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R.
Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) (following Big Horn in holding that an
ad valorem tax on a rail line within Indian country was not covered by the Montana consensual
relationships exception).
540. Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 654-55.
541. Id. at 659-60 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
542. The American Indian Law Deskbook, prepared for state attorneys general, suggests that Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), even “casts doubt on the ability of a tribe to impose taxes on transactions
that occur on tribal lands absent, as in Merrion, a commercial relationship.”  DESKBOOK, supra note 15,
at 383.  Hicks had suggested that the Montana exceptions might be narrowed, requiring a determination
as to whether tribal jurisdiction was “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations.”  Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).  I am skeptical that Hicks’s holding,
which had nothing to do with taxation (one question was whether a tribal court could exercise jurisdiction
over a section 1983 claim brought against state police officers for actions in Indian country), ought to be
extended to more benign sets of facts.  In any event, investors in significant business transactions almost
necessarily will be dealing with tribes, thus creating a consensual, commercial relationship.
relationship obviously existed, and the arrangement was not a matter of indifference
to the tribe: the Navajo Nation provided significant services to the area, including
patrolling highways in the vicinity and responding to emergency medical calls from the
hotel complex.540  The Navajo Nation lost in Atkinson Trading, but the tribe had other
ways to secure revenue associated with the nontribal enterprise.
Although tribes ordinarily ought to be able to tax nonmembers doing business in
Indian country, even on nontribal land, this area of law is in flux.  Three concurring
justices in Atkinson Trading—Souter, Kennedy, and Thomas—went much further than
the facts of the case required, stating that the “general proposition” derived from
Montana is that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”541  If that were the law, it presumably would
mean that Congress would have to affirmatively grant tribes the power to tax
nonmembers, even if a consensual relationship exists.  I find this assertion astonishing,
contrary to decades of precedent, and contrary—one might have thought—to basic
notions of tribal sovereignty.  Nevertheless, as notions of tribal sovereignty contract,
inherent tribal power to tax anyone other than tribal members may be a disappearing
notion in Washington judicial circles.542
3.  Can a Tribe Impose New Taxes After a Deal Has Been Struck?
As suggested above, investors doing business in Indian country ordinarily ought
to be treated as having entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe so that,
absent a contrary agreement, tribal power to tax should be conceded.  The investor
agrees to do business in Indian country, and he should understand that he will be
subject to relevant tribal taxes.  He therefore should take tribal taxes into account in
deciding whether to proceed.
But suppose the tribe later imposes a new tax on the investor, one that the investor
had not contemplated.  Indeed, suppose the tax is one that, had it been in effect at the
time the investor was considering the deal, would have kept him from going ahead.
Can the tribe legally impose such a tax?  The answer is probably yes, and it is therefore
important for investors in Indian country to establish the ground rules about tribal
taxation ahead of time.
90 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1
543. 455 U.S. 130 (1982); see supra notes 122-27, 475-76 and accompanying text.
544. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134-35.
545. The reason might not have been a good one, however.  It was not that the original constitution
prohibited tribal taxation.  Even if the constitution was silent, the tribe probably retained inherent power
to tax. See id. at 148 n.14.
546. See id.; Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe art. XI, § 1 (vesting “inherent powers”
of the tribe in tribal council); id. § 1(e) (providing that “tribal council may levy and collect taxes and fees
on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose
taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on the reservation”).
547. Interior Department approval was received in 1976. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 136.
548. Id. at 137 (“Because the Tribe did not initially condition the leases upon the payment of a severance
tax, petitioners assert that the Tribe is without authority to impose such a tax at a later time.”).
549. Id. at 145-46.
550. See id. at 141.  The Court went on to conclude, however, that, even if the taxing power did derive
only from the tribe’s power to exclude, the severance tax would have been valid.  See id. at 144 (“This
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on
reservation conduct, such as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation.”).
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,543 the Supreme Court in 1982 considered the
validity of a tribal severance tax that fell on non-Indian lessees of tribal oil and gas
lands.  The leases, entered into beginning in 1953 and approved by the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, set out the terms of the arrangement, with no mention of the
possibility of a tribal tax. Indeed, the tribal constitution in effect in 1953 had not
specifically provided for tribal taxing power.544  The investors thus had reason to think
no taxes would—or even could—be imposed.545
The tribal constitution was subsequently amended in 1969 to, among other things,
provide specifically for taxing power; taxes on nonmembers were subject to approval
by the Interior Department.546  When the tribe imposed the severance tax in 1976,547
the lessees challenged it, in effect arguing that the tribe had changed the terms of the
commercial deal and that the tribe had lost the power to tax the mining activities when
it leased the lands.548
The Supreme Court rejected that argument.  Whatever the tribe had agreed to in
its capacity as commercial actor, it had not waived its powers as a sovereign:
[P]etitioners and the dissent confuse the Tribe’s role as commercial partner with its
role as sovereign.  This confusion relegates the powers of sovereignty to the
bargaining process undertaken in each of the sovereign’s commercial agreements.  It
is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land and take
from it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned its
sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them through a
contract.549
The tribe could not unilaterally have imposed an additional royalty obligation on the
lessees because such an obligation was outside the terms of the leases, but taxes are a
different animal.  Although three dissenters disagreed, the Court rejected the proposi-
tion that tribal power to tax nonmembers derives only from the power to exclude
nonmembers from the reservation, that is, the power of a landowner rather than the
power of a sovereign.550  The taxing power may be a sovereign power, but the tribes
had not exercised it until recently.  No matter.  The Court emphasized that “sovereign
power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts
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551. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
552. Id. at 137-38.
553. As noted earlier, taxpayers generally have no guarantee that a government—any government—will
forgo making changes in its tax laws.  See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
554. See Miller, supra note 6, at 30 (quoting Chamber of Commerce executive director on Pine Ridge
Reservation: “We have a political revolution every two years.”).
555. Under the statutory scheme at issue in Merrion, the Interior Department was required to approve
any tax on nonmembers.  See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141 (noting various constraints “minimize potential
concern that Indian tribes will exercise the power to tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner”).
556. Cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 878 (1995) (interpreting “unmistakability”
doctrine to mean that “a contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated term
exempting the other contracting party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act”) (emphasis
added).
557. E.g., St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266, 280 (1908) (concluding that a city’s power to tax
continues “unless this right has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable
subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms.”551  In addition, the lessees had benefited from tribal services,
particularly police protection, over the years; the severance tax was not confiscation.552
Tribes as sovereigns thus can impose new taxes after investors have entered Indian
country, as irritating as that might be to the investors.553  But suppose an investor is
concerned about volatility in tribal politics, and he secures a promise from tribal
officials that his investment, and any income from his investment, will be exempt from
tribal taxation for a specified period.  One can understand an investor’s wanting
reassurance of this sort: even if he has had pleasant dealings with existing tribal
officials, he wants to know what the future will hold.  Sovereigns change their minds—
and their laws—all the time.554  Would such a promise be legally binding on the tribe?
On the one hand, this might not seem like a serious concern.  It would make no
sense for a tribe that is trying to develop economically to anger existing investors—and
thus to deter future investors as well.  And the Interior Department might very well
prevent a tribe from enacting an economically catastrophic tax.555  On the other hand,
it is not unusual for tribal populations to be divided about the desirability of economic
development, or about particular forms of development.  However favorable a
particular tribal government might be to development, there are no guarantees that the
pro-development leadership will remain in power.  Absent legal constraints, a new,
anti-development government might have few qualms about reneging on promises of
a prior government—or so a potential investor might reasonably fear.
One of the problems in Merrion seemed to be that the negotiations had been silent
about the taxing power of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.  The lessees may well have
thought that they (or their predecessors) had effectively received assurances of “no new
taxes,” or that, given the lack of taxing power at the time, no such assurances were
necessary.  But the lease documents did not reflect such an understanding.  The result
in the case may well have been different if the tribe had expressly, unequivocally, and
unmistakably waived its sovereign power to tax—or so the Court seemed to be
suggesting.556
That principle is not a surprising one; outside the American Indian law context,
it can be found in Supreme Court decisions of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.557  Additionally, cases after Merrion, including another one with American
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interpretation”); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446 (1861) (“[N]either the right
of taxation, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held . . . to have been surrendered, unless such
surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.”).
558. See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); United States
v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); see also
Johnny Hutchinson, Comment, What a Difference a Contract Makes: Protecting Taxpayers from Changes
in the Tax Code, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 483 (2007).  Not all actions are taken in a government’s capacity
as sovereign, of course, but with taxation there is no doubt that a government is exercising a sovereign
power. 
559. See supra Part III.E.
560. Indeed, as noted above, three justices in Atkinson Trading seemed to question whether a tribe has
the power to impose a tax on nonmembers at all without express congressional authority.  See supra notes
541-42 and accompanying text.
561. It is not going to be inferred because “[g]overnments do not ordinarily agree to curtail their
sovereign or legislative powers, and contracts must be interpreted in a commonsense way against that
background understanding.”  Winstar, 518 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
562. In discussing the application of the “unmistakability” doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
concern that contracts negotiated by underlings on behalf of the federal government should not be used as
a backdoor way of circumscribing sovereign power:
Justice Holmes . . . said that “men must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government.”  The wisdom of this principle arises, not from any ancient privileges of the
sovereign, but from the necessity of protecting the federal fisc—and the taxpayers who foot
the bills—from possible improvidence on the part of the countless Government officials who
must be authorized to enter into contracts for the Government.
Id. at 937 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S.
141, 143 (1920)).
Indian law overtones, have given effect to the idea that a sovereign power may be
waived if it is done so “unmistakably.”558
Since the Supreme Court has cut back on the scope of the Indian canons of
construction,559 and has also adopted a more restrictive notion of tribal sovereignty,
particularly as it affects tribal power over nonmembers,560 it may be that Merrion no
longer reflects the Court’s views about the scope of tribal taxing power.  As far as the
current Court is concerned, tribes may no longer have sovereign power to tax
nonmembers doing business in Indian country.
But Merrion has not been overruled.  It therefore behooves a potential investor in
Indian country—someone whose investment is based on the assumption that he, she,
or it will not be subject to tribal taxation—to make sure this understanding is reflected
“unmistakably” in the agreements with the relevant tribe.  Merrion and other cases
suggest that a tribe can waive its sovereign powers—it can agree, for example, not to
impose an otherwise generally applicable tax on particular parties—but a waiver is not
going to be inferred.561  Investors should get the beneficial tax treatment in writing, and
make sure that the signatories to any agreement have the authority to bind the tribe as
a sovereign.562
4.  Tribal Waivers of Taxing Power
One final point is worth making.  The Merrion Court implied that the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe could have waived its sovereign power to tax, provided that it did so
“unmistakably.”  As the above discussion suggested, that seems right.  One of the
attributes of a sovereign is the power to relinquish some aspects of sovereignty, such
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563. Congress can unquestionably waive tribal sovereign immunity and, presumably, other sovereign
powers.  See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
564. Cf. Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., 86 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir.
1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“[S]upposing there is [a requirement of a clear statement of waiver], we must ask
whether the language of the arbitration clause might have hoodwinked an unsophisticated Indian negotiator
into giving up the tribe’s immunity . . . without realizing what he was doing. We think that this is an
extremely implausible, as well as condescending, suggestion.”).
565. See supra notes 551-62 and accompanying text.
566. In many cases, the Department would be required to give its approval anyway. Cf. Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980), aff’d on other grounds, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)
(“[T]he grant of power under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is broad enough to encompass express
waiver of sovereign immunity . . . when the ordinance . . . has been specifically approved by the Secretary
of Interior.”).
567. Negotiations between tribes and businesses proceed on the assumption that tribal waivers will be
honored.  See Tebo, supra note 6, at 35-36 (noting that retailers negotiate contracts with tribes “that
prohibit collection of any taxes that would raise the retailers’ overall tax burden beyond what it would be
if the store were built off the reservation”).
as waiving sovereign immunity.  Possessing the sovereign power to tax does not mean
that a tribe must exercise that power.
Nevertheless, some cases in other contexts have hinted that tribes cannot
necessarily waive sovereign powers, at least not without federal approval.563  The
federal government’s obligation to act as trustee on behalf of the tribes—the guardian
protecting the tribal ward—may prevent a tribe, acting on its own, from relinquishing
an important sovereign power.
This question illustrates some of the conceptual conundrums raised in Part III of
this Article—the tension between the notion of tribal sovereignty on the one hand and
the plenary power doctrine and the federal trusteeship obligation on the other.  There
is a logical incongruity in suggesting that the United States might be able to prevent
a sovereign American Indian tribe from agreeing not to exert its sovereign powers in
the future.564
Given the cutbacks in the notion of tribal sovereignty, especially as the concept
applies to nonmembers, and in the scope of the canons of construction since Merrion
was decided, this issue is probably no longer of great practical importance.  Whatever
the theoretical difficulties, it is almost certainly the case that tribes will be permitted
to waive as long as they do so in an “unmistakable” way.565  If there is any doubt about
tribal power, the Interior Department can approve a waiver.566  It is in the tribes’ long-
term economic interest to make any understanding “unmistakable,” and thereby to
make Indian country more attractive to investors.567
VII.  DEVELOPMENTS TO FOLLOW IN INDIAN TAXATION
The devil is in the details, and the most important future developments affecting
taxation in Indian country are likely to be changes in details—such as Congress’s
enactment of additional incentives for investments, or a new case dealing with a
peculiar, and previously unstudied, form of business activity in Indian country.
But observers must also pay attention to developments affecting the doctrines of
American Indian law that affect the taxing power.  I have noted that the Supreme Court
is currently much less enthusiastic about the Indian canons of construction, particularly
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568. In fact, the declines in the Indian canons and in tribal sovereignty might be the same side of a single
coin. The “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty used in preemption analysis has been understood by some to
mean that the canons should be applied in that analysis. See supra Part V.G.2.a.
569. This does not necessarily reflect partisan, political splits on the Court. It is not only Republican
appointees, as those inclined to political correctness might think, who have authored opinions unfriendly
to tribal interests.
570. One might also question whether governmental policy should be directed at preserving traditional
lifestyles for one segment of society, particularly if doing so inevitably requires insulating that segment
from economic pressures that would otherwise require change. There is a legitimate question, that is, as to
whether “any group [has] a right to expect that it can continue to live as it always has.” Thomas Flanagan,
The Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands and Political Philosophy, 22 CAN.
J. POL. SCI. 589, 600 (1989).
when what is being interpreted is not a treaty, which means that the canons are less
likely to be a constraint on both federal and state taxing power.  The canons are also
less likely to be used to protect or enhance tribal taxing power.
Similarly, if notions of tribal sovereignty continue to contract,568 further lessening
tribal power over nonmembers within Indian country, tribal taxing power will be
affected.  And state power to enforce state laws within the boundaries of Indian country
will correspondingly expand.
From the standpoint of a lawyer evaluating the continuing significance of old case
law, the potential decline in the importance of these doctrines is critical.   If an old case
supported a restricted conception of state power and a correspondingly expansive
notion of tribal power, but depended on conceptions that are no longer accepted, then
the vitality of that old case is lessened, even if the Court has not explicitly rejected it.
One cannot come up with hard and fast rules on points like this, but it is important
to be sensitive to the possibility that change might be occurring as we speak.  And it
is likely that, unless the composition of the Supreme Court is dramatically altered, the
change will be in the direction of lessening tribal prerogatives.569
VIII.  AN AFTERTHOUGHT OR TWO ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This Article proceeded on the assumption that economic development in Indian
country is a good thing, but some skeptics might question that assumption.  Economic
development and traditional tribal cultures do not easily coexist.  Might tribes benefit
more from protection against outside influences than from infusions of outside capital?
If the ultimate goal of federal Indian policy is preservation of traditional cultures,
economic development could be more of a danger than a benefit.570
What, for example, might the long-term effect of Indian gaming be on tribes,
particularly those that are very small?  Are we trying to develop nations of blackjack
dealers or, if tribal members do not participate in gaming administration but simply
benefit from the revenue generated by others, nations of coupon clippers?  Bruce E.
Johansen has noted: 
One of the most important—and, often most vexing—questions in Indian country
today concerns the creation of reservation economic bases that produce necessary
cash income while being culturally appropriate and sustainable.  Casinos, the
reservation cash cow du jour, sometimes produce mountains of money as they
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571. Bruce E. Johansen, The New York Oneidas: A Business Called a Nation, in ENDURING LEGACIES:
NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 95, 95 (Bruce E. Johansen ed., 2004).
572. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic
Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? 2, 47 (Stephen Cornell &
Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
transform parts of reservations into annexes of the non-Indian economy, with all of
their imported artifices and vices.571
And Stephen Cornell has raised the following string of questions:
The fact that American Indian tribes, like other societies, have goals of political and
social sovereignty means that development success must also be assessed in political
and cultural terms. Will this project bring large numbers of non-Indians onto the
reservation who may challenge tribal sovereignty?  Is this project going to introduce
social or political strife among tribal members?  Is factory work going to appeal to our
young people?  Would building that road up to the mine damage important religious
sites?  Will tribal members object to non-Indian hunters roaming the wilderness areas
of the reservation?572
Those are all legitimate questions, but, one might argue, it is not up to non-Indians to
answer them.  It would surely be presumptuous for non-Indians like me to suggest that
economic development that could lift a tribe out of poverty should automatically be
resisted.  If tribal members want to forgo some traditional values to elevate their living
standards, who are we to say no?  I find it impossible to counsel against economic
development for the many tribes that currently are in dire financial straits, even though
I recognize that economic development might destroy some distinctive attributes of
American Indian nations. 
Nevertheless, economic change that affects traditional tribal values raises a
further, even more foundational, question that must eventually be considered by both
Indians and non-Indians.  If economic development causes traditional tribal ways to
fade away—and at some point that is sure to happen—will the justification for treating
American Indian tribes as distinctive nations within the larger American society
weaken, and perhaps even disappear?  If the affected nations become economically
indistinguishable from other groups in American society, what then would be the goals
of American Indian law and policy?  Would there then even be a need for American
Indian law and policy?
I cannot imagine any questions more important.  They cannot be ignored, but they
must wait for another day.

